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Business journalism comes under persistent criticism for serving its historic 
readership of brokers and business people while lacking sufficient autonomy and failing 
to sufficiently question or challenge powerful corporate and economic interests.  This is a 
dominant theme in media criticism of the savings and loan crisis ⁠ and 2008 financial 
crisis. ⁠ Against this backdrop, this dissertation asks: Is this critique valid, and if so, how 
can business journalism improve? To engage these questions, this dissertation examines 
the question of autonomy in business journalism in an unlikely place: the trade press. The 
 
central case study is coverage of the savings and loan crisis by the National Thrift News, 
a small financial services newspaper that won a George Polk award for its reporting in 
1988. How could a small trade newspaper succeed in some instances when larger news 
organizations failed to connect the dots? The National Thrift News created a newsroom 
environment that celebrated reporter autonomy and independence. In some cases, it used 
its insider knowledge and consistent beat reporting to serve both its core readers and the 
broader society by uncovering savings and loan corruption.  
This study will highlight a long-running debate among theorists of journalistic 
professionalism by arguing that the commercial and advertising model in journalism does 
not inevitably compromise journalistic independence ⁠ but rather can help pave a way 
forward for a more independent press.  It therefore challenges the political economy 
critique of journalism, which holds that external forces such as capitalism harm press 
independence. This case suggests journalistic independence and individual agency remain 
powerful forces in newsrooms. Lastly, the dissertation argues that in an era of media 
downsizing, the trade press can perform an even more useful watchdog role over industry 
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John’s College in Annapolis. They have remained by supporters throughout this entire 
process. At St. John’s, Lise van Boxel and Jeff Black were among those who set very 
hard high standards of scholarship and pushed me  hard. That rigor served me well when 
I arrived at the University of Maryland, and met Sarah Oates, the director of graduate 
studies, who very quickly became a strong supporter of my project. Dr. Oates is a fine 
editor, an outstanding scholar, and a terrific human being. Kalyani Chadha helped me as I 
continued studying philosophy and theory. David Sicilia’s expertise in business and 
economic history has been central to this entire project. Mark Feldstein was a natural ally 
in the Merrill College. This dissertation began as a class paper in his journalism history 
seminar in the fall of 2014. Ira Chinoy helped not only on this project but also helped  
build my skills as a college instructor. He made business journalism a priority in the 
Merrill  College curriculum. Lucy Dalglish, the Merrill College dean, supported my 
application to the doctoral program and allowed me to teach my business journalism 
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Many accounts of the savings and loan crisis news coverage sharply criticized the 
press for failing to grasp the economic, political, and social consequences of growing 
bank failures in Texas, Florida, California, Arizona and elsewhere.1 These critics faulted 
the business press for failing to assert its independence or stand up to powerful 
institutions in society, such as banks, government regulators, and multinational 
corporations. While this criticism has been contested,2 it raises fundamental questions 
about the role of business journalism in society and its service to the general public. 
Embedded in this criticism is the expectation that business journalism must do more than 
serve its historic readership of brokers and businessmen.  
This dissertation examines this criticism by focusing on one of business 
journalism's unlikely success stories: a small mortgage trade industry newspaper, the 
National Thrift News. This little-known financial newspaper, with a peak circulation of 
15,863,3 performed several remarkable acts of journalism in the 1980s, including being 
                                                            
1 Sparrow, Bartholomew H., Uncertain Guardians. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999); Dealy, Francis X., The Power and the Money: Inside the Wall 
Street Journal. (Secaucus, N.J.: Carol Pub. Group, 1993); Kurtz, Howard. Media Circus. 
(New York: Times Books, 1993); McChesney, Robert. “The Problem of Journalism: A 
Political Economic Contribution to an Explanation of the Crisis in Contemporary US 
Journalism.” Journalism Studies 4, no. 3 (2003): 299–329; Starkman, Dean, The 
Watchdog That Didn’t Bark: The Financial Crisis and the Disappearance of 
Investigative Journalism. (New York: Columbia Journalism Review Books, 2014). 
2 Roush, Chris. “Unheeded Warnings.” American Journalism Review, January 
2009. http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=4668; Blinder, Alan. After The Music Stopped. 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2013). 
3 Peak circulation was in 1985. Standard Rate & Data Service. “SRDS Business 
Publication Advertising Source,” 1995. http://www.srds.com. 
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the first to report the Keating Five scandal in the savings and loan crisis.4 This was one of 
the iconic money and politics scandals of the 1980s. It involved five U.S. senators who 
took up the case of a wealthy campaign contributor, Charles Keating, and pressured 
federal banking regulators to ease enforcement of Keating’s troubled Lincoln Savings 
and Loan. The National Thrift News broke the Keating story far ahead of the competition, 
and for two years newspapers and television stations largely ignored this groundbreaking 
story, one of the key developments in a financial scandal that cost U.S. taxpayers $125 
billion to clean up. This dissertation focuses on the work of the National Thrift News and 
its editor and co-owner, Stan Strachan, but it places this work in the broader context of 
the problems and evolution of business journalism in this era. The National Thrift News 
is a worthy subject for study since this small newspaper excelled not only within the 
genre of trade journalism, but also within the broader field of journalism. For example, it 
won a George Polk Award for financial reporting in 1988 for its coverage of the savings 
and loan crisis. The close study of Strachan and his newspaper serve as a departure for a 
broader analysis of excellence in business journalism, through leadership, company 
ownership, and newsroom culture.  
One theme in this dissertation involves the news media’s power — how 
journalists use it and how the business community and the government can curtail it. The 
power of journalism is examined here through a core normative theory, examining the 
press as a “watchdog” or independent overseer of government and similar powerful 
                                                            
4 Ross, James. “When Trades Lead The Pack.” Columbia Journalism Review, 
November 1990. 
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institutions such as large corporations.5 These concepts originate from British 
philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke and former president James Madison and have 
been developed and discussed over America’s history.6 The National Thrift News’ 
reporting also is examined through this theory as well as the political economy theory, 
which holds that powerful forces in capitalism, such as large banks and influential 
advertisers, weaken the news media’s independent oversight role. Scholars have faulted 
business journalism for being overly reliant on corporate public relations officials,7as 
well as for adopting the viewpoints of government and corporate officials.8 This study of 
the National Thrift News puts all these issues of compromised autonomy in stark contrast. 
This small newspaper was economically reliant on the industry it covered. Its main 
sources of information came from savings and loan officials and regulators. Its editor was 
an industry insider. Despite all of this, the political economy theory failed to account for 
the behavior of the National Thrift News and this is a central question examined in the 
theory chapter. The newspaper conducted investigative reporting on the savings and loan 
crisis, which criticized powerful industry players and advertisers. This dissertation will 
                                                            
5 Siebert, Fred Seaton, Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, 
Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press 
Should Be and Do. (Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1956). 
6 For Burke, see Schultz, Julianne, Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, 
Accountability and the Media. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
Madison, James. “The Writings of James Madison.” (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1900). 
7 Kalogeropoulos, Antonis, Helle Mølgaard Svensson, Arjen van Dalen, Claes de 
Vreese, and Erik Albæk. “Are Watchdogs Doing Their Business? Media Coverage of 
Economic News.” Journalism, November 3, 2014; Manning, Paul. “Financial Journalism, 
News Sources and the Banking Crisis.” Journalism 14, no. 2 (2012): 173–89. 
8 Doyle, Gillian. “Financial News Journalism, A Post-Enron Analysis of 
Approaches towards Economic and Financial News Production in the UK.” Journalism 7, 
no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 433–52.; Schiffrin, Anya, ed., Bad News: How America’s 
Business Press Missed the Story of the Century (New York: The New Press, 2011); 
Starkman. The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark, 2014; Manning, Paul. “Financial Journalism, 
News Sources and the Banking Crisis.” 2012. 
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argue the National Thrift News did so because of a combination of institutional factors 
and the power of individual agency, supported by journalistic professional ideals and 
norms. In other words, journalistic autonomy and the watchdog ethos proved to be 
powerful forces in the National Thrift News culture. Simply put, it was “a reporter’s 
paper,” one where journalists can set the news agenda rather than the industry. That 
identity speaks to the importance of individual agency in the organization. Numerous 
former National Thrift News editors and reporters were interviewed for this dissertation, 
but it is not an in-depth anthropological examination of the newsroom culture. Instead, 
this dissertation explores individual agency through two case studies in order to make 
more generalizable claims about reporter autonomy. 
Critics contend the political economy theory’s emphasis on the influence of 
capitalism is overly deterministic. As a result, it fails to account for role of individual 
agency. This is where the dissertation contributes to a long-running debate in 
communications theory about commercialism and its influence on journalistic autonomy.  
Did the commercial turn in nineteenth century journalism compromise journalistic 
independence9 or pave a way forward for a more professional and independent press?10 
This dissertation will argue that journalistic norms such as impartiality and independence 
remain powerful forces in newsrooms. The newspaper’s coverage of the Keating Five 
and CenTrust cases, described in subsequent chapters, speaks to the enduring power of 
                                                            
9 McChesney. “The Problem of Journalism” 2003; Herman and Chomsky. 
Manufacturing Consent, 1988; Bagdikian, Ben H., The New Media Monopoly: A 
Completely Revised and Updated Edition With Seven New Chapters (Beacon Press, 
2004); Philo, Greg, Seeing and Believing: The Influence of Television, (London; New 
York: Routledge, 1990). 
10 Schudson, Michael, The Sociology of News, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011); 
Hallin, Daniel C. “Commercialism and Professionalism in the American News Media.” 
In Mass Media and Society, edited by James Curran and Michael Gurevitch, 3rd ed., 
218–37. London: Arnold, 2000. 
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the journalist's occupational ideology that can, in many cases, significantly challenge 
commercial influences over news production.11 The National Thrift News succeeded, 
based on this research, because publisher and editor Stan Strachan gave his reporters 
significant autonomy to pursue stories while Strachan also upheld journalistic ideals of 
watchdog reporting and professional ethical norms of journalistic independence. Mark 
Fogarty, the former National Thrift News editor who worked with Strachan for 13 years, 
recalled, “We would piss people off, with the kind of brand of journalism that we had. 
Sometimes people thought that we were a trade newspaper and that we kind of belonged 
to the industry. And you know, we didn't. We were quite independent.”12  One senior 
government official shared that view. Eugene Carlson, former communications director 
for the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, wrote after Strachan’s death: 
 
It is one thing for a well-heeled television network, general 
circulation magazine, or big city newspaper to broadcast or 
publish a story that might offend an advertiser…It is quite 
another matter for a relatively small trade newspaper to 
relentlessly and aggressively cover the industry whose 
advertising dollars comprise its very lifeblood.  But that's exactly 
the no-holds barred approach that Stan and his crew of reporters 
brought to their coverage of the mortgage industry. 13 
 
                                                            
11 Hallin, “Commercialism and Professionalism in the American News Media,” 
2000; Schudson, Michael. “The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism*,” Journalism 
2, no. 2 (August 1, 2001): 149–70; Breed, “Social Control in the Newsroom: A 
Functional Analysis,” Social Forces 33, no. 4, May 1955, 326–35; Waisbord, Silvio, 
Reinventing Professionalism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
12 Fogarty became editor after Strachan’s death in 1997. Fogarty, Mark. Interview 
with Mark Fogarty, October 24, 2014. 
 13  Carlson, Eugene, “An Industry Remembers Stan Strachan,” National Mortgage 
News, January 20, 1997. 
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As industry insiders, National Thrift News reporters gathered information from 
business executives in order to write critically about abuses in the field. Reporting on 
Charles Keating, for example, was a significant challenge given his tendency to file 
lawsuits against any perceived adversary, competitors, regulators, or the press. Keating at 
one point had retained 77 law firms and, by 1987, had spent $50 million fighting 
regulators.14 One example, a case that tested Strachan's journalistic independence, was 
his relationship with the chief executive Miami-based CenTrust Bank David Paul. Media 
accounts painted Paul as an iconic figure of 1980s greed and excess. St. Petersburg Times 
reported when Paul was convicted of fraud in 1993: 
Paul's lifestyle was seen as a symbol of the 1980s. He entertained 
Elizabeth Taylor on his yacht, gave to Democratic Party 
candidates and causes, jetted to Cannes to relax and surrounded 
himself with millions of dollars worth of Old Masters paintings, 
Oriental rugs, and Baccarat crystal. His income tax forms for the 
last five years of the '80s listed $17 million in income, but he 
estimated his net worth last year at minus $1.7-million. Joking or 
not, Paul listed his occupation on his 1990 tax return as 
"defendant."15 
 
The American Banker, writing as the major savings and loan prosecutions 
concluded in 1995, reported: " `This was south Florida's most notorious white collar 
criminal,’ said Cheryl Bell, the financial crimes coordinator in the Miami U.S. attorney's 
office. `It's safe to say that there is no greater S&L crook on the East Coast than Paul. 
                                                            
14 Jackson, Brooks, “Sleeping Watchdog: How Regulatory Error Led to the 
Disaster At Lincoln Savings--- Charles Keating Had History Of Alleged Abuse but Still 
Was Allowed to Run S&L --- Five Senators in His Camp,” The Wall Street Journal, 
November 20, 1989. 
15 n/a, “Former CenTrust Chief Paul Convicted,” St. Petersburg Times, November 
25, 1993. 
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You have Keating (Charles H. Keating, former president of Lincoln Savings and Loan) 
on the West Coast and Paul on the East.’ ”16  
Strachan's reporters discovered unflattering accounts of Paul and his management 
of CenTrust and Strachan printed those stories. Paul was sentenced to 11 years in prison 
and ordered to pay $65 million in restitution, slightly less than the punishment for 
Keating, who was sentenced to a 12-year prison term and assessed $122 million. The 
collapse of Paul’s CenTrust cost taxpayers an estimated $1.7 billion. The CenTrust study 
also revealed the gaps and shortfalls of the National Thrift News coverage. It was late in 
reporting some important stories, such as a pivotal settlement between Keating and 
federal regulators in 1988 and behind the competition in reporting on Keating’s efforts to 
sell Lincoln Savings. While my research finds much to commend for the newspaper’s 
coverage, I do not regard Strachan as a “great man” in journalism history. Former 
employees praised Strachan as a journalist and a human being, but they would agree with 
Muolo’s assessment that Strachan was simply doing his job as a professional journalist. 
Muolo observed, “He didn’t launch National Thrift News to be a crusading journalist. He 
launched it to be a good journalist.”17 
The dissertation makes an additional contribution to the field of journalism 
studies with an extensive discussion of the normative and historical origins of business 
journalism and the trade press,18 or publications designed to serve business readers. 
                                                            
16 Rhoads, Christopher, “Prosecutions of ’80s S&L Figures Winding Down,” The 
American Banker, January 10, 1995. 
17 Muolo, Paul, Second Interview with Paul Muolo, December 8, 2014. 
18 Quirt, John, The Press and the World of Money: How the News Media Cover 
Business and Finance, Panic and Prosperity, and the Pursuit of the American Dream, 
Byron, Calif,: Anton/California-Courier, 1993; Galbraith, John Kenneth, The Great 
Crash, 1929, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972; Parsons, Wayne, The Power of the 
Financial Press, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Endres, The 
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Fürsich, in a review of over 25 years of journalism research, called business journalism 
one of the areas least investigated by communication scholars.19 Yet business journalism, 
particularly the trade press, is a rich area for journalism scholars. Consider that a trade 
publication, Gleanings in Bee Culture, was first to report on the Wright Brothers’ flight 
in 1904.20 Very little research has been conducted about financial trade publications and 
their role in the savings and loan crisis. This finding was especially surprising given the 
size of this trade press genre. These niche publications collectively make up one of the 
largest and most influential segments of the American media industry. By one measure, 
the U.S. trade press in 2013 brought in $15.4 billion in print, digital, and data revenue, up 
3% from the year earlier.21  Trade press revenues were about one-quarter of the $63 
billion in U.S. news industry revenues, according to a 2014 Pew estimate.22  On this 
theme, Endres wrote:  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Trade, Industrial and Professional Periodicals of the United States, 1994; " Laib, Janet. 
“The Trade Press.” Public Opinion Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1955): 31–44; Fursich, Elfriede, 
“Nation, Capitalism, Myth: Covering News of Economic Globalization,” Journalism & 
Mass Communication Quarterly 79, no. 2 (2002): 353–73. 
19 Fursich, Elfriede, “Nation, Capitalism, Myth: Covering News of Economic 
Globalization,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 79, no. 2 (2002): 353–73.  
Fursich writes, “Despite the prominence of financial reporting, the genre seems to be one 
of the least investigated by communication scholars. A search of the last twenty-five 
years of US. media research found only a few studies investigating financial reporting.” 
20 n/a, “The First Reporter: ‘Dear Friends, I Have a Wonderful Story to Tell 
You...’” NOVA - Science Programming on Air and Online, September 2003. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/wright/reporter.html Thanks to Doug Cumming, 
Washington and Lee University, for this tip. 
21 Data are from the Association of Business Information & Media Companies, a 
trade association for the business-to-business and media information industry. See:  n/a, 
"Digital Ads Continue to Drive Industry Growth," The Association of Business 
Information & Media Companies, April 9, 2014, 
http://www.abmassociation.com/News/3288/Digital-ads-continu. 
22 Holcomb, Jesse, and Amy Mitchell, “The Revenue Picture for American 




It is unclear why the business press has not been studied as 
extensively as newspapers, broadcasting, advertising, public 
relations, or consumer magazines. It is older than many of these 
areas. It remains a lucrative branch of American journalism. It 
performs a service to the industries it covers.  23 
 
Trade newspapers, after all, are the foundation of modern business journalism.24 
Business journalism in the U.S. has evolved over the past 240 years from narrow 
commodity "price current" newspapers in South Carolina and New York to multi-
dimensional news outlets serving a general public such as The Wall Street Journal, 
Bloomberg News, and Reuters. The project will contribute to the journalistic literature by 
analyzing the normative foundations of the trade press, such as its intimate relationship 
with business, advocacy for capitalism, and will describe how those norms relate to 
contemporary criticism of business journalism. One important norm of trade publications 
involves educating industry officials to advance business growth.25 Trade publications 
suffer from a history of undue influence of advertisers in the editorial process.26 Trade 
                                                            
23 Endres, Kathleen, “Research Review: The Specialized Business Press” 4, no. 
2–4 (1994), http://www.cios.org/EJCPUBLIC/004/2/004211.html. 
24 Elfenbein, Julien, Business Journalism, Greenwood Press New York, 1969; 
Hollifield, C. Ann. “The Specialized Business Press and Industry-Related Political 
Communication: A Comparative Study,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 
74, no. 4 (1997): 757–72; Laib, Janet, “The Trade Press,” Public Opinion Quarterly 19, 
no. 1 (1955): 31–44. 
25 Gussow, Don, The New Business Journalism: An Insider’s Look at the 
Workings of America’s Business Press, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984; Endres, 
Kathleen, ed. The Trade, Industrial and Professional Periodicals of the United States, 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994. 
26 Hollifield, “The Specialized Business Press and Industry-Related Political 
Communication: A Comparative Study,” 1997; Ross, James, “When Trades Lead The 
Pack,” Columbia Journalism Review, November 1990; Gussow, The New Business 
Journalism, 1984. 
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and early business journalism were strong advocates of capitalism.27  Business journalism 
also fulfills a central role in capitalist markets as a provider of information and prices.28 
Markets need business news to operate effectively. The trade press also helps form 
communities in the business world and serves as a mechanism to link these communities 
to the broader public. 
Mainstream journalists have dismissed the trade press for failing to take a tough, 
watchdog stance in their reporting as well as for failing to frame their journalism in the 
broader context of society. The limited scholarship in this field shares this critical view.29 
Ross observed, "Trade publications have long been consigned to a netherworld 
somewhere between journalism and public relations.”30 Strachan was well aware of this 
reputation. “We were first in coverage of the disastrous collapse of the thrift industry. We 
pulled no punches in our reporting and played no favorites, actions that were considered 
unusual, if not unique, for a trade publication.”31 While general business news 
publications (those that serve both consumers and business people such as The Wall 
Street Journal and Fortune) have evolved from the trade press, they face similar 
criticism. Intellectual capture and excessive reliance on sourcing on the industry or 
                                                            
27 Steeples, Douglas, Advocate for American Enterprise: William Buck Dana and 
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 1865-1910, Greenwood Press, 2002; 
Starkman, The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark, 2014; Roush, Chris, Profits and Losses: 
Business Journalism and Its Role in Society, Marion Street Press, 2006. 
28 Elfenbein, Business Journalism, 1969; Quirt, The Press and the World of 
Money, 1993 
29 Hollifield, “The Specialized Business Press,” 1997; Laib, “The Trade Press,” 
1955. 
30 Ross, “When Trades Lead The Pack,” 1990. 
31 Strachan, Stanley, “Looking Back Over 20 Years,” National Mortgage News, 
October 7, 1996. 
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businesses covered remain significant problems for general business journalism.32 These 
are reasons critics cite when asserting business journalists failed to uncover key warning 
signs about major financial crises. Yet, this has generally been asserted without a careful 
study of what the trade press actually did in these situations. As described in subsequent 
chapters, the National Thrift News went beyond the normative boundaries of trade 
journalism with its investigative journalism that served the public in significant ways. 
Another example involved the National Thrift News providing a platform for the 
reporting of a book, Inside Job, which was one of the first detailed accounts of the 
national scope of the savings and loan crisis and one of the main works documenting 
criminal activity in the industry.33 
Lastly, this dissertation will seek to place the National Thrift News in an 
important moment in the evolution of business journalism. The 1970s witnessed a surge 
in both trade and general business journalism as business people and general readers 
sought to understand trends such as rampant inflation or the decline in U.S. 
manufacturing dominance.34 The National Thrift News epitomized this upswing in 
business journalism at this time. This dissertation breaks new ground by examining the 
financial trade press and its coverage of a major financial crisis. Trade journals, with their 
                                                            
32 Manning, “Financial Journalism, News Sources and the Banking Crisis,” 2012; 
Thompson, Peter A. “Invested Interests? Reflexivity, Representation and Reporting in 
Financial Markets,” Journalism 14, no. 2 (February 1, 2013): 208–27. 
33 Pizzo, Stephen, Mary Fricker, and Paul Muolo, Inside Job, New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1989. 
34 Judith Stein's Pivotal Decade: How The United States Traded Factories for 
Finance in the Seventies as well as Henry Kaufman's On Money and Markets were 
especially influential in setting the context for the upheaval in the U.S. economy and the 
growth of the U.S. bond and financial markets from the 1970s forward. See Stein, Judith, 
Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the 1970s, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010; Kaufman, Henry, On Money and Markets: A Wall 
Street Memoir, New York: McGraw Hill, 2000. 
 12 
detailed coverage of industries and access to decision makers, play an influential role in 
shaping coverage of mainstream media.35 Yet the trade press has been both largely 
ignored by academic researchers and not given respect by mainstream journalists. This 
dissertation also hopes to highlight how autonomy and occupational ideology empower 
business journalists to undertake investigative projects and perform a watchdog function 
over markets and corporations. Insights gleaned from studying media coverage of the 
savings and loan crisis, especially one of its rare media success stories, could help a new 
generation of business journalists better serve the public.  
The role of business journalism in society is not an abstract exercise; it a question 
is of vital public importance. Criticism of the media in the savings and loan crisis persists 
today as business journalists were accused of failing to warn the public and professional 
investors about the 2008 financial meltdown.36 The 2008 financial crisis led to a number 
of business journalism studies exploring the media’s coverage and its shortfalls.37 
Business journalism is playing a more important role for a modern society because 
regulators and other mechanisms are not protecting consumers' interests effectively.38 
Deregulation and financial innovation have caused significant market volatility since the 
                                                            
35 Hollifield, “The Specialized Business Press and Industry-Related Political 
Communication: A Comparative Study,” 1997 
36 Starkman, The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark, 2014; Schifferes, Steve, and 
Richard Roberts, The Media and Financial Crises: Comparative and Historical 
Perspectives, London: Taylor and Francis, 2015. 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1775338; Schiffrin, Bad News, 
2011; Stiglitz, Joseph E. Freefall : America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World 
Economy, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010. 
37 Tett, Gillian, “Silos and Silences Why so Few People Spotted the Problems in 
Complex Credit and What That Implies for the Future,” Financial Stability Review 15 
(July 2010); Schechter, Danny, “Credit Crisis: How Did We Miss It?” British Journalism 
Review 20, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 19–26; Schifferes and Roberts  The Media and 
Financial Crises, 2015; Manning, “Financial Journalism, News Sources and the Banking 
Crisis,” 2014. 
38 Stiglitz, Freefall, 2010 
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1980s.39 Consumers face risks of losing money in declining markets, but there was 
another more significant shift involving the rules of the investment game. Deregulation 
and a neoliberal mindset have reduced the government's role and shifted the burden to 
individual consumers who have to make retirement and investment decisions without 
corporate or governmental support, subjecting them to the market's whims. This is a 
manifestation of the "ownership society," an outgrowth of neoliberal ideology advanced 
by economist Friedrich Hayek and perfected by Milton Friedman,40 a worldview that 
firmly took hold in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan. One example is the shift 
from defined benefit pension plans, where an employer contributes to a worker's 
retirement plan, to a defined contribution plan, such as a 401(k), where workers have to 
weight market risks for themselves. 
This dissertation contributes to existing journalism scholarship by using the 
National Thrift News to examine questions of journalistic professionalism, autonomy, and 
independence that persist in business journalism.41 The dissertation will describe how 
consumers, average readers and regulators look to the news media to oversee the markets. 
                                                            
39 Burgin, Angus, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the 
Great Depression, Harvard University Press, 2012; Minsky, Hyman P, “‘The Financial 
Instability Hypothesis: A Restatement,’” in Can “It” Happen Again? New York: M.E. 
Sharpe Inc., 1982; Kaufman, On Money and Markets, 2000. 
40 Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 2012. 
41 McChesney, “The Problem of Journalism” 2003; Bagdikian, The New Media 
Monopoly, 2004; Thompson, Peter A, “Market Manipulation? Applying the Propaganda 
Model to Financial Media Reporting,” Westminster Papers in Communication & Culture 
6, no. 2 (November 2009): 73–96; Manning, “Financial Journalism, News Sources and 
the Banking Crisis,” 2012; Starkman, The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark, 2014; 
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It seeks to build on an ongoing conversation about ways to improve business journalism 
and have it evolve and protect the public good.42 
Plan	of	the	Dissertation	
This dissertation has three general parts: theory, history, and content analysis. 
After an introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines media theories of journalistic 
professionalism and its impact on journalistic independence and accountability reporting. 
The idea of the independent and autonomous journalist is central to journalistic 
professional identity. This literature will describe how journalists can maintain autonomy 
in the face of powerful interests, but also how they can fall short of this goal. To this end, 
the chapter considers the political economy theory and commercialism in journalism, 
which arose in the mid-nineteenth century. Commercialism brought new conflicts to 
journalism, with advertisers and other major businesses seeking to plant favorable stories 
or suppress critical articles. Yet other theorists viewed commercialism in a far more 
favorable light. They argue it helped secure financial independence for newspapers and 
cleared the way for a more independent press. This debate over commercialism is urgent 
in business journalism, which has a legacy of being cozy with advertisers. Equally 
concerning, however, is the persistent criticism that the news agenda of business 
journalism is shaped by market and business experts. Even though journalism is supposed 
to be independent of established elites, business journalists rely heavily on economists, 
corporate leaders, and senior government officials as news sources, and their capitalist-
friendly worldview too often is reflected in news coverage.  
                                                            
42 Henriques, Diana, “What Journalists Should Be Doing About Business 
Coverage - But Aren’t,” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 5, no. 2 (Spring 
2000): 118–21. 
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Chapter 3 will examine the normative origins of business journalism and will 
include an extensive discussion about the identity and definitions of business journalism. 
There is considerable confusion about how to distinguish between general-interest 
business news and news for trade or specialized audiences. This chapter will critique 
earlier attempts to define business journalism based on content, which fail to account for 
the hybrid nature of modern business journalism. It will embrace the more modern view 
of business journalism as a type of social construct, which aligns with contemporary 
definitions of journalism at large. To clarify these definitional issues, the chapter 
examines the origins of business journalism back to the sixteenth century “price current” 
publications for European commodity merchants and traders. From its very beginnings, 
business journalism has been an essential component of capitalism, and this tradition is 
carried on to this day in the trade press, the publications designed to serve businesses and 
assist with their evolution. The commercial conflicts described in the prior theory chapter 
come into sharp view in the trade press. Yet business journalism has evolved and now is 
attempting to serve a much broader audience of general readers.  
Chapter 4 builds on the discussion of norms and will examine how modern 
journalism evolved in the twentieth century. Business journalism began to serve broader 
audiences after World War I as more individuals began investing in the stock markets. At 
the same time, corporations were changing. Companies were being run by a new 
managerial class, which needed more interpretive and analytical reporting on business 
issues. As the consumer society exploded after World War II, many readers began 
demanding news to help them navigate investment decisions. As business journalism 
spread to general interest media platforms such as mass distribution newspapers and 
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television, the conflicts inherent in the trade press  - its reliance on official business 
sources and its relationship to the industry it covers - became more apparent. Business 
journalism faced new demands from its readers, but critics found it failed to serve as a 
watchdog over businesses and markets.  
Chapter 4 also traces the evolution of major economic trends since the 1950s and 
summarizes the financial, regulatory, economic, technological, and cultural developments 
that led to the savings and loan crisis. The economic and regulatory causes were 
intertwined. The financial markets faced significant disruption due to the rise in 
technology and globalization, such as the U.S. decision to drop the gold standard for its 
currency. The regulatory framework for savings and loans was under intense challenge 
due to these economic challenges and a rise in neoliberal ideology, with its push for a 
smaller government and fewer regulations. The deregulatory trend helped feed the 
growing reckless business decisions by savings and loan executives. The chapter 
examines weakness in the general business journalism and its coverage of the savings and 
loan crisis, such as an inability to see a national crisis arising from events in Texas, 
Arizona, Florida, and California. The chapter concludes with a historical overview of the 
National Thrift News, including details of its business plan and a profile of Strachan’s 
professional career. 
Chapter 5 is a content analysis of media coverage of Charles Keating and Lincoln 
Savings, which examines the National Thrift News, American Banker, The Wall Street 
Journal, and The New York Times from 1986 through 1990. One key finding is the 
National Thrift News defied trade press norms in its savings and loan crisis coverage, 
particularly in the Keating Five reporting. This finding challenges behavior that otherwise 
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would be predicted by the political economy theory. In several ways, the National Thrift 
News delivered much better journalism about the savings and loan crisis than larger 
publications, such as The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. Its reporting 
highlighted problems with regulation and warned about the expensive consequences to 
taxpayers. The National Thrift News did fall short in some aspects, however, and missed 
a few opportunities to better explain Keating’s misdeeds to the public. 
Chapter 6 is the second content analysis chapter and it focuses on media coverage 
of David L. Paul and his CenTrust Savings Bank in Miami.  It includes a content analysis 
of the 516 articles between 1984 and 1993 of National Thrift News, The New York Times, 
The Wall Street Journal, American Banker, and the St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times. This case 
study examines the relationship between Strachan and Paul as well as the articles about 
CenTrust printed in the National Thrift News, and so it tests the narrative of Strachan’s 
reputation for journalistic independence. The research finds National Thrift News carried 
adequate coverage of the CenTrust case since the newspaper discovered and reported on 
unflattering behavior about Paul. But the paper was not the first with key developments.  
Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the National Thrift News’ impact on the 
savings and loan coverage and its importance in the history of business journalism. The 
National Thrift News was both ignored and celebrated by the mainstream press. The 
newspaper's work on the Keating Five scandal gained little traction initially, yet after the 
collapse of the Charles Keating banking empire, media critics hailed the National Thrift 
News for its foresight. This episode shows the National Thrift News served a traditional 
trade press role as an insider channel of communication. One of the newspaper’s greatest 
impacts on the savings and loan coverage was through its supporting role to the 
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journalists who wrote the bestselling book, Inside Job, authored by reporters writing for 
National Thrift News. The book drew critical acclaim for documenting the influence of 
organized crime in the savings and loan industry. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the urgency of business journalism and the need to improve business 
reporting skills.   
Research	Questions	
 This dissertation seeks to uncover the practices, values, and work methods of the 
National Thrift News and see what lessons it can provide to the broader journalism 
community. This dissertation will seek to explore the following research questions: 
RQ 1: How did the National Thrift News' reporting on the savings and loan 
crisis differ from mainstream and general interest business publications? 
This question examines the basic operations and newsroom management of the 
National Thrift News to understand how it was able to win the Polk award and scoop 
larger competitors on the Keating Five story. To examine these questions, the dissertation 
will include a case study of two episodes in the S&L crisis to explore the impact and 
contribution, if any, of the National Thrift News in the savings and loan media coverage. 
As described more fully in the methodology section, the research project will conduct a 
content analysis of the National Thrift News coverage of the Keating Five episode and 
compare it to coverage in The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and the 
American Banker. A second content analysis will involve the National Thrift News 
coverage of CenTrust and compare it to the Times, Journal, American Banker, and St. 
Petersburg Times, a major regional newspaper that closely covered CenTrust. 
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RQ 2: How did the National Thrift News' status as a trade publication help or 
hurt its reporting on the savings and loan crisis? How did the National Thrift News' 
reporting on the savings and loan crisis align with or defy standard norms of trade 
journalism?  
Strachan's reputation as an industry expert and his friendships with senior industry 
officials allowed his reporters to gain access to people and events ahead of other 
journalists. This will examine how the National Thrift News used that access and insider 
knowledge to advance its reporting on the Keating Five, David Paul, CenTrust, and 
Inside Job projects. It will also examine how such stories either fit with, or departed, 
from trade press norms at the time.43  
RQ 3: What was the impact, if any, of the National Thrift News' reporting on 
the savings and loan crisis? 
The impact of the National Thrift News appears mixed. Respected in the industry, 
the paper's achievements were largely ignored by the media. It broke the Keating 
influence peddling scandal story in 1987, two years ahead of the competition. The 
newspaper began to gain recognition for that story only from fellow mainstream 
journalists after Keating's savings and loan collapsed.44  
In examining these cases, the dissertation research project will also examine if 
there was any evidence of advertiser backlash or boycotts of the National Thrift News as 
a result of its reporting. One fundamental norm of journalism involves a publication's 
independence and autonomy from the subject covered. This tension is highlighted in 
                                                            
43 See Chapter 2, What is Business Journalism and Chapter 4, History and Norms, 
for a discussion of trade press norms. 
44 The New York Times (Quinn, 1990), Newsweek (Martz, 1990), and Columbia 
Journalism Review (Ross, 1990) recognized the National Thrift News achievements. 
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trade journalism, where publications typically are reliant on a single industry as a source 
of advertising and subscription revenue and face criticism of compromising their 
journalism to advance commercial goals. 
RQ 4: What does a critical, autonomous business press look like? 
The Lincoln Savings and CenTrust case studies allow us to compare coverage of 
the savings and loan crisis and see where the newspapers succeeded and failed to provide 
readers with early warnings about the emerging problems at these thrifts. When did the 
newspapers provide valuable context about daily developments and when did they simply 
rely on the company’s press release and their version of events? These case studies will 
provide empirical data to answer the broader question of how we get good journalism on 
business matters. 
Methods	and	Research	Strategy	
This dissertation uses qualitative and quantitative content analysis to examine 
news media coverage of two major figures in the savings and loan crisis, Charles Keating 
and Lincoln Savings and Loan, and David Paul and CenTrust Savings Bank. Content 
analysis allows the exploration of rhetoric, narratives, discourses, images, norms, and 
customs in a wide variety of communications, including newspaper articles. Neuendorf 
described content analysis as "a systematic, objective, quantifiable analysis of message 
characteristics.”45 It can also be used for interpretative analysis, conversation analysis, 
critical analysis and normative analysis. Bernard Berleson, one of the giants of this field, 
described content analysis is an “objective, systematic and quantitative description of the 
                                                            
45 Neuendorf, Kimberly A, The Content Analysis Guidebook, SAGE, 2002, 5. 
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manifest content of communication.”46 It is useful for business journalism to analyze 
issues such as sourcing and story selection, inquiries that would help illuminate the 
complex relationship between business journalists and the businesses and markets they 
cover. In reviewing the manifest content, this dissertation also employs the historical 
method of mass communications research and a focus on evidence, interpretation, and 
narrative.47 Additional insights were gained by employing the method of triangulation – 
analyzing the interviews against the articles, archival documents, historical record, and 
vice versa – to place events in proper context.  
Primary sources included articles and editorials in the National Thrift News and 
interviews with 20 journalists, associates, and friends of the National Thrift News editor 
Stan Strachan. Strachan's daughter, Hillary Wilson, is his sole surviving relative and 
provided access to her family's records and photographs. Former associate editor Paul 
Muolo also provided access to some personal records. An extensive legal case file 
describing litigation over ownership of the National Thrift News provided early financial 
details of the newspaper and many operational details, such as the business plan and 
internal memoranda. Many standard sources of information for an institutional history, 
such as internal company records and memos, have either been lost or destroyed.48 Other 
sources included video interviews and transcripts of Strachan, Muolo, and correspondent 
Stephen Pizzo discussing their work on national television or at academic seminars. 
                                                            
46 Berelson, Bernard, Content Analysis in Communication Research, (New York: 
American Book-Stratford Press Inc., 1952). 
47 Startt, James D,, and William David Sloan, Historical Methods in Mass 
Communication, (Vision Press, 2003); Lucht, Tracy L, “Sylvia Porter: Gender, Ambition, 
and Personal Finance Journalism, 1935-1975,” (Doctoral dissertation, 2007). 
48 Company memos and financial records from 1976-1979 survived as exhibits in 
litigation, Rollo v. Glynn, a lawsuit contesting ownership of the newspaper. This material 
is discussed in Ch. 2. “Thomas Rollo v. John Glynn et al. 020079-1982,” (New York 
State Supreme Court, August 11, 1982). 
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Transcripts from Strachan appearances on CNN, for example, were examined. The 
historical research relied heavily on numerous books about the era, the journalist 
interviews, as well as newspapers articles. Details of the content analysis structure, 
definitions, and typologies are in Appendix 1. 
On the topic of newspapers, a brief discussion about the research into the National 
Thrift News is in order. National Thrift News changed its name twice: in June 1989, to 
National Thrift and Mortgage News, and in April 1990, to National Mortgage News, 
which is its current name. Strachan remained part owner and publisher the entire time. To 
eliminate confusion, I use the publication’s original title, National Thrift News, 
throughout the entire dissertation. I encountered substantial logistical challenges gaining 
access to physical or microfilmed copies of the newspaper. Lexis-Nexis carries the 
National Thrift News from 1985 forward; the first nine years of publication are only on 
physical media. The New York Public Library is the sole owner in the public domain of 
the National Thrift News microfilm; no other public or university libraries in the United 
States or Canada list physical holdings of this publication. The New York Public Library 
would not provide microfilm to the University of Maryland via inter-library loan, and so I 
traveled to New York four separate times to read back issues and make copies. 
SourceMedia Inc. is the publication’s current owner and I am grateful to the editors of 
SourceMedia for generously granting me access to the bound editions of the newspaper 
in its New York offices in the summer of 2015. SourceMedia officials were unable to 
locate the business records of the National Thrift News prior to 1995. The company was 





























This dissertation will make a contribution to journalism scholarship where there is 
scant literature on business journalism and the trade press, particularly on the issues of 
journalistic professionalism and reporting autonomy. The dissertation will illuminate a 
long-running debate on theories of journalistic autonomy and the media's oversight of 
governmental and business interests. It will examine a central normative theory about 
journalism, its role as an independent watchdog over government and powerful private 
interests. Edmund Burke in 1787 conceived of the press as a “Fourth Estate,” an idea 
later refined and advanced by former U.S. President James Madison.49  This public 
service and oversight ideal is a foundational principle in the Society of Professional 
Journalists’ code of ethics in 1909.50 
There are, of course, many examples of the news media failing to live up to this 
ideal, and a prime example involved the media coverage of the savings and loan crisis.51 
A 1993 federal commission that studied the savings and loan disaster, the National 
Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, said the news 
media’s weak coverage of the crisis did not serve the public. Commission member Elliott 
H. Levitas, a former U.S. Representative from Georgia, observed:  
 
                                                            
49 For Burke, see Schultz, Julianne, Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, 
Accountability and the Media, (Cambridge University Press, 1998); Madison, “The 
Writings of James Madison,” 1900. 
50 “SPJ Code of Ethics,” Society of Professional Journalists, Accessed September 
24, 2014. http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp. 
51 See Sparrow, Uncertain Guardians, 1999; McChesney, “The Problem of 
Journalism” 2003. 
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Nothing becomes an issue in Washington until made so by the 
news media. The collapse of the S&L industry was like a series 
of trees falling in the forest with no one to hear. The news media 
did not hear and made hardly a sound. Reporters now readily 
admit that they missed one of the biggest stories of the century. 
The story was missed because the news media have grown 
accustomed to being spoon-fed news.52 
 
Other top financial industry leaders voiced disappointment. The founder of 
Vanguard Group of mutual funds, John Bogel, in 1996 urged the financial news media to 
re-dedicate itself as an industry watchdog and to heighten its scrutiny of the mutual fund 
business. “A probing, thoughtful, activist press, combined with tough regulatory policies, 
can play a huge role in making a difference,” Bogel wrote.53  
One common explanation for this failure comes from the political economy 
theory tradition of media studies, which asserts that journalists lack the autonomy needed 
to challenge powerful corporate and economic interests.54 Critics contend that newspaper 
publishers will weaken or suppress reporting that could otherwise anger companies and 
compel them to stop advertising in the newspaper.55  These commercial pressures, critics 
                                                            
52 National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement, July 1993, 87 
53 Bogel, John, “Vanguard Chairman Urges Mutual Fund Industry To Return to 
Its Traditional Principles,” November 11, 1996. 
54 McChesney, “The Problem of Journalism,” 2003.  
Thompson, Peter A, “Market Manipulation? Applying the Propaganda Model to 
Financial Media Reporting,” Westminster Papers in Communication & Culture 6, no. 2 
(November 2009): 73–96; Manning, “Financial Journalism, News Sources and the 
Banking Crisis,” 2012; Starkman, The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark, 2014. 
55 Gerald J. Baldasty, The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Century 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992); Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929. 
1972; Starkman, The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark, 2014. 
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say, are even more pronounced in business journalism, which is rooted in the capitalist 
free market system.56 
While the political economy theory remains an important explanatory framework, 
it does not account for key findings from the National Thrift News content analysis. The 
dissertation will show how the National Thrift News stood up to powerful economic 
interests with its investigative reporting on the Keating and Lincoln Savings story and its 
reporting on the Paul and CenTrust stories. Political economy theorists would predict 
such a trade newspaper, wholly dependent on the financial services industry for 
advertising revenue, would be highly reluctant to challenge these powerful Wall Street 
firms. This chapter will explore a possible explanation for this theoretical shortfall: the 
political economy theory fails to account for individual agency, such as cases where 
individual reporters challenge powerful companies and government officials. A review of 
history offers other significant cases where business-oriented publications challenged 
their core advertisers and readers such as The Wall Street Journal’s 1954 showdown with 
General Motors Co.57 General Motors had boycotted The Wall Street Journal in a dispute 
over the paper's coverage, but the newspaper stood its ground and refused to retract or 
apologize for its reporting, and the carmaker eventually backed down.58 The record of the 
National Thrift News can be best explained by a historical and sociological analysis of 
                                                            
56 This argument is described in Chapter 3. 
57 Other notable cases of business reporting challenging powerful interests would 
be Ida Tarbell’s coverage of Standard Oil in McClure’s magazine in 1905; The Louisville 
Courier-Journal’s 1967 reporting on the ravages of strip mining for coal, which won a 
Pulitzer prize; The St. Louis Globe-Democrat’s Pulitzer Prize winning investigation in 
1968 of meat packing plants, which led to passage of new federal laws. See “Pulitzer 
Prizes in Business Journalism,” American History of Business Journalism, April 2013. 
http://www.ahbj.org/awards/03312013pulitzer-prizes-in-business-journalism/. 
58 Tofel, Richard J. Restless Genius: Barney Kilgore, the Wall Street Journal, and 
the Invention of Modern Journalism, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009). 
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journalistic professionalism, which emphasized the role of reporter and editor autonomy. 
Schudson and Hallin, for example, argue the political economy theory does not account 
for innovation and agency in a dynamic market economy.59 In addition, the indexing 
hypothesis of media communications, where the media tend to follow the viewpoints 
expressed by government and business leaders, serves as a useful framework to explain a 
key finding in the media coverage of Keating and Paul.  
Watchdog	and	Autonomy	
The normative role of the press as a watchdog over the government and powerful 
interests is a central aspect of journalistic professionalism and its public service ideal. 
Cynthia Mitchell cited Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant as examples of democratic 
theorists who described a "principle of publicity"60 that emphasized transparency and 
disclosure to keep political and economic institutions in check.61 Burke believed the press 
held vast power to oversee government; he equated the press to a house of parliament.62 
Madison also saw the press as an independent institution overseeing government, one 
                                                            
59 Schudson, The Sociology of News, 2011; Siebert, Four Theories of the Press, 
1956. 
60 The underpinning of the watchdog credo, the “public’s right to know,” has 
roots in the Enlightenment philosophers. Kant described publicity as “a transcendental 
concept of public right… All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong 
if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public.” See Kant, Immanuel, 
“Perpetual Peace,” In Kant: Political Writings, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 126; Splichal, Slavko, Public Opinion, (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1999), 21. “Kant conceived of publicity as a moral principle and legal norm, as an 
“instrument” to achieve both individuals’ independent reasoning and legal order in the 
social realm.” See Splichal, Public Opinion, 1999, 21. 
61 Mitchell, Cynthia, “Checking Financial Power: Newspaper Coverage of the 
New York Stock Exchange’s Bid to Control the Ticker, June 1889,” American 
Journalism 27, no. 1 (2010): 37–65. 
62 Schultz, Julianne, Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability and 
the Media, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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with the "right of freely examining public characters and measures.”63 Paul Starr wrote 
the U.S. government at its inception created mechanisms to enable the press to evolve as 
an autonomous institution. "From the founding of the republic, the federal government 
had given the press constitutional guarantees, postal subsidies and other benefits that 
enabled newspaper, book and magazine publishing to become economically as well as 
formally independent of the state and political parties.”64 These concepts were contained 
in Fred Siebert’s "social responsibility theory" of the press. Siebert described these roles 
as the press servicing the political system; enlightening the public to facilitate self-
government; serving as a watchdog over the government; providing entertainment; and 
maintaining financial self-sufficiency to be free from special interests.65 Another part of 
Siebert's theory, the libertarian model, also addressed a watchdog norm, arguing the press 
is an instrument to check on the government’s vast powers.  
Scholars such as Michael Schudson and Daniel Hallin regard autonomy as a 
foundational element of the journalistic professional identity.66 Morten Skovsgaard wrote 
autonomy is core to the public’s trust in journalists, and underpins the notion that 
journalists will provide the public with the unbiased information they need to participate 
                                                            
63 Madison, James, “The Writings of James Madison,” (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1900). 
64 Starr, Paul, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern 
Communications, (New York: Perseus Books, 2004), 394. 
65 Siebert, Four Theories of the Press, 1956. 
66 Schudson cites other elements of journalistic identity as accuracy, objectivity, 
and serving the public as a watchdog over the government and business interests. 
Schudson, Michael, Discovering The News: A Social History of Newspapers, (New York: 
BasicBooks, 1978); Hallin, Daniel C, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 64. 
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in a democracy.67  Mark Deuze wrote that journalistic autonomy and public service (with 
journalists serving as watchdogs) are two of the five ideologies that define journalism.68 
The standard narrative about professionalism is it provided the autonomy and ethical 
foundation for journalists. The Society of Professional Journalists, founded at DePauw 
University in 1909 (originally as Sigma Delta Chi), has an ethical code that describes 
journalists as independent and truthful, free from commercial and political ties.69 A 
related argument is the concept of journalistic objectivity — the ideal that reporters are 
nonpartisan observers and will present neutral accounts of news events — works in 
tandem to support autonomy. Schudson and C.W. Anderson wrote, “objectivity acts as 
both a solidarity enhancing and distinction-creating norm and as a group claim to possess 
a unique kind of professional knowledge.”70   
Autonomy remains a vital aspect of journalists’ identity today. Edward Epstein, in 
his analysis of autonomy, described the reporter as an outsider. He quoted Reuven Frank, 
an executive producer for NBC News, as saying, “News is change as seen by an outsider 
                                                            
67 Skovsgaard, Morten, “Watchdogs on a Leash? The Impact of Organisational 
Constraints on Journalists’ Perceived Professional Autonomy and Their Relationship 
with Superiors,” Journalism 15, no. 3 (April 1, 2014): 344–63. 
68 Deuze's five ideologies are: 1) Public service: journalists provide a public 
service. 2) Objectivity: journalists are impartial, neutral, objective, fair, and thus credible; 
3) Autonomy: journalists must be autonomous, free, and independent in their  
work; 4) Immediacy: journalists have a sense of immediacy, actuality, and speed 
(inherent in the concept of 'news'); 5) Ethics: journalists have a sense of ethics, validity, 
and legitimacy. See, Deuze, Mark, “What Is Journalism? Professional Identity and 
Ideology of Journalists Reconsidered,” Journalism 6, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): 442–64. 
69 “SPJ Code of Ethics,” Society of Professional Journalists, Accessed September 
24, 2014, http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp. 
70 As an aside, many contemporary journalists (myself included) believe this ideal 
is dated and flawed, and instead strive for a more realistic standard of fairness. On 
objectivity, see: Anderson, C.W., and Michael Schudson. “Objectivity, Professionalism, 
and Truth Seeking in Journalism,” In Handbook of Journalism Studies, edited by Karin 
Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch, (New York: ICA Handbook Series, Routledge, 
2008). 
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on behalf of other outsiders.”71 The outsider status helps preserve their autonomy. Zvi 
Reich summarized key elements of journalistic autonomy as "the freedom from 
interference, domination, and regulation” and "the ability of news people to criticize 
various individual and collective actors” as well as the extent to which the press can 
‘‘fulfill its duty of informing the citizenry, free from partisan bias and other corrupting 
influences.’’72 This reflects a finding in the interviews with National Thrift News 
journalists, who all said they had independence to pursue reporting without any 
commercial interference. 
Numerous commentators discuss how the commercial aspects of journalism 
compromise claims to autonomy.73 One crucial factor defines the relationship: in our 
modern media environment, journalists are employees of profit-making enterprises. The 
final authority over their work product rests with their employers. The classic professions 
of medicine and law once granted practitioners considerable autonomy over their work 
product,74 although this professional independence has eroded today amid increased 
competition and greater citizen access to technical information in these fields. Silvio 
Waisbord wrote that all professions, not just journalism, generally are in a permanent 
flux, subject to social processes, and this undermines claims to autonomy.75 He called for 
a more subtle understanding of journalistic autonomy, saying the press can never be fully 
                                                            
71 Epstein, Edward Jay, News from Nowhere, (New York: Random House LLC, 
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separate or insulated from the broader political and economic forces of society. In fact, 
Waisbord wrote, journalism could be seen as more sensitive to commercial and 
bureaucratic considerations given its links to elites. 
There has never been an explicit watchdog role spelled out for the business 
press,76 yet many commentators generally assumed journalism's public service ideal also 
applies to financial news. Cynthia Mitchell provided an example of market watchdog role 
in her analysis of early media coverage of the powerful New York Stock Exchange, or 
NYSE.77 In the culmination of a long-running fight over ownership of valuable financial 
information, the NYSE in June 1889 refused to let stock ticker services transmit stock 
prices over telegraph to clients. Mitchell's examination of New York newspaper coverage 
of this fight between the NYSE and the ticker services found: 
…Many of the stories had a surprisingly critical slant and the 
majority went far beyond merely parroting the NYSE's official 
statements…The leading New York newspapers clearly viewed 
themselves as a watchdog, protecting the public against what it 
viewed as economic powers that could do it harm if left to their 
own devices.78  
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Regulators have long championed the watchdog role of the press, describing it as 
a tool to help police the markets. This fit within the legal literature, which regards the 
press as an extra-legal form of market enforcement.79 For example, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission enforcement staff closely reads the business press for tips about 
corporate and market misdeeds.80 Former Securities and Exchange Commission 
Chairman Christopher Cox in 2006 spoke about the media’s role in helping the markets: 
"A thriving media debate is vital to a healthy economy. 
Journalists play a critical watchdog role in curbing corruption. 
More broadly, our entire system of publicly owned and traded 
enterprises depends on the free flow of information.”81  
 
Indeed, the SEC has policy papers that describe how the news media coverage can 
assist their enforcement efforts: “Effective journalism complements the Commission's 
efforts to ensure that investors receive the full and fair disclosure that the law requires, 
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and that they deserve. Diligent reporting is an essential means of bringing securities law 
violations to light and ultimately helps to deter illegal conduct.”82   
M.J. Borden said business journalism can help address inherent weaknesses in 
corporate law. The publicity function of business journalism is an extra-legal means of 
enforcement that can help remedy failures in the marketplace. Borden wrote, “Journalists 
can catalyze both legal process and market responses to corporate wrongdoing.”83 The 
business press can spark regulatory action. "By calling attention to the misdeeds of 
corporate directors and officers, the press can initiate various sorts of corrective 
responses, whether judicial, legislative, administrative, or market-imposed."84 Michael 
Klausner wrote how news articles on business frauds and other wrongdoing reinforce 
professional norms by motivating good corporate governance.85 Others note how 
journalism can pressure corporate managers and directors to behave in ways that are 
socially acceptable.  Critical articles about their conduct can damage corporate 
executives’ reputations in the eyes of shareholders, future employees, family, friends, and 
the public at large. As Alexander Dyck wrote, “Reputational penalties can be long-
lasting."86  
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Borden also argued business journalists have both financial and career incentives 
to ferret out fraud in companies. In the most extraordinary cases, top business journalists 
found rewards in significant book and movie deals. For example, Bethany McLean, the 
former Fortune magazine writer who helped uncover the Enron Corp. accounting 
scandal, received a $1.4 million book advance with co-author Peter Elkind for their 
account of the Enron collapse, “Smartest Guys in the Room.”87 The book was turned into 
a documentary movie. While such lucrative arrangements are rare, business journalists 
also enjoy greater professional stature for uncovering corporate misdeeds. Borden wrote, 
“Financial journalists actually enjoy a convergence of their self-interest in career gains 
and the public's interest in managerial integrity and shareholder wealth maximization. 
Indeed, journalists have more incentive than ever to perform this function.”88  
Commercialism	
Any examination of journalistic autonomy will need to address commercialism in 
journalism, the economic force underpinning the concerns about conflicts of interest and 
compromised autonomy. Historian Gerald Baldasty wrote, "Industrialization changed the 
way in which commerce was conducted and made advertisers a major constituency of the 
American press.”89 Newspapers in the penny press era starting in 1830s began shifting to 
an advertising-based revenue model, which led to criticism that the business community 
was impeding on journalistic independence and dictating what is and is not news. As 
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tales emerge of newspapers' favoritism towards advertisers, newsrooms began to 
differentiate between the separation of the "church" and the "state" inside news 
organizations or separation of editorial from advertising.90 To others, the commercial turn 
represented a path towards journalistic independence, since private sector advertising 
allowed newspapers to be financially independent from the government. For this reason, 
Joseph Pulitzer viewed advertising as a pathway to journalistic autonomy. Paul Starr 
wrote, “Pulitzer's equation – 'circulation means advertising, and advertising means 
money, and money means independence ' – captured the potential relationship between 
commercial success and editorial autonomy.”91  
One narrative in journalism history traced a growing independence of the press in 
tandem with the expansion of the commercial advertising model. By the late 1800s, the 
press became a more independent source of power and began providing more 
independent commentary on events, according to this viewpoint. Hallin described about 
the British "Whig interpretation of media history," which held that the increased 
commercial value of newspapers allowed them to shake off government control.92 Hallin 
wrote, “The development of commercial media markets in the nineteenth century, 
according to the interpretation, permitted the differentiation of media from political 
structures, and their reconstitution as independent structures increasingly central to the 
process by which public opinion was formed.”93 Altick shared this view: "Not until the 
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nineteenth century was decades old would the increasing value of newspapers as 
advertising mediums allow them gradually to shake off government or party control and 
to become independent voices of public sentiment.”94 
To this point, consider McClure's magazine and its decision to finance Ida 
Tarbell's remarkable investigative series on John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil and its 
political influence. McClure estimated each of Tarbell's 15 Standard Oil articles cost 
$4,000 in expenses and salary at the time.95 In 2015 dollars, this would be about 
$106,400 per article, meaning a 15-article series would cost about $1.6 million today.96 
Starr made the connection between the quality of journalism and the rising wealth and 
autonomy of journalism in that era. "No publisher could have afforded that investment 
without the mass circulations then achievable under conditions created by cheap second-
class mail rates, lower production costs, and a growing middle-class audience.”97 
Newspapers financed through the private market would, in theory, make them 
independent and beyond authoritarian government press controls.98  
Political	Economy	Critiques	of	Journalistic	Independence	
The political economy theory has the potential for explaining the many flaws in 
business journalism coverage identified in the literature. This dissertation examines the 
institutional tradition of the political economy theory, which Vincent Mosco defines as a 
school that “documents how large media companies can control the production and 
distribution of media products and, by doing so, restrict the diversity of content, 
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specifically by keeping out work that challenges pro-business views.” 99 These theorists 
make important contributions to media scholarship by arguing capitalism and corporate 
power offer significant financial incentives, create a hegemony of ideas, and harm press 
independence.100 Put another way, they argue private interests trump the public interest.  
The political economy theory is a macroscopic theory involving the basic 
relationships between man and society. The main ideas of the institutional tradition 
involve a concern about inequality and what the theorists see as a direct link between 
economic ownership and dissemination of messages that affirm the elite’s power in a 
class society. These theorists assert that governments and corporations exert their power 
indirectly -- they don’t rule by overt coercion but they rule by consent. In their view, the 
audience can be manipulated and processed like any commodity. Some of its guiding 
ideas involve an interpretive perspective, or a study of social behavior as a way for 
understanding how people create meaning and shape reality. It also adopts 
constructionism, or the view that society is a construct rather than a fixed reality, and the 
media provide materials for construction of reality.  
Karl Marx and his materialist theory of history provided the foundation for the 
political economy theory.101 One of Marx’s great intellectual contributions was his focus 
on the economic life of humans as central to society’s formation and existence. This 
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supports a central point for this dissertation: the economy cannot be separated from 
history. By extension, business news cannot be separated from mainstream journalism. 
Marx asserted that broader economic and material forces shape individual consciousness: 
“The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the 
same time over the means of mental production.”102 Marx asserted individual rights and 
aspirations are subordinated to broader economic priorities; the individual has interests 
imposed on them. Through this, Marx sees a predestination of class; the state and 
individual ruling classes assert common interests. These are valuable warnings, but here 
we see the seeds of Marx minimizing human agency, spirituality, and other aspects of 
individualism.  
Still, Marx’s ideas are enormously useful and influential in media 
communications scholarship. Denis McQuail noted that Marxist theory “posits a direct 
link between economic ownership and the dissemination of messages that affirm the 
legitimacy and value of a class society.”103 Antonio Gramsci expounded on this idea, 
arguing a ruling class established a hegemony of ideas and allowed the ruling class to 
dominate through ideology.104 This is a theme reflected in Edward Herman and Noam 
Chomsky’s critiques of journalism. Hegemony is created through a “spontaneous 
consent” granted by the mass population towards a general direction in society. The 
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public provides this consent due to the prestige afforded to the dominant group. The 
hegemony is assisted by the state, which “ `legally’ enforces discipline on those groups 
who do not `consent’ either actively or passively,” Gramsci wrote.  
Political economy theorists see hegemony reflected in news sources, particularly 
when the media relies excessively on “official” sources such as government and business 
leaders, who reinforce the worldview of elites and capitalist media owners. Aeron Davis, 
in a 2000 study of the London financial press, wrote, “journalists covering financial and 
business news tend to move in small exclusive circles consisting almost exclusively of 
City105 sources. The few studies of business and financial media that exist come to 
similar conclusions about business-source dominance.”106  Such relationships between 
business journalism and industry led to criticism that journalists share the worldview of 
industry and business leaders, described as "intellectual capture.”107 "In the United States 
media, there has been very little debate about whether 'markets work' and the view that 
reduced corporate regulation and 'free markets' have contributed to widespread prosperity 
has been largely accepted as 'conventional wisdom’."108 Business journalists rely heavily 
on business executives, bankers and other professionals to explain the arcane nature of 
U.S. business and finance.109  Davis described a "Financial Elite Discourse Network" 
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where business news has been "captured by financial elites."110 Such criticism was 
evident in examinations of business journalism failures over the last 100 years: the 1929 
stock market crash, the savings and loan crisis, and the 2008 financial crisis.111 Harold 
Carswell, in 1938, criticized business reporters for relying excessively on the New York 
Stock Exchange for news.112 This critique about narrow sourcing continues today. 
Antonis Kalogeropoulos wrote, “The empirical findings of Reich (2011) suggest that, in 
comparison to their political counterparts, financial journalists use fewer sources per 
item, are more reliant on PR (public relations) and they take less initiatives in contacts 
with sources.”113 However, this criticism of excessive reliance on official sources was a 
longstanding complaint about all forms of journalism. Leon Sigal’s 1973 study of 
Washington reporting found 58 percent of news stories emanated from what he called 
‘‘routine channels’’ such as news conferences, press releases, official proceedings, and 
American and foreign government officials.114  
Marx’s scholarship inspired theories of the commodification of the audience, 
where readers and television viewers serve commercial interests rather than become 
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informed in meaningful ways.115 Baldasty noted this concept of the news audience as a 
commodity has origins in the late nineteenth century: “By century’s end, editors and 
publishers saw their readers not only as voters but also as consumers, so the produced 
content that went far beyond the world of politics and voting. This vision of a 
`commercialized reader,’ if you will, naturally fueled commercialized news.”116 The 
commodification of the audience was a key idea developed by Dallas Smythe117 and 
extended in Herman and Chomsky's Manufacturing Consent, an important and influential 
work in the political economy canon, one that examined corporate and capitalist 
influence on news production and content. Herman and Chomsky's "propaganda model" 
asserted news is filtered through concentrated ownership and profit orientation of the 
dominant mass-media firms; that advertising is the primary income source of the mass 
media; that the media relies too much on government, business and "experts" funded and 
approved by these primary sources and agents of power; the media are disciplined by 
"flak" from corporate and government interests; as well as that the media operates in an 
environment where “anticommunism” is a national religion and control mechanism.118 
Herman and Chomsky essentially made an argument that money and power create a 
hegemony of ruling class ideas by filtering out the news fit to print, marginalizing 
dissent, and allowing government and private interests to transmit their messages free 
from meaningful political challenge.  
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Robert McChesney built an important case for the political economy theory 
through historical analysis. McChesney argued the rise of commercial journalism in the 
mid-nineteenth century led to politically neutral, watered-down reporting designed not to 
offend advertisers.119 McChesney also contended journalists were so inculcated in the 
norms of capitalism that they became champions of the system while they thought they 
were being objective. He found inspiration in muckraking journalist Upton Sinclair's 
Brass Check, which he described as "the first great systematic critique of the limitations 
of capitalist journalism for a democratic society.”120 His work built on Gans and 
Tuchman, who described how sourcing is compromised when reporters rely on powerful 
institutions; Tuchman wrote "news is an ally of legitimized institutions."121  
Herman and Chomsky also asserted a lack of reporter autonomy exists in 
newsrooms, a claim that arises in the professionalism literature. The Hutchins 
Commission, for example, said corporate ownership of news organizations is a powerful 
force that can weaken autonomy of individual reporters. This happens because the writer 
works for the news organization, which in turn takes ultimate responsibility for the 
writer’s work. Hutchins wrote, “The element of personal responsibility, which is of the 
essence of the organization of such professions as law and medicine, is missing in 
communications.”122 On this point, Johnstone described how reporters are subordinates 
and rarely are free to cover whatever they want in the larger, more bureaucratic 
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newsrooms.123 Further, news work tends to be collaborative, especially in the editing 
process, further clouding individual responsibility. Bartholomew Sparrow also saw a 
diminished role for individual reporters in these organizations, noting that news is a 
product of the organizational priorities, not the choice of individual reporters.  
The literature described instances where a news organization can establish 
procedures that suppress or weaken the news.124 Epstein described how the employer's 
demands will lead journalists to align their views to those of their employer.  Consider 
this example of NBC journalist Sander Vanocur, who described how he came to parrot 
the ideas of senior management: "It was then I realized the process was so subtle that for 
years I had taken their institutionalized fears and inhibitions and had now 
institutionalized them into myself.”125 Schlesinger and his study of the BBC came to a 
similar conclusion that "corporate ideology comes to constitute an integral part of the 
BBC newsman's professional identity.”126  
The ability of businesses to compromise journalistic autonomy remains a vital 
concern today. A 2008 British study finds "substantive empirical evidence” that public 
relations professionals help shape content in news stories. "Nearly one in five newspaper 
stories and 17 per cent of broadcast stories were verifiably derived mainly or wholly from 
PR material or activity…The main source of PR activity overall is the business/corporate 
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world, which originated 38 per cent of the PR material that found its way into press 
articles and 32 per cent of broadcast news items.” By contrast, public relations material 
from non-governmental organizations and charities was reported in only 11 per cent of 
press articles and 8 per cent of broadcast news items reviewed in this study.127  
  
"Taken together, these data portray a picture of the journalistic 
processes of news gathering and news reporting in which any 
meaningful independent journalistic activity by the media is the 
exception rather than the rule…The findings illustrate that 
journalists’ reliance on these news sources is extensive and raises 
significant questions concerning claims to journalistic 
independence in UK news media and journalists’ role as a fourth 
estate.”128  
 
The literature on journalistic professionalism also described an identity crisis. 
Waisbord wrote the very identity and definition of a professional journalist remained a 
contested notion and the lack of a clear professional identity can weaken a profession’s 
status: “Professionalism refers to the ability of a field of practice to settle boundaries and 
avoid intrusion from external actors.”129 This becomes even more complicated in the 
digital age. For example, how can professional journalists distinguish themselves from 
citizen journalists? The spread of smartphones, with their video and instantaneous 
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communications capabilities, empower citizen journalists and erode the traditional 
gatekeeper function enjoyed by reporters and editors in the bygone print era.  
Certainly, the political economy theorists helped explain some of the challenges 
to autonomy in business reporting, challenges that are particularly intense when reporting 
on banking and finance. Bankers are at the center of the capitalist ecosystem. They 
extend credit to businesses but also serve on boards of directors of local companies and 
engage in local philanthropic activities. Banking legend J.P. Morgan expanded his power, 
for example, by gaining seats on boards of railroads and other industrial enterprises in the 
nineteenth century.130 A journalist will face significant consequences when crossing such 
powerful individuals. Bankers are in a central position of influence and they can pursue 
retribution or deny access to an upstart reporter. Following chapters, such as the case 
study of the Keating episode, describe the challenges the National Thrift News faced 
when writing about such powerful individuals. 
Political	Economy	Issues	
Under Herman and Chomsky’s interpretation of the political economy theory, 
Strachan and the National Thrift News would tend to act more favorably to the industry 
or avoid confrontational reporting because they were economically indebted to and 
influenced by the savings and loan industry. However, they did not. National Thrift News 
reported independently on the Keating and Paul episodes, the content analysis showed. 
Results from these case studies raise questions about why the political economy theory, 
                                                            
130 Chernow, Ron, The House of Morgan : An American Banking Dynasty and the 
Rise of Modern Finance, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990). 
 46 
as interpreted by Herman and Chomsky, fails to explain the conduct of the National 
Thrift News.  
A key assertion of Herman and Chomsky is dominant elite forces guide media 
performance, yet their argument minimizes the legal and institutional factors that support 
journalistic independence. For example, U.S. journalists enjoy considerable latitude due 
to the powerful protections enshrined in the legal system, such as First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution that prohibits Congress passing laws that result in “abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.” In addition, individual journalists saw an expansion 
of their legal rights in the twentieth century with more robust shield laws and similar 
protections against disclosure of sources.131 Osiel also pointed to states passing shield 
laws for the press to confer confidentiality with their sources, even though they are not 
uniform across the country.132 The legal construction of these shield laws enhanced 
individual autonomy of reporters. Osiel wrote: 
The protections that these laws provide, unlike those of broadcast 
licensing, are granted, significantly, to the reporter himself. Even 
when the publisher or editor might prefer that a reporter hand 
over his information to the authorities, it remains the legal 
prerogative of the newsman himself whether or not to do so.133 
 
The 1966 Freedom of Information Act provided an important advance for 
watchdog journalism by opening more records for journalists as well as the public. 
Another institutional factor that can support autonomy involves the ownership structure 
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of news companies. Ben Bagdikian described the interplay between company owners and 
the news product: “It is within this necessary professional decision making that corporate 
values and the central aims of owners are imbedded.”134 Strachan, a journalist, was part 
owner of National Thrift News and was given full editorial control over the newspaper. 
He imbued his staff with a “hard news” reporting culture that did not shy away from 
controversy.135 Lang and Lang also noted the interplay between reporters and media 
owners can result in publication of controversial material. 
Some owners possessed of a social conscience are prepared to 
take on acceptable financial risks, while other media personnel 
have sometimes been able to use the leeway, autonomy, prestige, 
and authority they enjoy to get their version of a major news 
event out to the public, thereby pressuring political leaders to 
confront a problem they preferred to ignore. There is a lot of 
interaction, much of it openly or tacitly collaborative but also 
with distinct elements of confrontation.136  
 
Jonathan Hardy said that while traditional political economy theorists assert 
ownership can steer news coverage, a more careful examination of media ownership is 
needed. Hardy wrote, “Ownership matters for content, but neither media content nor 
behavior can be derived from an account of corporate and market structures alone.”137  
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Newsroom size is another institutional factor affecting autonomy. The literature 
suggested innovation and reporter autonomy might be more prevalent in the smaller and 
newer newsrooms. Weaver surveyed 736 journalists about the components of journalistic 
autonomy; reporters enjoyed the most autonomy in smaller newsrooms, which is an 
important finding in the research of National Thrift News. Weaver wrote, “As size 
increased, perceived autonomy declined.”138 Johnstone finds as newsrooms grow larger, 
reporters participate in fewer decisions and that large newsrooms “exert more formal 
controls over the work of a newsman” and narrow the reporter’s functions.139 Such 
bureaucratic barriers were not as common in smaller newspapers, thereby providing 
individual reporters with more freedom and a voice in decisions.140 Of course, reporter 
autonomy would be limited in other ways at smaller newspapers, which can lack the 
money or staffing to allow complex investigative reporting. Yet the literature holds out 
promise for innovation at newer institutions. DiMaggio and Powell found new and 
smaller institutions can innovate better than established institutions.141 They develop this 
general finding: "Once a field becomes well-established, however, there is an inexorable 
push toward homogenization.”142 The National Thrift News was relatively new (about 10 
years old), small, non-bureaucratic and situated in an evolving field, all conditions 
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favorable to innovation. The savings and loan industry was undergoing a dramatic growth 
surge in the mid-1980s while facing tremendous systemic economic problems. This was 
an industry in considerable crisis and transition.  
 The status of trade newspapers afforded some measure of autonomy: the National 
Thrift News reporters also possessed specialized knowledge of their field, which helped 
them challenge industry leaders. This independent style of reporting was a goal of the 
National Thrift News’ business model. Investigative reporting aligned with the 
newspaper’s business goal of focusing on “hard news” about the industry, meaning it 
valued critical stories about savings and loans.143 One example involves the newspaper’s 
coverage of David Paul and CenTrust. The episode showed the power of individual 
agency since reporters wrote controversial stories about Paul, even though Paul was a 
news source for National Thrift News publisher Strachan.  
In addition, it should be note that there are cultural developments in journalism 
and society that the political economy theory does not address, such as the increased 
adversarial relationship among the press, police, and government agencies. Mark Osiel 
observed that since the late 1960s, "American reporters have grown increasingly 
sensitive" to the dangers of collaborating with government agencies may pose to the 
independence of the press.144 Carey, reflecting a cultural studies tradition in 
communications research, argued journalists and the audience have agency and the 
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newspaper helps form a sense of community,145 a far cry from Marx's view of a media 
transmitting the ideas of the ruling elite.  
In today’s media environment, however, journalists still are coping with 
significant challenges to their autonomy. James Risen, the national security reporter for 
The New York Times, faced a subpoena to testify about former C.I.A. officer who had 
been charged with espionage. Risen faced a seven-year legal fight over whether he would 
be forced to disclose his sources or face imprisonment.146 Risen eventually won the case 
when Justice Department said he would not be called to testify. This case speaks to the 
contemporary challenges all journalists confront when confronting powerful interests 
whether in the government or business sectors.  
 
Indexing,	Critical	Theory	
One key research finding aligned with indexing hypothesis, advanced by Lance 
Bennett and refined by Robert Entman, is that mass media professionals tend to “index” 
voices and viewpoints in news coverage based on views expressed in mainstream 
government debate.147 Entman’s cascading activation model described how politicians 
can spread news frames across a variety of political actors and influence the news media 
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agenda, particularly when there is little coherent dissent to a government policy.148 This 
content analysis, particularly of the CenTrust and David Paul coverage, showed negative 
news media coverage began primarily after regulators publicly rebuked Paul for his $25 
million in rare art purchases. Prior to the regulators’ action, there were warning signs 
about CenTrust and Paul but little negative news coverage in the five newspapers 
examined. So once the regulators publicly criticized CenTrust and Paul, negative news 
stories followed, behavior that would fit Bennett’s indexing hypothesis and Entman’s 
cascading activation model.  
Critical theory can provide an explanatory framework for this behavior by 
showing that banking regulators help set the tone of news coverage. Stuart Hall noted 
such outside institutions often are the primary definer of news and that this primary 
definition is both dominant and powerful in setting the discourse. 
 
The important point about the structured relationship between the 
media and the primary institutional definers is that it permits the 
institutional definers to establish the initial definition or primary 
interpretation of the topic in question. This interpretation then 
'commands the field’ in all subsequent treatment and sets the 
terms of reference within which all further coverage or debate 
takes place. Arguments against a primary interpretation are 
forced to insert themselves into its definition of 'what is at issue' - 
they must begin from this framework of interpretation as their 
starting-point. This initial interpretative framework — what Lang 
and Lang have called an `inferential structure’ — is extremely 
difficult to alter fundamentally, once established.149 
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The point here is the news media reproduces ideas that elites define as 
legitimate.150 For example, Merrill Goozner studied press coverage of the 2000 
technology boom and found coverage of foreign trade — which labor unions contend 
result in a loss of domestic jobs — has a pro-industry bias that is out of sync with public 
opinion polls.151 Hallin wrote that elites, such as government officials, defined the 
spheres of legitimate controversy.152 Sigal, in his study of Washington correspondents, 
described how a beat reporter covering the Pentagon or Congress or the White House 
“gradually absorbs the perspectives of senior officials he is covering." This happens, in 
part, because reporters will mentally assume the roles of officials they cover in order to 
detect nuance and shifts in policy positions. Sigal warned, “Repeated role-taking may 
lead (journalists) to adopt the official’s perspectives on issues. The line between role-
taking and absorption is a thin one indeed."153 We see this pattern arise in studies that 
critique narrow sourcing in business journalism. Larry Powell and William Self examined 
media coverage in the 1990s of consumers poisoned by products. The cases ranged from 
poisonings by the cough cold medicine Sudafed to food produced by the restaurant chain 
Jack in a Box. They found “the data indicate that newspapers rely heavily on government 
sources and minimize the use of consumer sources when reporting on business crises.”154 
Cook wrote about the power of institutions in setting routines and limiting the agenda for 
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journalists as well as the institution narrowing the course of discussion.155  Such studies 
help explain why the CenTrust and Paul news coverage so quickly turned negative once 
the government described the thrift as a bad actor. In this respect, the research findings 
and literature review tended to align with a more nuanced and hybrid view of political 
economy and critical theory schools. Consider Hardy, who advocates a critical political 
economy theory influenced by cultural studies.156 He argued political economy requires 
revision since corporate and market structures alone don’t explain media content.  
Lastly, the intermedia agenda setting theory is useful to explain one significant 
finding in the Keating content analysis.157 Major newspapers such as The New York 
Times for nearly two years ignored a significant exclusive reported by National Thrift 
News on the Keating case. Matthew Ragas’ study of the intermedia agenda setting in 
business journalism provides an important insight into the behavior of the larger 
newspapers.158 Ragas described how trade newspapers operate more of a “market model” 
of journalism that focuses on the needs of its business audience and advertisers. 
Mainstream newspapers, by contrast, pursue a “traditional trustee model” where they 
focus on what is “most important” for the audience to know about. Ragas wrote, “If some 
major business news outlets are embracing a more market-driven approach to story 
selection and coverage emphases, while other outlets are sticking with the trustee model, 
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a possible outcome could be more limited intermedia agenda setting correlations across 
business news as a whole."159 In other words, the mainstream newspapers, in their 
process of reviewing competing news coverage, may not necessarily consider the work of 
trade newspapers, which are writing for a different audience and have a different agenda.  
At the same time, other research suggests meaningful interplay between the trade 
press and the mainstream press. Hollifield’s research showed “the trade media frequently 
set the news agenda for the mass media by feeding stories into the mainstream press.”160 
Elfenbein’s study of business journalism said one of the normative goals for the trade 
press was informing more mainstream news outlets.161 Douai and Wu and Carroll and 
McCombs also examined business news through the agenda-setting theory. Carroll and 
McCombs wrote, “Much of what consumers and other external stakeholders learn about 
companies and the issues that surround them comes from the news media.162 Ragas 
described how journalists are voracious consumers of news and often crosscheck other 
news sources “to help confirm their story selections.” Such imitative behavior is seen in 
other industries and settings, Ragas wrote. Rather than viewing news media outlets in 
competition, media outlets often view each other and their audiences as being 
complementary, Ragas wrote. 163 
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Institutional	Influence	-	The	Inverse	Argument	
This chapter concludes with a key finding in the National Thrift News research, 
that occupational ideology can serve to expand journalistic autonomy. Strachan set the 
tone and encouraged his reporters to cover the industry aggressively, such as in the 
CenTrust and Keating stories. In numerous interviews, reporters described Strachan as 
taking risks by publishing articles critical of influential industry players and companies 
that advertised in the newspaper.164 This attitude was on display in a September 1987 
editorial Strachan wrote to accompany the exclusive on the Keating Five meeting. Not 
only was National Thrift News reporting about a form of political corruption involving 
five U.S. Senators, it was challenging one of the most powerful and litigious industry 
executives, Charles Keating. In case that point was lost on readers of the news pages, 
Strachan reinforced it with an editorial:  
After thinking about the incident for some time, we have reached 
the unfortunate conclusion that there is only one thing that could 
have made that meeting possible: money … The Phoenix 
developer (Keating) has accrued a significant amount of 
influence.  And much of it has been evident over the past year or 
two in the ongoing fight between Lincoln and the regulators.165  
 
Another example of Strachan’s ability to challenge the industry and anger his 
readers was a 1984 editorial that endorsed Walter Mondale for president over Ronald 
Reagan. The editorial acknowledged the endorsement would be highly unpopular with 
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the paper’s readers.166 “It means we are out of step with the vast majority of our readers,” 
he wrote. An informal reader poll by the newspaper showed a 3-1 support for Reagan.167 
The reason for the Mondale endorsement? Reagan had run up large budget deficits in his 
first term, Strachan wrote, which would be bad for the financial markets.  
The newspaper’s staffing trends offered other evidence of how Strachan’s 
journalistic priorities guided operations of the newspaper. While the National Thrift News 
was not a large news organization, it still maintained a staff of 13 journalists through 
1993, at a time when the savings and loan industry was undergoing a historic collapse 
and downsizing, one that shrinks the base of advertisers. Muolo, a former associated 
editor, recalled Strachan fighting with the paper’s other investors to maintain the news 
budget.168 Mark Fogarty, a former news editor, said of Strachan, “His job was the 
journalism. His partners didn't have much influence on that at all.”169  
Communications theory literature often describes an editor and owner’s power 
over news coverage in negative terms, as something to interfere with news coverage. 
Warren Breed's 1955 landmark study of newsroom sociology described how news 
owners can set the tone for their journalists and how incentives guided news production. 
He argued journalists will alter their coverage to please superiors; he described how 
newsroom leadership can compromise journalistic autonomy. One example involved how 
news reporters learn and conform to a newspaper's news "policy," a blend of the 
publisher's preferences, community values and journalistic professionalism. The new 
reporter, Breed said, "learns to anticipate what is expected of him so as to win rewards 
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and avoid punishments.”170 Breed wrote about pressure to conform: "Instead of adhering 
to societal and professional ideals, he (the reporter) redefines his values to the more 
pragmatic level of the newsroom group.” Breed also noted the power of journalistic 
occupational ideology, such as autonomy from commercial interests, and described how 
this can be a powerful force to curb abuses. Journalists can appeal to professional norms 
as a way to prevent a media owner from intentionally trying to slant the news for 
commercial or political self-interest. "Conformity is not automatic," Breed wrote .171  
I propose to look at the inverse of Breed's thesis. Why can't newsroom leadership 
and institutional values lead to greater autonomy? If reporters followed the newsroom 
culture to "win rewards and avoid punishments," what about a newsroom that was "a 
reporter's paper" and rewards them for telling truth to power? Consider how Strachan set 
the tone in the newsroom, describing in 1996 the newspaper's editorial values: "We 
pulled no punches in our reporting and played no favorites, actions that were considered 
unusual, if not unique, for a trade publication … And we still have the strong sense of 
outrage that makes it difficult for swindlers to evade our notice for very long.”172 Along 
these lines, Fogarty recalled how Strachan reinforced this message of telling truth to 
power: "The CEO of a company wants to know what the truth is. They don't want smoke 
blown up their ass. If things are bad, they want to know that. If things are good, they want 
to know that. But if things are bad they need to know that even more."173  
Journalistic autonomy was core to the identity of National Thrift News, which is 
known as a “reporter’s paper” where reporters can pursue stories even when they were 
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unflattering for the editor's personal friends. "He didn't let any business friendship get in 
the way of reporting negative things, if they were true,” according to Fogarty. Wilson 
recalled discussing with her father about friendships and journalism. “I remember my dad 
talking about having to write a story, a negative story about someone who was a friend. 
He said it is hard, but you have to stand by your convictions, and this is the story and you 
can’t shade it because you like the person who did something stupid,” Wilson said.174 
Eugene Carlson, former communications director at the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight, called Strachan an “equal opportunity critic.”175  
One concluding thought:  Do not underestimate the power of professional norms, 
especially the attachment journalists hold to values of independence and autonomy. 
Reporters, in some cases, can use these journalistic values to win battles with publishers. 
In 1999, protests by some 300 Los Angeles Times journalists helped defeat a revenue 
sharing arrangement between the newspaper and the Staples Center sports arena.176 
Referring generally to the power of the journalistic ideal, Hallin wrote, “Professional 
norms have, over the last generation, significantly limited manipulations of news by 
owners seeking to push their particular political convictions or interests.”177 In a similar 
fashion, the research shows Strachan and the National Thrift News reporters used these 
values of independence to advance their journalism.  
This dissertation contributes new material to the field of journalism studies about 
how journalistic professionalism operates in business journalism and the trade press. The 
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normative theory of journalistic professionalism offers a useful explanatory framework 
for the extraordinary journalism produced by the National Thrift News. The trade 
newspaper’s work on these two episodes in the savings and loan crisis contradict key 
aspects of the political economy theory, which fails to account for individual agency and 
innovation. The political economy theory remains a valuable tool for media studies, yet 
this dissertation and other literature suggest a blend of historical and sociological analysis 
with this theory provide a more accurate account of the behavior of the National Thrift 
News. Yet it is important to note that the power of journalistic professional norms goes 
only so far. Jane Singer wrote that journalists’ autonomous status could face an even 
greater threat: a loss of public confidence. She cited studies in 2001 showing roughly half 
of Americans indicated they have little or no confidence in the news media to report the 
news fairly and completely. “So while journalists tend to see themselves as skilled, 
ethical, autonomous and estimable professionals, the public is not convinced,” Singer 
wrote.178 The following chapters will detail the normative and historical underpinnings of 
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Business journalism, according to its critics, has been too focused on serving 
businessmen and stockbrokers.179 It has failed to serve the public by overseeing corporate 
and market misbehavior. This chapter examines the origins of the critique through the 
historical and normative foundations of business journalism, from the sixteenth century 
“price current” publications providing market prices through the 1989 launch of CNBC, 
the cable business news channel. The chapter will argue business journalism began as an 
advocate and arm of capitalism that provided “news for the market,” an important legacy 
that defined the genre’s priorities and worldview. These close ties to the market also have 
marginalized business journalism in the eyes of the mainstream profession. For years, the 
business desk has been a separate corner of the newsroom, a “backwater” assignment 
with low prestige. To this day, business journalism has yet to fully separate from its 
market and commercial origins into a more independent form of journalism that can serve 
general readers. 
The dissertation will argue business journalism must evolve and better serve 
general readers in addition to the market. This chapter describes several foundational 
ideas required for that evolution to occur. First, it will argue the notion of separating 
business journalism from mainstream journalism is both difficult and, ultimately, 
counterproductive. Economics is intertwined with history; consider the centrality of 
capitalism to the American experience. Likewise, business journalism is intertwined with 
mainstream journalism. Yet the journalism profession has treated business journalism as 
something separate, which ultimately diminishes the importance of business journalism. 
                                                            
179 McChesney, “The Problem of Journalism” 2003; Starkman, The Watchdog 
That Didn’t Bark, 2014. 
 62 
As this chapter will argue, business journalism fits into the broader historical evolution of 
mainstream journalism. Both were raw information providers in the eighteenth century 
and shifted to more analytical forms of information in the nineteenth century. Both 
provide a watchdog function, although business journalism’s surveillance role deserves 
broader recognition. This lack of recognition, this dissertation will argue, is one reason 
why mainstream news organizations ignored extraordinary journalism produced by the 
National Thrift News in the savings and loan crisis.  
The case for a greater role for business journalism rests on theories of journalistic 
professionalism. This dissertation will show that the professional orientation of 
journalists transcends any boundaries and that great journalism can be conducted at the 
trade press or at the business desk. Muckraking journalist Ida Tarbell in the early 
twentieth century is a good example. She did not self-identify as a business journalist, yet 
she produced groundbreaking business journalism that challenged one of the most 
powerful men in America, John D. Rockefeller. Good journalism can happen anywhere 
— at trade weeklies, at the business desk of regional daily newspapers, at the wire 
services. Instead of putting business journalism into a discreet box, I propose to define 
business journalism expansively, as a series of analytical tools to tell a broader range of 
stories. This chapter discusses definitions in some detail, and this is an important exercise 
to empower and focus the mission of business journalism. A profession’s identity and 
sense of purpose matter. The skills and methods of business journalism can help serve 
many aspects of society. Attempts to marginalize or ignore the trade press or the business 
desk, which happened during the savings and loan crisis, will harm the public interest. 
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What	is	Business	Journalism?		
A seemingly simple definitional question — what is business journalism? — not 
only vexes journalism scholars, it also contributes to the status and identity problems 
business journalism has faced since its inception. According to Kathleen Endres, “Few 
fields of journalism have had to deal with such confusion with regard to name, 
categorization, integrity, or the roles they play within the industries they cover.”180 The 
definitional question is central to understanding the National Thrift News' work, not only 
as a trade newspaper but also for business journalism in general. The dissertation will use 
the term "trade press" to refer to journalism for specialized industries or professions, such 
as the National Thrift News, and the term "general business journalism" to describe 
publications with broader consumer audiences, such as The Wall Street Journal. The term 
"business journalism" refers to the wider field of both the trade press and general 
business journalism. This chapter will examine how the trade press relates to general 
business journalism and define similarities and differences in their normative 
foundations. 
Both the trade press and general business journalism share a normative origin as a 
servant to business and have a symbiotic relationship with the markets. “Capitalist tool” 
— the cheeky motto for the business magazine Forbes — captures the normative 
foundation of business journalism. John McCusker traced the origins of the business 
press to 1540 in Antwerp and the "price current" publications that described commodity 
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prices and trade information.181 These papers, organized by brokers and market owners, 
helped businesses function and evolve. The price reporting function was critical to early 
capitalism since it allowed for price discovery of products and commodities as well as 
advertising to match suppliers, manufacturers, merchants, and financiers.182 McCusker 
wrote that “business newspapers helped to perfect the market.”183 Reporting on prices 
helped "cut a firm's transaction costs and (allowed) merchants to engage customers more 
closely, to challenge competitors more successfully" and to "generate more business for 
the city.”184 At a later point in history, Paul Julius Reuter, founder of the eponymous 
news service, took this idea one step further: “News moves markets …news is a 
market.”185 Wayne Parsons viewed business journalism and capitalism as evolving 
together. “The growth of economic communications was and is a precondition of 
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capitalist development and the spread of capitalism as a concept or ideology.”186  Parsons 
continued: 
The historical importance of the financial press does not lie so 
much in its contribution to the development of a literary form as 
in its role in defining a capitalist language and culture: free 
markets, individualism, profit and speculation.187  
 
As will be discussed more fully in the subsequent chapter, business journalism 
evolved along with three distinct phases of U.S. capitalism. Financial capitalism, 
represented by banker J.P. Morgan, ran generally from late 1800s to about 1912; 
managerial capitalism from the 1920s to the 1980s; and shareholder capitalism from the 
1980s forward.188 In one of the early histories of the business press, Flynn described a 
close relationship of the business press to capitalism and functional operations of 
business: “All though industrial history, there is a close relationship between basic 
inventions, the subsequent development of industries founded upon such inventions and 
finally, the emergence of publications to represent that industry.”189 Such an evolution 
was evident with the early price current publications. 
 David Forsyth noted the price current publications, such as the South Carolina 
Price Current in 1774 or The New York Prices Current in 1795, dominated the U.S. 
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business press until the War of 1812.190 The South Carolina Price Current was one of the 
first business publications in what became the continental United States.191 The early 
U.S. newspapers carried considerable commercial information, with reports on shipping, 
harvests and European market developments aimed at merchants who were eager to 
advertise their own products.192 The Journal of Commerce, a significant business 
publication focusing on shipping news, was founded in New York in 1827. The early 
trade press did not make compelling reading for a general audience. Jesse H. Neal, a 
pioneer in U.S. trade press journalism, wrote that a modern business editor, reading these 
price currents, would have “found little real news material, and still less reader 
interest."193 Even as journalism grew in the nineteenth century, these publications printed 
“news as information” rather than “news as story,”194 which parallels the general 
evolution of newspapers. Early business journalism was still designed for the business 
class and not the general public. 195 
Both the trade press and general business journalism grew from the 1830s 
forward, tracking the production and reporting innovations in the field of journalism 
generally and benefitting from the boom in a new industrial society. Although they 
served different audiences and played different roles, both trade press and general 
business journalism enjoyed close ties to markets and industry in the nineteenth century 
and helped them evolve. “The need and the opportunity for a business press grew out of 
the introduction of the factory system, and the dawning of the realization that the making 
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and distribution of goods depended upon economic principles,” wrote Jesse H. Neal, a 
leader of the trade group Association of Business Papers in New York.196  
The growth of both industry and the journalism documenting its rise was evident 
in the transportation field with early trade magazines such as the American Railroad 
Journal. Founded in 1832, this magazine is known by academics as "the granddaddy of 
them all" in the early business press. Henry Varnum Poor’s reporting in the American 
Railroad Journal marks an important development for U.S. business journalism as he 
was one of the first business reporters to demand correct financial information197 from the 
companies he covered.198  The rise of railroads in the early nineteenth century marked a 
major turning point in the U.S. industrial development as well as emergence of modern 
U.S. business and regulatory regimes.199 Others in this era included Hunt's Merchant 
Magazine and Commercial Review and the Dry Goods Reporter and Commercial 
Glance.200 Specialized commercial publications expanded significantly after the Civil 
War.  
This early history is important since it helped establish one of the negative 
normative features of business journalism: a “backwater” in the newsroom that wrote in a 
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foreign jargon, was too close to business and often explicitly advocated for its interests. 
This tight relationship to the markets and business stands in tension with a core ethical 
ideal of modern professional journalism: to separate and eliminate conflicts of interest 
between advertising and news content.201 Early business journalism in the price currents, 
with their focus on prices and transactions, was devoid of context, narrative flair, or 
analysis, and thus did not enhance the genre’s stature: "The profession did not acquire a 
reputation for literary merit or high journalistic standards. Indeed, for this reason, in most 
accounts of the history of journalism, financial reporting is mentioned either not at all or 
merely en passant.”202  Kjaer wrote that the technical nature of some business reporting, 
especially its coverage of abstract financial issues, “led many critics to conclude that 
business journalism today is remote from the traditional ideas of journalism, since 
business journalism is no longer concerned with the description and interpretation of 
current event on behalf of the public.”203    
Business news grew out of the price currents to more substantive reporting, 
growth that generally tracked the rise of industrial America, as described more fully later 
in the chapter. From the 1830s forward, there is a split occurring between the trade press 
and general business journalism. The trade press had grown to such a size by 1893 that 
the American Economist carried an article that sought to distinguish trade press from 
mainstream media. It is still a pertinent question as to how we distinguish between the 
two. There are some clear lines of division: For example, the trade press provides 
technical knowledge and performs a continuing education function for business people, 
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something not present in general circulation newspapers. Yet the line between the trade 
press and general business journalism is indistinct and arguably is becoming even more 
so in the modern media age. 
General	Business	Journalism	
Modern scholars have attempted understand the role of business journalism and 
its identity, and they generally define business journalism based on content. Tracy Lucht 
distinguished four separate genres that serve different audiences: business, finance, 
economics, and consumer journalism:204 
§ Business journalism examines "corporate structure, small-business trends, 
executive performance, marketing, industry, and labor." 
§ Financial journalism "mainly covers the stock, bond, and commodity 
markets; its readers are investors…" 
§ Economic journalism "is more political in focus, explaining the policies of 
presidential administrations and the Federal Reserve." 
§ Consumer journalism "covers products and business practices of interest 
to buyers.”    
These categories are clear and useful. Yet there is one problem: these four 
categories tend to overlap in the newsroom. A story about Congress approving a tax cut 
bill – is this a business or economics or finance or consumer story? It would span all four 
categories. In addition, personal finance news blurs the distinction of business journalism 
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as specialist financial news targeted to investors.205 Are these investors regular consumers 
or professional Wall Street traders? They could be either, or both. 
Nikki Usher, after examining The New York Times business news coverage 
through the twentieth century, concluded there is not a clear definition of business 
news.206 Other scholars described a fluid definition of business journalism.207 Chris 
Roush offered a fairly expansive definition: "all reporting and writing that is written not 
only about business but also about the economy.”208  He added this includes beats such as 
labor, workplace, technology, personal finance, investment, and consumer reporting, a 
definition reflected by the news coverage decisions of major financial news wires, such 
as Bloomberg, Reuters, and Dow Jones Newswires. Peter Kjaer examined the evolution 
of Danish business journalism since 1960 and found a blurring of lines between 
economic and business journalism.209 The ambiguity over definitions is perhaps best 
expressed by Alan Sloan, the award-winning Fortune magazine reporter, who described 
business journalism colorfully as stories "about life that will have a few numbers in it.”210  
Trade	Press	
The issues of identity and conflicts with the market were even more pronounced 
in the early history of the trade press. In the origins of the trade press, there is an explicit 
mission to provide information to help businesses and markets grow, i.e. it is indeed a 
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capitalist “tool.” Julien Elfenbein writes that “the editor of an independent businesspaper 
is a trustee of the free enterprise system."211 Elfenbein described a trade publication as a 
"businesspaper" that serves a specialized, professional, technical, scientific, industrial or 
business audience.212 For a "businesspaper," Elfenbein writes, the "primary objective is to 
advance the status of the field.” M.B. Flynn described business papers as “periodicals 
published for the purpose of producing profit by fostering commercial enterprise. Their 
principal appeal is to purchasing agents who buy for business purposes, rather than for 
personal consumption."213 The Federation of Trade Press Associations, an industry group, 
embraced an intimate relationship between the trade press and business development. 
"The trade press is one of the most successful business builders in the country," W.L. 
Terhune, president of the Boot and Shoe Recorder Publishing Company said in 1906 
testimony to the U.S. Postal Commission.214 One reason for the success of the trade press 
was a focus on its specific area of expertise.  
Trade publications kept a narrow focus out of necessity, which further puzzled 
and perhaps alienated outside readers. Yet this narrow focus is a norm for this genre and, 
indeed, a reason for its success.215 As Janet Laib wrote in her  study of the trade press, "If 
they dilute the subject matter with political coverage and other supported irrelevancies, 
they will get a diluted audience, and a diluted audience would weaken their appeal to 
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advertisers who want to reach a specialized market of readers.”216 Elfenbein provided a 
humorous elaboration: “Inside the businesspaper, you find no circus makeup, no crime or 
sex stories, no `itchy, prurient journalism,’ no sin swathed in morality, no fiction, no 
gossip, no politics, no sports, no Hollywood or Broadway.”217 Ann Hollifield wrote how 
the trade press is less likely than mainstream media to write about the big picture, "to 
cover the social implications of industry policy proposals.”218 This is one way Strachan 
and the National Thrift News defied normative behavior of the trade press: They covered 
politics closely, publishing presidential polls and making campaign endorsements. Trade 
press scholars such as Laib would find this highly unusual: 
Although trade editors aren't fearful of tangling with pertinent 
government policies, political campaigning per se is almost 
totally by-passed in their columns. Trade publishers believe that 
they must concentrate upon the narrow scope of material that 
directly relates to the profession or industry of their readership.219 
How best to distinguish between the trade press and general business journalism? 
Look at the publication's intended audience: is it the general public or a specific slice of 
the business community? Do they publish technical information designed for a specific 
profession or material aimed at general readers?  
Examining identity is a second way to distinguish the trade from general business 
press. Does the publication have an autonomous identity, such as The New York Times, or 
one linked to an industry or field, such as Broadcasting and Cable or Women's Wear 
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Daily? Elfenbein noted that trade publications are defined by the industries they serve.220 
The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal are both stand-alone entities that serve 
a general public. Circulation is a third way to make the distinction. Does the publication 
circulate generally? Can the public buy a copy? Some trade and technical journals simply 
are not sold to the public, thereby classifying them as specialty publications. Endres 
noted that “controlled circulation” publications are sent free to individuals qualified by 
occupation. Government regulations also provide some definitions. Various government 
entities, such as U.S. Postal Service to the U.S. Senate press galleries, distinguish 
between forms of business and trade press.221 These distinctions are not binary, but they 
serve to generally sort business news for a mass audience and those for specialized 
fields.  
 David Mason makes this distinction between the two genres:  
Universality is the distinguishing badge of the general 
newspaper; specialty is the exclusive mark of the trade journal … 
The trade journal is useful; the general newspaper is 
entertaining…The trade journal stimulates investigation and 
reflection; the general newspaper creates and feeds the appetite 
for what is superficial and often frivolous.222 
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The trade press differs significantly from general business journalism or even 
regular mainstream journalism in another way. A main role of the trade press is to 
provide a type of adult education; this was rooted in the nineteenth century trade papers, 
which provided industrial education when the U.S. lacked a system or trade or technical 
schools.223 The Federation of Trade Press Associations noted the "inestimable" value of a 
trade paper in providing technical education for business people in the U.S., especially 
with the absence of trade or industrial schools at the turn of the twentieth century. Trade 
press scholars and industry officials even argue that advertising played an educational 
role in these industry publications, one different than mass consumer advertising in 
general publications. Trade press advertising serves an important communications 
function by describing an industry’s new products, innovations, and availability of 
product supply.224 The Federation of Trade Press Associations, in its very beginning, was 
defensive about the amount of advertising carried in trade papers: "It should be 
remembered that trade papers differ radically from magazines and daily papers. Trade-
journal advertising is a necessary medium of communication between the manufacturer 
jobber and retailer.”225 This educational role is one the trade press took seriously. 
According to Gussow, “Such papers became the `colleges' and `trade schools' of the early 
period.”226  According to Elfenbein, ”Businesspapers are published for people on the 
managerial level who need continuing education and knowledge because they have to 
continuously make the prime decisions227.” Indeed, trade papers still play this role. 
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Publications such as Tax Notes, Oil & Gas Journal, and Women’s Wear Daily are 
educating journalists at mainstream papers who cover beats such as taxes, energy or 
fashion. Journalists often scour the trade press for background on an issue or story ideas. 
This was the case for the National Thrift News. Reporters at The Wall Street Journal and 
The New York Times read National Thrift News and credited it occasionally in their 
stories.228 When the National Thrift News won the 1988 George L. Polk Award, the prize 
citation recognized this educational function of the trade press: “In the best tradition of 
the specialized or trade press, it has acted as an advance scout for the rest of the 
media."229  
Modern	Definition	
The discussion above shows traditional ways of understanding the trade press and 
general business journalism. This chapter, however, argues that theories of journalistic 
professionalism help provide not just a better modern definition, but also a path forward 
for the genre’s evolution into the mainstream. Consider the analysis of professional 
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identity conducted by Pierre Bourdieu and Silvio Waisbord. Instead of arriving at specific 
typologies, Bourdieu and Waisbord look at how modern journalism interacts with 
political, economic, cultural, and social forces.230 Bourdieu essentially asserted someone 
can be identified as producing cultural works, such as journalism, merely by just doing 
the work – writing stories, producing films, and making broadcasts. According to 
Bourdieu, “There is no other criterion of membership of a field than the objective fact of 
producing effects within it.”231 In this view, journalism and even business journalism is a 
type of social construct, a product of its culture and its times. Gillian Doyle wrote that 
“many of the pressures and imperatives faced by financial and economic journalists are, 
in fact, similar to those affecting specialists that cover other ‘beats’, for example, 
constraints over time and resources and the need to remain close, but not too close, to 
relevant sources.”232 Herbert Gans offered similar ideas, saying culture plays a critical 
role in news selection and reflects a set of enduring values.233 Since culture, social forces, 
and economics remain in flux, so does the definition of journalism, according to this 
view. As Waisbord noted, "The meaning of professional journalism remains elusive.”234 
Part of the problem is the constant blending of occupational and normative definitions, 
which is also the case with business journalism.  
Nikki Usher's study of The New York Times business news leads to a modern, 
multidimensional definition of business journalism. She argued business news is a type of 
social construction,  "the product of institutional factors … and a set of narrative and 
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structural conventions that determine whether a story will ultimately be a business story." 
Usher continued, "Furthermore, the definition of business news at The Times and who 
was responsible for reporting and editing these stories may not have always fit clearly 
within the institutional boundaries of the newspaper.”235  With this definition, we see the 
influence of Bourdieu’s theory of cultural production. Usher described three general 
types of business stories:  
1) "Stories that always have been defined as business stories" and "do not fit the 
agendas of other sections of the newspaper because of their direct and explicit focus on 
business and economics;" 
2) "A business story that is the genesis of a larger story that develops a broader 
scope," such as Google pulling out of China; 
3) "A general story that can take on a business perspective.”236   
These definitions help explain how a story that was once considered business 
news now can appear elsewhere in the newspaper: on page one as national news (a story 
about a falling stock market) or in the sports section (money from player corporate 
endorsements) or in the metro section (construction of a new shopping mall).  
My definition of business journalism, therefore, is influenced by Usher's 
observations about the dispersed nature of modern business journalism, Bourdieu's theory 
about cultural production, and Waisbord's description of the evolving identity of 
journalism. My proposed definition of business journalism is broad: it is a series of 
analytical tools journalists use to tell a broader range of stories. Put another way, business 
journalism is a skill set and an attitude intended to help reporters gain deeper insight into 
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their subjects, from covering City Hall or Congress to Major League Baseball or 
Hollywood. In this light, a journalist trained to analyze corporate financial statements will 
cover political stories, such as the business dealings of real estate mogul and presidential 
candidate Donald Trump.  
New York Times business editor Larry Ingrassia told Usher about the fungible 
boundaries between a business story and a general story: 
I would say, if you forced me, it is anything that intersects the 
very broad set of issues how people go about their economic lives 
and what affects them as workers, as investors, as consumers, and 
sometimes as citizens. For example, taxes and tax policies, is that 
a government or a business story? That can be both, and a lot of 
things, depending on the emphasis.237 
  
Defining business journalism as a set of skills and a mindset allows it to work 
fluidly with the evolving nature of news and establishes a path forward for it to evolve 
into a genre to better serve the general readership.238 One benefit of my definition is it 
would remove business journalists from the backwater of newsrooms and integrate their 
skills fully into the regular news production, a trend reflected in The New York Times and 
The Associated Press, for example. This definition is flexible enough to account for the 
influence of trade publications on general business journalism outlets as well as to allow 
for the interplay between the two subgenres. Modern newsrooms are emphasizing team 
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reporting across beats and specialties. In this way, business journalism would reflect the 
commercial and economic mindset of our society.  
Instead of seeing business journalism as part of a historic continuum, the broader 
profession of journalism has sought to place it in a separate category.239 Such attempts at 
separation are out of step with theories of history and the centrality of capitalism in the 
American political and cultural experience. Karl Marx’s influential historical theories 
noted how the disciplines of politics and economics were intertwined.240 Marx argued 
that material conditions of life account for general development of the human mind, not 
legal relations or political forms. His materialist theory of history emphasized empiricism 
and asserted that humans, by producing their means of subsistence, “are indirectly 
producing their actual material life.”241 The economy and history are two sides of the 
same coin. Angus Burgin wrote that, “For better or for worse, we now live in an era in 
which economists have become our most influential philosophers, and when decisions 
made or advised by economistic technocrats have broad and palpable influence on the 
practice of our everyday lives.”242 
Functionalist	Role	
Some of the business journalism in the nineteenth century, so influential in 
forming the genre’s modern identity, played functionalist role to help the market evolve. 
This functionalist mindset is explicit in the title of the first railroad newspaper: 
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"American Railroad Journal and Advocate of Internal Improvements" (emphasis 
added). This functionalist role is a theme as business journalism adopted new 
communications technology, such as the telegraph. This invention, dating back to the 
1830s, helped establish business journalism as an essential information provider in the 
modern financial markets. Palmer wrote that in this era, the growth of industrial 
capitalism depended on news and information.243 Publications arose to meet the growing 
demand for market news for wealthy and elite individuals as well as brokers. One 
example was the Kiernan News Agency, which distributed breaking news on shipping, 
railroad and construction as well as information from the New York Stock Exchange to 
clients around the country. Kiernan News Agency was among the early users of the 
telegraph to distribute business news in New York in 1860s.244 O'Neill credited Kiernan 
with inventing the news ticker tape machine, which became the iconic information source 
and a fixture in Wall Street trading rooms. Regardless of that bold claim, Kiernan hired 
two journalists – Charles Dow and Edward Jones – who worked for him until 1882 and 
later greatly advanced the field of business journalism. Dow and Jones went on to form 
Dow Jones & Co., a market news service that evolved into The Wall Street Journal  in 
1889.245  
 The business press also played a functionalist role in Europe, adopting the 
telegraph and other technologies to help the markets grow and evolve. In 1845, Charles 
Louis Havas scrapped use of carrier pigeons in favor of the telegraph to deliver news to 
his Agence France Press, which bills itself as “the world’s first international news 
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agency,” a news service popular with European banks and stockbrokers.246 Julius Reuter 
worked for Havas, and left in 1851 to found the Reuters news agency on London.  
Besides the telegraph, newspapers and specialized publications in the nineteenth 
century benefitted from other advances in technology such as photography, mechanical 
typesetting, and new industrial printing technologies such as rotary presses.247 The 
newspaper industry was among the first to adopt the mass production methods in the 
industrial era.248 The New York Sun in 1837 purchased a steam-powered press that 
produced 4,000 papers an hour.249 The period of 1865-1885 also saw major evolutions in 
the printing and engraving processes.250 Businesses began to conduct research and 
development into ways to improve their products and services.251 The price of 
distribution fell due to reductions in postal rates. Such changes allowed specialized 
business publications to grow along with the broader rise as mass distribution newspapers 
emerged from the 1870s forward. Both the trade publications and general newspapers 
benefitted from major social and demographic changes in the United States, such as 
increased population and urbanization of U.S. cities that provided a larger and easier-to-
reach audience. Frank Luther Mott described the late nineteenth century as the rise of the 
independent press. For example, more than 9,000 periodicals (not newspapers) had 
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publishing starts in the 1865-1885 period.252 General trends in U.S. business created a 
new demand for specialized business news, with the beginning demise of small 
merchants and the rise of more specialized (mercantile) manufacturing enterprises and a 
new professional class. Mott wrote, “The last 30 years of the 19th century were a 
formative period of the American business press.”253  
With this technology and growth of the market came a boom in the number and 
variety of periodicals that serve industry, particularly banking and finance. Specialized 
publications such as Bankers' Magazine, Dun's Review, and The Bond Buyer launched in 
the nineteenth century, and in keeping with the normative role of the trade press, some of 
these publications greatly assisted with the development of these industries. The 
American Banker, founded in 1836 as Thompson's Bank Note Reporter, provided an 
extremely valuable service to businesses, banks and merchants: investigating fraudulent 
and unsafe banks and reporting on legitimate and illicit bank notes and currency.254 In 
other instances, the business press helped restore market order. In 1884, for instance, the 
Dow Jones Newswire helped to calm a market panic following the failure of a New York 
Stock Exchange member firm, Grant and Ward. Dow Jones issued a series of reassuring 
remarks from major financial figures, including the railroad mogul Jay Gould, who 
predicted the panic had run its course.255  
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Analytical	Reporting	
In addition to the technological changes, business journalism began to evolve 
stylistically in the mid-nineteenth century, moving beyond market information and into 
more analysis, further increasing its value and utility as a business information source.256 
Publications began to evolve by printing news stories instead of more raw market data, 
and then by printing criticism of the industries they covered.257 Some general newspaper 
publishers began to sense reader demand for business news; James Gordon Bennett in the 
1830s created a money column in his New York Herald newspaper.258 Other publications 
pursued a more analytical approach to business journalism, such as the London-based 
Economist magazine, continually published since 1843, and the New York-based 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, launched in 1865. Scottish hat maker James 
Wilson founded The Economist newspaper in 1843 to fight the protectionist Corn Laws 
and promote free trade.259 Economist editor Walter Bagehot became enormously 
influential for his writings about banking and finance, which helped shape the industry’s 
identity. “Bagehot’s economic journalism provided businessmen with a set of ideas they 
could understand, and gave a highly articulate voice to the emerging commercial and 
financial classes.”260 In the U.S., William Buck Dana sought to model the Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle after the Economist. Dana took over the paper in 1861 and 
created a highly influential publication that reported on general business and economic 
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trends, with broader coverage than industry-focused railroad and banking journals.261 
Dana brought journalistic standards to the business press and sought to forge an identity 
for the emerging age of large corporations. Douglas Steeples wrote that “Dana helped 
forge an American philosophy of business that would withstand the rigors beyond his 
imagining and prevail in a 21st Century that is increasingly American.”262 Still, Dana and 
his paper were boosters of capitalism, as Steeples wrote that Dana "was an advocate of 
business and himself an entrepreneur vested with an interest in a thriving capitalist 
society.”  
Advocacy for capitalism is widespread in the financial press at the dawn of the 
twentieth century. Publications that started between the Civil War and the 1929 crash 
"were faithful to the idea of untrammeled free enterprise.”263 Financial journalist 
Clarence Barron, who purchased The Wall Street Journal in 1903, saw his paper "as a 
defender of both the capitalist system and individual capitalists and financiers.”264 Such 
advocacy also was evident at Dun's Review, 1898; Financial World, 1902; and Forbes, 
1917: "Each in varying degrees offered a benign picture of the country's growing 
economic power… Readers were assured business was the proper agent for achieving 
public ends and business leaders were given benedictory treatment.”265 In this early 
period, many of the historical accounts would agree with Dean Starkman that “early 
business news was almost by definition a form of elite, as opposed to mass, 
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communication, a press geared to a small band of market participants.”266 McCusker’s 
research on business journalism in sixteenth century Belgium showed how brokers on the 
Antwerp Exchange organized publication of early business newspapers, which had a 
primary function of channeling information to their local members, not necessarily the 
public at large.267 As the business press modernized in the nineteenth century, 
publications such as the early Wall Street Journal or the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle “catered mainly to the concerns of the privileged.”268 
Advertising	and	Controversy	
The rise of commercialism in journalism in the mid-nineteenth century set up a 
tension between press and corporate interests, one that still exists today. Advertising 
became a viable revenue source, overtaking subscriptions, due in part to the growing 
urbanization of the U.S. the nation's population. This population growth was driven in 
part by immigration, which quadrupled from mid-nineteenth century to the first decade of 
twentieth century.  This is when mainstream journalism began to shift to a commercial 
advertising model and away from ownership by political parties.269 Advertising had many 
effects on journalism such as "influencing newspapers' size, selection of stories, 
organization and personnel, and vulnerability to the economy.”270 In this era, “Publishers 
began to sell their newspapers for less than it cost to produce them and to emphasize 
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stories of more widespread interest.”271 Penny papers, embodied by The New York 
Herald, emphasized street sales and shifted away from a sole reliance on subscriptions.272 
The penny press was part of a broader movement, the growth of commercial culture 
industries in the nineteenth century that included distribution of lower cost books and 
magazines.273 The penny press met the needs of what Schudson calls a "democratic 
market society" created by the growth of mass democracy, a market ideology, and new 
urban centers274. 
Advertising became established in the mid-nineteenth century. The first 
advertising agency, owned by Volney B. Palmer, opened in 1849.275 By 1905, total 
revenues for the U.S. advertising industry were $45.5 million, double the level from 
1890, leading Mott to call the early twentieth century the Golden Age of Advertising. "It 
marked the beginning of an era in which advertising was not only to exert a great 
influence on American living but was also to work an important change in the publishing  
economics of all periodicals.”276 Magazines of all subjects, from business to economics to 
politics, emerged from 1885 through 1905.277  
The new revenue source shaped journalism in several ways, and historians 
continue to argue about its beneficial or negative impact. In one viewpoint voiced by 
                                                            
271 Delorme and Fedler, “An Historical Analysis of Journalists′ Attitudes toward 
Advertisers and Advertising’s Influence,” American Journalism, 2005. 
272 Emery and Emery, The Press and America, 1984. 
273 Hallin, Daniel, “Field Theory, Differentiation Theory and Comparative Media 
Research,” In Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field, edited by Rodney Benson, Polity, 
2005, 234. 
274 Schudson, Discovering The News, 1978; Emery and Emery, The Press and 
America, 1984. 
275 Emery and Emery, The Press and America, 1984. 
276 Mott, Frank Luther, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905, Vol. IV, 
1957, 20. 
277 Mott, Frank Luther, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905, Vol. IV, 
1957. 
 87 
Michael Schudson, advertising allowed press to become financially separate from the 
state. By the late 1800s, the press became a source of power in society and was able to 
provide independent commentary on events. Press barons such as William Randolph 
Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer embodied the rising power, prestige, and wealth of the 
newspaper industry. Pulitzer viewed advertising as a means of providing financial 
autonomy for newspapers.278  
Other historians such as Robert McChesney provide a more critical view of 
advertising role. He views powerful capitalist forces as shaping and restricting the news. 
The new advertising model “served as a powerful mechanism weakening the working-
class press” in the early nineteenth century as conservative business owners avoided 
advertising in radical publications.279 This commercialism also led the press to adopt a 
new view of its audience. Readers were regarded as consumers, a type of commodity, 
which became a founding idea in leftist press criticism. Baldasty described this shift: 
By century's end, editors and publishers saw their readers not 
only as voters but also as consumers, so the produced content that 
went far beyond the world of politics and voting. This vision of a 
`commercialized reader,' if you will, naturally fueled 
commercialized news…Advertisers operated with a vision of the 
press that valued the newspaper’s ability to help them make 
money.280   
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The concept of the public as a commodity for advertising fits into a leftist critique 
of the U.S. media, one inspired by Marx’s materialist theories of history.281 Building on 
Marx’s insights about how readers and audiences are treated as a commodity, economist 
Dallas Smythe looked at how news media companies use this to accelerate their profits. 
Smythe argued the principal product of the commercial mass media in monopoly 
capitalism was not the creation of “messages” or “information” or “meaning.” Instead, it 
was the creation of a product called “audience power,” which allows the ruling elite to 
accomplish economic and political tasks.282  
Conflicts	
The rise of advertising as a business model quickly led to conflict of interest 
concerns. Journalists as early as 1869 "worried about advertisers' power and attempts to 
manipulate the news.”283 Baldasty wrote advertisers in the penny press era sought to 
influence business news coverage and to seek free publicity and promotion from 
newspapers. They were often successful: "Business received much laudatory coverage in 
the late nineteenth century.”284 For example, newspapers printed news items called 
“puffs" or "local notices" to praise local advertisers or other products. Unethical behavior 
was also evident in mainstream journalism, which earned a reputation for marginality 
through its sometimes lurid and sensationalized crime reporting in New York City.  One 
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high profile example of this “yellow journalism” was the famous Hearst-Pulitzer 
competition to exaggerate Spanish abuses in Cuba in 1898.285 
Driven by complaints about corrupt reporters and sensational articles, a general 
movement toward journalistic professionalism began at the end of the nineteenth 
century.286 The first U.S. professional journalism society was founded in 1914 at DePauw 
University, Sigma Delta Chi, now the Society of Professional Journalists. This society 
created a code of professional standards that emphasized avoidance of economic conflicts 
of interest.287 Some of the earliest evidence of a professional identity for business 
journalists came in 1890, when a business writer’s association was founded in Detroit.288 
Various trade newspapers and magazines in 1906 established the Federation of Trade 
Press Associations, headed by James H. McGraw and John A. Hill of the McGraw-Hill 
publishing fame. It shaped the identity of the trade press and advocates for industry 
priorities, such as reduced postal rates for publications.289 The National Conference of 
Business Paper Editors Inc. was founded in 1919 at Herbert Hoover’s request. For 
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business journalists, industry-wide ethical guidelines were not established until 1963 with 
the founding of the Society of American Business Editors and Writers.290  
The move toward professional standards and education did not halt abuses, which 
happened sometimes at the highest ranks of the field. Clarence Barron, owner of The 
Wall Street Journal, engaged in unethical practices in the early twentieth century, such as 
ordering stories promoting companies in which he owned stock.291 Such behavior is now 
forbidden at the modern Wall Street Journal and every other mainstream business 
publication.292 In the 1920s, some business reporters developed reputations as "two-
hatters" who sold advertisements and wrote favorable stories about the same advertisers. 
It wasn't until 1934 that The Wall Street Journal banned advertising people from the 
newsroom and forbid reporters from selling ads or trading stocks they covered.293 
Columbia Journalism Review noted that in 1973, the bulk of the business press still was 
"appallingly disreputable" with editors selling ads and ad salesmen editing stories.294 
Hubbard surveyed business newspaper editors and found they "seem curiously resigned 
to trimming their editorial sails to the edicts of the ad department.”295 Hubbard found 
business editors complained about pressure from corporations about upcoming stories. 
This pressure could take the "form of personal favors, such as expensive gifts, travel 
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junkets or entertainment." Some 23% of business editors said "as a matter of routine they 
were compelled to puff up or alter and downgrade business stories at the request of the 
advertisers.” 
Considerable academic literature also explores the conflicts and tension between 
advertisers and editorial decisions. Jay Black described how newspaper editors often 
trade a certain amount of editorial coverage in return for significant volumes of 
advertising.296 Lawrence Soley and Robert Craig said in 1992 they surveyed 147 editors 
at daily newspapers and found about 90 percent reported advertisers attempted to 
influence content of their newspaper's stories. Some 37 percent said “they capitulated to 
advertiser pressure.”297 Other studies described how conflicts would result in advertisers 
boycotting a newspaper: "Dozens of journalists either experienced or knew of a 
boycott.”298 Tofel recounted how General Motors boycotted The Wall Street Journal in 
1954 in a dispute over the paper's coverage.299  These conflicts persist today300 and in 
genres beyond business journalism. BuzzFeed, for example, was criticized in early 2015 
for deleting posts due to advertiser pressure.301  
Advertiser influence was one concern, but there was also an extensive history of 
business reporters engaging in outright corruption. Many accounts portrayed business 
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journalists on the take. Journalists "demanded cold cash for news favorable to the 
market.”302 One of the most dramatic journalist corruption cases involved the markets 
columnist for the New York Daily News, Raleigh T. Curtis. He received $19,000 in 1929-
1930 (worth $259,674 in 2015 dollars) from a stock promoter who happened to be his 
next door neighbor in White Plains, N.Y. Curtis’ bribes were detailed in 1932 U.S Senate 
Banking Committee hearings.303 One investigation found financial writers at eight papers 
touted stocks in exchange for cash or other favors, including Wall Street Journal 
columnists William Gomber, who wrote the “Broad Street Gossip” column and Richard 
Edmonson, who penned the “Abreast of the Market” column.304 Galbraith described the 
standards of business journalism in the 1920s in blunt terms: "Many of those who were 
writing about Wall Street and business in those days were drunks and incompetents.”305  
	Advertising	and	Trade	Press		
The scant trade press literature described advertisers as exerting a significant 
influence on trade press editorial decisions. For example, Hays and Reisner examined 
pressure from advertisers on agricultural journalists.306 "Our study offers clear evidence 
that advertiser-related pressure on farm magazine writers is a serious problem, although it 
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is one not always recognized by those more seriously affected," Hays and Reisner wrote. 
They made a broader claim about the trade press generally: "Farm magazines, like many 
other specialized publications, tend to have a somewhat narrow advertising base. The 
inherent danger of losing a single major advertiser that might be displeased by 
unfavorable editorial content necessarily weighs more heavily on the minds of farm 
magazine editors and publishers.”307 The survey also reported that advertisers sometimes 
attempted to win over journalists with gifts and free meals. In the survey, 64% of 
journalists agreed with the statement, “Some media seem to bend over backwards to 
some of the commercial outfits to butter up sponsors, advertisers and the like.”308  
Backwater	
The history of corruption, influence of advertisers over editorial content, cozy 
relationships with companies and government, lack of a watchdog culture, and a narrow 
focus on elite audiences all contributed to the reputation of business journalism as a 
backwater. This negative reputation continued all through the 1980s.309 A 1980 survey of 
newspaper editors showed much of the coverage did not challenge fundamental issues 
about the economic order and instead sought to promote capitalism. Ernest Hynds 
conducted a survey and found that “more than half (57 percent) of the newspapers seek to 
foster the development of the free enterprise system through their business coverage … 
Fewer newspapers reported doing exposes during the past year, and only 30% discussed 
                                                            
307 Hays and Reisner, “Feeling the Heat From Advertisers,” 1990. 
308 Hays and Reisner, “Feeling the Heat From Advertisers,” 1990. 
309 Parsons, The Power of the Financial Press, 1990; Ross, James, “When Trades 
Lead The Pack,” Columbia Journalism Review, November 1990. 
 94 
how corporations wield power, More than a fourth (27%) ran exposes on a local business, 
27% ran exposes on a state business, and 33% ran exposes on a national business.”310  
In general interest newspapers, business journalism traditionally lacked the stature 
of prominent assignments such as politics or foreign affairs. There was very little space 
set aside for stories of business journalists and few of these stories appeared on the front 
page. The business desk was "a dumping ground for burned out city-side reporters and 
others looking for a place to camp until retirement.”311 Sylvia Porter, fighting the 
widespread sexism in journalism, decided to pursue business journalism as first step for 
her reporting career. Noting business journalism’s lack of prestige, Lucht said Porter 
“accepted a job in a non-prestigious field of journalism.”312 
Such criticism was especially pointed for the trade press, which a 1990 Columbia 
Journalism Review derided as dull, "too cozy with the industries they cover.” Gussow313 
described the trade press, with few exceptions, as "basically a hodgepodge. While 
improvements were made in the 1950s and 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that large 
numbers of business magazines took major steps to revamp their image and 
operations.”314 While trade press editors and reporters claimed to believe in journalistic 
standards, "trade publications may not meet these standards when covering the business 
strategies and developments of the industries they serve,” according to Hollifield’s 1997 
study of the trade press. “Specifically, there is evidence that the trade media may be 
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reluctant to write about the negative impact that industry-related expansion and 
development may have on individuals and society.”315  
We see this lack of prestige voiced by even its leading practitioners up until the 
modern era. Elite publications such as The Wall Street Journal failed to devote adequate 
resources to the issue and missed the story. Paulette Thomas, a former Wall Street 
Journal reporter, said the savings and loan beat “has never been a particularly high 
profile beat for any financial reporter over the years. And I think the Wall Street Journal’s 
Washington bureau has had a new reporter on this beat every year since 1981.”316 Myron 
Kandel, CNN's former financial editor, was hardly enthusiastic when he learned about his 
first business news job opportunity: "My first reaction was, "Who wants to be in business 
news?" 317 
Watchdog:	Complex	Legacy		
 In the early years of business journalism, the journalists were not watchdogs over 
the industries they covered. This genre focused on the protection of capitalism but not 
necessarily the protection of consumers. Perhaps the most vivid early example involved 
Bertie Forbes, a columnist for Hearst newspapers, who started Forbes magazine in 1917. 
Forbes was perhaps the first business magazine aimed at general readers.318 Forbes' 
inaugural issue contained a classic case of business journalism pandering to the powerful. 
An exclusive interview with John D. Rockefeller was entitled "How Forbes Gets Big 
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Men to Talk" and compared Rockefeller to Napoleon. This is an example of business 
journalists acting as if they were part of the club they are covering. Quirt explained it in 
the following way:  
One reason so much of the reporting during that period lacked a 
measure of doubt was the curious view that business journalism 
had of itself. It saw itself not so much as a tough-minded 
chronicler of events as it did as an extension of the community it 
wrote about. 319 
 
Muckrakers such as Ida Tarbell, Lincoln Steffens, Upton Sinclair, and Jacob Riis 
wrote some of the toughest articles about businesses at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Muckrakers’ targets were food companies, meat plants, oil and gas conglomerates or 
railroads, but as Chris Roush wrote, “The reporters and editors working on these stories 
did not consider themselves `business’ journalists’.”320 Perhaps these journalists avoided 
the business journalism title due to its lack of stature at the time. Much of the 
muckraker’s work was published in general interest magazines, such as Harper’s 
America and McClure’s. There was plenty to write about. A great consolidation of 
corporate power and wealth took place starting in the 1880s, led by financier J.P. 
Morgan, industrialists John D. Rockefeller, Jay Gould, Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius 
Vanderbilt, and others. This so-called “robber baron” era was a time of significant 
corporate mergers, with some 4,277 U.S. companies collapsing into 257 firms between 
1897 to 1904.321  
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Without a doubt, Tarbell pioneered many investigative business journalism 
techniques, such as corporate affiliation research, in her influential series on 
Rockefeller.322 Tarbell’s work and that of other muckrakers was well outside the 
established norms of business and financial journalism at the time. No one had performed 
such detailed documentary work on a major business executive. Tarbell’s reporting from 
1902-1904 helped unravel Rockefeller’s broad monopoly in the oil industry by 
documenting operations of his Standard Oil empire. Later, the U.S. Justice Department 
filed a major antitrust lawsuit against Standard Oil and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 
1911 that Standard Oil was an illegal monopoly. Tarbell’s reporting achievement in the 
early 1900s was even more remarkable considering her gender; discrimination was so 
embedded in society that women did not even have the right to vote.  
Another influence from the Progressive Era was the labor movement, which 
emerged from industrial abuses in the late nineteenth century. Journalist John Swinton’s 
coverage of union boycotts in the 1880s influenced business journalism for its challenge 
of the established business order: “What the labor newspaper movement signified was the 
growing tension between the working class and industry that would contribute to the 
Progressive movement and would spill over into the early 20th century into a brand of 
journalism that aggressively attacked business.”323  
The muckrakers’ critiques of concentrated economic power resonated with basic 
American values, which Morton Keller describes as “hostility to the active, centralized 
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state, deep commitments to social individualism and economic competition.”324 This 
journalism tapped into a significant political movement at the time, a populist opposition 
to finance prominent in agrarian communities. Indebted farmers in the South and West 
resented East Coast bankers and politicians’ defense of the dollar and the gold standard in 
an effort to prevent a flight of capital to Europe; retaining the gold standard defense 
effectively placed farmers in a severe cash crunch.325 William Jennings Bryan gave a 
voice to this anti-finance, populist uprising, a cultural force that endures to this day and is 
seen in the rhetoric of 2016 presidential candidate Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont. The 
work of Tarbell and other muckrakers was celebrated by the Progressive Movement, and 
one of its intellectual champions, Louis Brandeis, later the U.S. Supreme Court justice. 
Brandeis penned a critique of J.P. Morgan and other trusts, one that evoked similar 
themes of excessive monopoly power examined by muckrakers. Brandeis’ 1914 critique 
of economic power in Other People’s Money served as an inspiration for key New Deal 
architects, James Landis, Louis Frankfurter, and William O. Douglas.326   
A new profession of public relations arose in part due to the corporate backlash 
against muckrakers and the Progressive era. J.P. Morgan, for example, adopted an 
aggressive public relations campaign in 1912 ahead of the Pujo congressional hearings on 
financial abuses in the market.327 Other major corporations began using public relations 
strategies. As early as 1887, General Electric and Westinghouse hired publicity agents to 
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promote their businesses.328 As Schudson notes, “The public relations that developed in 
the early part of the 20th century as a profession which responded to, and helped shape, 
the public … This had a far-reaching impact on the ideology and daily social relations of 
American journalism.”329  
Trade	Press-Watchdog	
While business journalism lacks an explicit watchdog ideal, a close examination 
of trade press history reveals several strong examples of watchdog journalism that served 
the public interest. Elfenbein wrote that readers of the trade press value articles 
containing interpretation and analysis of companies and events. General news can't just 
be repeated; trade press articles must say how an issue affects them and their business. 
"The modern corporation needs a critical business press" Elfenbein wrote, saying the 
business press has a watchdog role comparable to the press' role in politics. "The modern 
corporation needs the free -- that is, free to be critical -- press just as much as the 
government does; It needs it as one of the fundamental checks and balances of a free 
enterprise economy."330 
This oversight role is valuable to the readers of the trade press. Top industry 
executives find the trade press to be a better source of information than the mainstream 
press and the trade media can set the news agenda for the general press. The trade press 
may lead the pack by functioning as "an insider channel of communication in the early 
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stages of industry-related policy processes.”331 Existing scholarship describes the strong 
impact of business journalism on corporate reputations and in setting the news agenda.332  
Some literature in business management measures the impact the news media on 
corporate reputations. David Deephouse studied how media coverage of banks in St. Paul 
and Minneapolis helped the reputation of the banks and then incrementally increased the 
banks’ return on assets.333 
Trade press histories have described cases in which these business publications 
were ahead of their mainstream competition and provided a service to the broader 
society, all themes in this National Thrift News study. Roger Burlingame noted a 
remarkable report by the Engineering News about the collapse of the Quebec Bridge in 
1907 that killed 75 workers. An Engineering News editor and a writer conducted 
extensive interviews, performed engineering calculations, and discovered design flaws 
that caused the bridge collapse. The episode was a "telling illustration of the value of the 
technical press.”334 The Engineering News articles challenged the established order in the 
industry. "The tragedy, the News candidly stated, was an indictment on the entire 
profession.”335  
One compilation of important trade press stories, Journalism That Matters: How 
Business-to-Business Editors Change the Industries They Cover, described how these 
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niche publications can prompt change in their industries. Andre Shashaty, a reporter for 
Multi-Housing News in September 1988 "provided the first report" of an influence-
peddling scandal at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development involving 
lobbyist James Watt, the former U.S. interior secretary. This story was picked up by 
newspapers such as The Washington Post and led to reform legislation.336  A 2003 report 
by Government Computer News described how Laura Callahan, deputy chief information 
officer at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, inflated her credentials with a PhD 
purchased from a diploma mill. She was later suspended.337  Outstanding trade press 
reporting is celebrated each year by the Jesse H. Neal Awards, sponsored by the 
Association of Business and Information & Media Companies.338 Other literature has 
praised trade publications such as Variety, Broadcasting, and Women's Wear Daily as 
"often aggressive analysts of the industries they cover.”339 The publications received little 
public notice or credit for campaigning for better work and safety standards, for 
endorsing and in some cases helping form professional groups as well as publicizing 
innovations to make industry more efficient and profitable.340 Indeed, one theme in 
academic literature is that these specialized journals set out to conduct in-depth and 
analytical journalism.  
As described in more detail later in this dissertation, Strachan challenged the 
savings and loan and mortgage industry in several ways, drawing ire but also respect. 
                                                            
336 Freedman, Robert, and Steven, Roll, Journalism That Matters : How Business-
to-Business Editors Change the Industries They Cover, (Oak Park, Ill.: Marion Street 
Press, 2006), 16. 
337 Freedman,  Journalism That Matters, 2006,  88. 
338 Association of Business and Information & Media Companies, “The 61st 
Annual Jesse H. Neal Awards,” 2015.  
339 Welles, “The Bleak Wasteland of Financial Journalism,” 1973. 
340 Endres, Kathleen, ed., The Trade, Industrial and Professional Periodicals of 
the United States, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994). 
 102 
Laib wrote this is how a strong trade publication should function: "In principle the 
worthy trade journal is not afraid of antagonizing its advertisers and feels free to criticize 
the industry, individual companies or products -- something company house organs and 
trade association bulletins rarely do.”341 This is even more difficult in the finance and 
banking industry, where reporters face difficulty mastering issues of a complex and 
technical industry as well as significant political push-back from banks and other 
financial institutions involving critical stories. Strachan also brought a hard-news 
reporting sensibility to the industry and was willing to criticize his industry allies and 
sources if he saw fit. "Everybody understood Stanley was a maverick," recalled Ranieri, 
Strachan’s close personal friend and a prominent Wall Street financier. "We would go to 
industry conferences and everybody knew Stanley would make up his own mind and he 
was the maverick.”342  
 Strachan’s independence as a business journalist has its roots in the genre’s 
broader evolution, particularly with the introduction of analytic reporting in the 
nineteenth century at the Commerical and Financial Chronicle. As this chapter has 
described, business journalism has grown to serve multiple audiences: business 
executives, stock traders, investors, retirees, politicians, social activists, and others. It is a 
broader source of information that focuses its reporting on the business community but 
also interacts with other genres of journalism, from political to sports to community 
reporting. At the same time, modern business journalism has retained some of the key 
features of the trade press, such as reporting for a specialized audience, news to serve 
business and market participants as well as the endorsement of free market capitalist 
                                                            
341 Laib, “The Trade Press,” 1955. 
342 Ranieri, Lewis, Interview with Lewis Ranieri, August 12, 2015. 
 103 
ideals. The following chapter will show how Strachan’s newspaper was the product of 


























































This chapter first will examine the evolution of modern business journalism in the 
twentieth century and how the National Thrift News fit into broader cultural and business 
trends in the United States, particularly after World War I.343 Broadly speaking, the 
cultural trends were driven by a new readership, a new professional business class that 
arose with a broader managerial revolution in U.S. business. These new professionals 
needed more than dry facts from the old price current publications, and a more 
interpretive style of business journalism arose to meet their needs. Publisher Henry Luce, 
for example, launched Fortune magazine in 1929 to serve this new professional class. He 
also believed journalism was able to properly report on the broader story of his 
generation, the rise and dominance of free enterprise. Demand for business news grew at 
home, too, as a new consumer and mass culture began to rise in the early twentieth 
century. Thorstein Veblen’s 1899 Theory of the Leisure Class, identified a new trend of 
“conspicuous consumption” which spoke to the emergence of a consumer class and 
economy in the U.S.344 As personal incomes grew, individual investors sought insight 
about the market and business issues. Business news expanded in various forms, with 
mass circulation magazines such as Forbes and Fortune, syndicated personal finance 
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columns from authors such as Sylvia Porter and Knight Kiplinger rose to meet that 
demand. Andrew Yarrow wrote how business journalism readership expanded 
enormously in the twenty years after World War II: “Most significantly, financial 
journalists recognized that the era's big story was America's dramatic economic growth 
and mass prosperity along with the changes that these were bringing about in American 
society.”345 It is within this broader context that the National Thrift News was launched in 
1976, at a time when the U.S. markets were poised for a dramatic expansion due to 
technological innovation and globalization. 
The mid-1970s marked the beginning of the savings and loan crisis, and this 
chapter will describe the broader economic forces leading to this debacle. The U.S. began 
to lose its role as the dominant global leader in the 1970s as it faced growing competition 
from Japan and Germany and their production of quality consumer and industrial goods. 
Globalization of currency and bond markets, combined with technological innovations 
such as the mortgage-backed security, also caused market turbulence. These innovations 
clashed with a financial regulatory system that grew out of the 1929 stock market crash. 
This chapter will describe how the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. influenced the scope of news 
coverage during the savings and loan drama, setting the agenda in many respects. These 
agencies were under strain as well as under political attack in the 1970s and 1980s as the 
U.S. economy faced challenges from globalization and revolutions in finance. Amid such 
disruptions in the U.S. economy, a new school of neoliberalism and deregulation 
ascended, particularly during Ronald Reagan’s administration, which sought to reduce 
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government’s role in the market and allow businesses to grow out of their problems. This 
deregulatory movement created significant tensions and dysfunction and was a primary 
force underlying the savings and loan crisis. These broad forces of market turmoil and a 
deregulatory ideology underpinned the savings and loan crisis and inform the activities of 
savings and loan executives Charles Keating and David Paul, who are the subjects of the 
content analysis in subsequent chapters. 
Roots	in	1920s	 	
In the 1920s, the U.S. business press provided an upbeat portrayal of business and 
capitalism. The coverage fit the national political mood, embodied by President Calvin 
Coolidge’s endorsement of laissez-faire economics. Amid the growing individual wealth 
and economic expansion, speculation grew in the stock market in the late 1920s.346 John 
Kenneth Galbraith described the prevailing view about the markets: “By the summer of 
1929, the market not only dominated the news. It also dominated the culture.”347 Yet few 
business journalists reported skeptically on this rising market bubble. According to one 
scholar, The Wall Street Journal was “one of the main cheerleaders” of the stock market 
leading up to the 1929 crash. Three days before the Oct 29, 1929 crash, the Journal 
reported: “Hoover Asserts Business Sound.”348 The day after the crash, on Oct. 30, 1929, 
the Journal’s headline read: “Stocks Steady After Decline."  
Reporting on the markets in this decade represented a dramatic failure of business 
journalism. Many publications fueled the market speculation and failed to warn readers 
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about the 1929 market crash.349 Newspapers "were noticeably bullish along with the rest 
of Wall Street" after 1924.350 Some journalists were bribed into stoking the 
speculation.351 Business journalism, while growing, also was a niche field during the 
1920s and lacked an ethical code and stature in the field.352 However, Alexander D. 
Noyes of the New York Times offered one bright spot in the 1920s business reporting. 
Noyes’ market coverage did not buy into the stock market hype in this decade. He had 
covered the 1901 market bubble and crash, which led him to voice concerns about the 
1920s bull market. Under Noyes’ leadership, the Times “financial page was all but 
immune to the blandishments of the New Era. A regular reader could not doubt that a day 
of reckoning was expected.”353  There are other instances of outstanding business 
coverage in the decade. New York World reporter John J. Leary Jr. in 1920 won one of 
the first Pulitzer Prizes involving a business or economic issue for his coverage of a coal 
strike.354 Galbraith praised other members of the business press, such as the financial 
news service Poor’s and the Standard Statistics Company which “never lost touch with 
reality.”355 
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Government	Sets	the	Agenda		
Ample research has described how government regulators and politicians help set 
the agenda for the news media.356 For business journalism, the government assumed a 
prominent role in framing the news agenda after the trauma of the Great Depression. The 
radical prescriptions of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda to build 
a social safety net and boost regulation of business changed the relationship between the 
government and the markets. The New Deal also represented a paradigm shift in 
economic thought away from laissez-faire economics to the Keynesian economic model, 
or a focus on macroeconomic policy357 and politics, and it influenced the rise of a new 
genre of economics journalism.358 John Maynard Keynes’ theory of countercyclical 
spending— an increase in government spending when the economy is weak and a 
reduction when it is booming— is a radical notion that governments could and should 
change the behavior of markets and businesses through strategic management of the 
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economy.359 Keynes actively published his ideas in the popular press, writing some 300 
articles for the New York Post, The Nation, The New Republic and others: “Journalism 
enabled Keynes to have a ready command of public (outside) and policy making (inside) 
opinion.”360 The Depression and the New Deal made the economy a mass interest story 
like never before. Economist Herbert Stein, chairman of the White House Council of 
Economic Advisers from 1972-1974, told Quirt:  
 
Before the war, reporters had looked to Wall Street for answers to 
their economic questions. But some of the people there had 
gotten themselves pretty well discredited in the ’30s, and 
Washington was starting to become the arbiter on economic 
matters. …  Government declared that it was going to do business 
in economics, so everyone had to start learning the language of 
economics. The press had a lot of catching up to do.361   
 
Time magazine became an example of a mainstream publication that provided 
more prominent coverage of the economy from 1933 forward. In this era, “the definition 
of news changed. The demand for facts and explanations of what was happening 
increased.”362  
New	Deal	Regulation	and	Journalism	
From the Great Crash emerged the pillars of the modern financial regulatory 
network, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in 1933, Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1934, and National Labor Relations Board in 1935. To this day, these 
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agencies serve as key resources for modern financial journalists. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission, established to regulate publicly traded companies and police the 
many of the financial markets, has an enforcement framework founded on financial 
disclosure to the public. Roosevelt aide James Landis crafted the Securities Act as a 
sunshine law, forcing companies to disclose pertinent financial details to the market, and, 
by extension, through the press.363 Business journalists eventually play a significant role 
in scouring the SEC corporate filings for market-moving news stories. With this 
arrangement, the SEC leveraged the press to advance its policing of the markets. The 
media’s essential role as information source to the U.S. capital markets is spelled out in 
federal securities laws. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s “Regulation FD” 
requires companies to use newspaper, wire services or press releases to announce 
significant corporate news such as mergers, quarterly earnings, or management 
changes.364  
With the creation of these new federal banking and market watchdogs, the federal 
government for the first time directly regulated banks, Wall Street firms and stock 
markets. Parsons writes that, "Washington became an economic news center that rivaled 
the pre-eminence of the financial district: from the 1930s onwards, governments were 
making economic news.”365 Business journalism's daily agenda was now greatly 
influenced by a set of economic indicators, which limited the news story selection in 
some respects.366 To critics, this is the root of business journalism's overreliance on 
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government as a news source, an issue that arose in reporting on the savings and loan 
crisis.367 Strachan agreed with this critique, citing cases where other news media failed to 
challenge regulators and failed to pursue the early Keating Five revelations.368  
Rising	Professional	Class	-	Interpretive	Journalism		
The emerging business journalism in the early twentieth century was shaped by 
the significant changes in the U.S. culture and economy in this era. Alfred Chandler’s 
study of the managerial revolution in U.S. business in this era summarized the dynamic 
factors driving growth of the American economy: development of concentrated urban 
markets for industrial and consumer goods, rise of mass production technology, 
electrification and the internal combustion engine and organized research and 
development.369 A new professional class was taking hold as the country witnessed a 
growing urbanization and rise of corporations amid a decline of small towns and small 
businesses.370 Following World War I, the U.S. enjoyed a period of growth and 
prosperity, partly because its industry was not damaged by the war. An emerging middle 
class began to expand. “Individual investors entered the market in unprecedented 
numbers, with a growing desire, whetted by broadly successful issues of wartime 
industries to get rich via securities, including common stocks.”371 The rising 
consumerism was fueled by banks that supplied credit to individuals; by the 1920s 
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consumer spending amounted to two-thirds of the U.S. gross domestic product. President 
Calvin Coolidge embraced free market capitalism and pushed for limited government and 
tax cuts. This trend propelled a stock market boom; the number of shareholders in the 
U.S. quadrupled in a six-year span to 10 million in 1930.372 Yet as Harold Bierman has 
noted, “the 1920s were, in fact, a period of real growth and prosperity.” 373 
In the 1920s, a new phase of managerial capitalism began as modern business 
enterprise arose in the United States. Chandler wrote these new companies employed 
professional managers to run corporations, which represented a separation of ownership 
and control of the company.374 It was this new professional class that Fortune publisher 
Henry Luce saw as an important new readership and constituency in the U.S. economy. 
His new magazine would serve this managerial class with a new interpretive journalism 
that brought together bolder reporting techniques and literary journalism. “The 
establishment of large culture industries in years after World War I brought the estranged 
worlds of artist and business executive together in new way.”375  
Luce wanted his new business publication to tell a story about how these large 
corporations were changing the social fabric of the nation: “Fortune magazine had a 
prominent role in shaping the way professional business managers imagined themselves-
and were imagined by others-as political and social beings.”376 These new companies 
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provided employees the potential for a lifelong attachment to an enterprise with 
considerable social welfare benefits, from pensions to health insurance. This managerial 
phase, which ran into the 1980s, generally overlapped with the progressive politics and 
assertive government activity marked by Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society. Luce’s journalistic vision was driven by larger cultural 
observations about American hegemony and imperialism, ideas that form his concept of 
the “American Century.”377   
 Fortune also emphasized an interpretive style of reporting that stood up to the 
business community and challenged conventional wisdom; he envisioned Fortune as a 
“devil’s advocate.”378 This sort of ethos was reflected in the National Thrift News 
decades later as it wrote increasingly critical articles about the savings and loan industry. 
Luce was influenced by trends in 1920s journalism and used candid camera techniques to 
catch business executives unaware and off guard, making them appear more human.379 
Reilly wrote that “part of the power of Fortune’s business journalism was that it seldom 
took the manufactured public image of an executive or a corporation at face value. 
Fortune was never allowed to be anti-private business but even when articles were not 
particularly critical, the subjects often seemed upset.”380 Fortune also placed greater 
emphasis on context and used specialist reporters.381 This was a step towards more 
interpretive reporting, something that gained greater prominence in the 1930s as 
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journalists sought to place events in greater historical and social context and to answer 
“why” an event happened.382 
Others in business journalism began to position their publications to serve this 
rising professional class. For example, Business Week, founded just weeks before the 
1929 stock market crash, focused on economic news.383 The Wall Street Journal began its 
transformation into the modern newspaper it is today. Barney Kilgore, a journalistic 
prodigy who became Dow Jones president at age 37, offered a bolder new vision for 
business journalism.384 Like Luce, he saw the potential for a national daily newspaper to 
serve a rising professional class, and he pushed for construction of new printing plants in 
Texas, Maryland, and California to deliver the Journal to senior and middle managers 
across the country. Kilgore had a vision for a national newspaper decades before the 
creation of USA Today.385 A strong writer, Kilgore helped transform the writing and 
reporting of a business story, bringing in broader context of political and cultural trends 
and demystifying arcane language. “A business newspaper must be two things at one and 
the same time,” Kilgore wrote. “It must be specialized. Yet the interests and activities of 
its editors must be as diverse as the American landscape.”386 Kilgore’s vision benefitted 
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The Wall Street Journal, which saw its circulation rise from 100,000 in 1947 to 615,000 
by 1956.  
As this professional class and the broader U.S. economy grew, so did the trade 
press.387 Business news accelerated in the 1950s with the general post World War II 
prosperity; one study claimed the trade press grew in this decade at a rate faster than the 
U.S. economy as a whole.388 This fit a broader theme in this dissertation of how the 
National Thrift News grew during a dramatic expansion of the mortgage market and bond 
market in the 1980s. The U.S. savings and loan industry was a primary source of credit 
for the rapidly growing post-World War II Baby Boom generation to finance housing. 
This growth and demographic change brought significant changes to the financial 
markets, particularly in the 1970s, and greatly influenced business journalism. As 
discussed in more detail below, Reuters launched a new service to accommodate the 
growing foreign currency markets. Strachan's newspaper emerged to help the savings and 
loan industry deal with the challenges of that growth.389 
Consumer	Culture	-	Personal	Finance	Journalism	
 
Business leaders were not the only ones demanding better reporting about 
business and finance. Individuals began to invest their growing wealth in stocks and 
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bonds, a trend that began after the U.S. Treasury Department started marketing war bonds 
during World War I. Julia Ott wrote: 
Because the War Loan campaigns celebrated the benefits of 
investment as a general practice, they opened the door for 
postwar marketers of corporate stocks in the 1920s. …In 1900, 
the average American had nearly nothing to do with financial 
markets and institutions, but by the time of the stock market crash 
of 1929 stock ownership had spread to a quarter of American 
households.390 
 
There were other signs of growing individual prosperity: total real U.S. income 
rose by 10.5 percent a year from 1921 to 1923, Bierman noted. Bertie Forbes, a columnist 
for Hearst newspapers, sought to seize the opportunity in the rising investor culture by 
founding Forbes magazine in 1917. Davis wrote how this trend led to a stock market 
boom. Indeed, the number of shareholders in the U.S. quadruple in a six-year span to 10 
million in 1930.391  
As the markets expanded in the 1920s, a growing consumer class began to look 
for financial advice. Journalist Sylvia Porter saw this need and pioneered the new genre 
of personal finance journalism.392 Porter’s reporting boiled down the complexities of 
compounding interest rates and fixed income investments for average readers. In doing 
so, she captured the rise of mass culture from popular culture in the twentieth century, 
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reflected in journalism with an expansion of syndicated columnists, national magazines, 
and self-help literature.393 Porter began her career in an obscure, low-prestige assignment, 
as a bond market columnist for the New York Post in 1935. Once on the beat, Porter 
mastered financial topics and focused her mission on her readers. She wrote for multiple 
audiences, ranging from bankers to housewives. Tracy Lucht wrote, “Here was a woman 
who did not fit our cultural memory of the fifties. She was rich, she was respected, and 
she was not a housewife.”394 Porter’s rise to prominence in the 1950s and 1960s mirrored 
the broader post World War II prosperity and the growing importance of business 
journalism to average households. From 1947 to 1965, U.S. per capita income increased 
by 234 percent while the economy, as measured by the gross domestic product, grew by 
212 percent. Demand from a growing “baby boom” generation for food, housing, 
education and other necessities powered this growth. U.S. industry, undamaged from 
World War II, was the unquestioned world leader and enjoyed healthy exports abroad. 
This economic expansion transformed the American landscape with the construction of 
interstate highways and suburban communities. Lucht noted the demand for personal 
finance news also was driven by women's growing presence in the workforce, and the 
G.I. Bill, which created a “higher number of financial choices” for veterans.395 After 
decades of market turbulence, this post World War II period had a new "ideology of 
abundance."  
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pre-dated radio and television. Mass culture refers to media produced after popularization 
of cinema, radio and television, news and entertainment to serve a more concentrated 
industrial society. See DiMaggio, Paul, “Market Structure, the Creative Process, and 
Popular Culture: Toward an Organizational Reinterpretation of Mass Culture Theory,” 
Journal of Popular Culture 11, no. 2 (Fall 1977): p 436. Also Lucht, “Sylvia Porter,” 
2007.  
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Porter, while leading a new journalistic genre, was also benefitting from this 
broader upswing in the economy. Other publications caught the wave. In 1947, W.M. 
Kiplinger created what is believed to be the first personal finance magazine, Changing 
Times, The Kiplinger Magazine. Porter and Kiplinger represented a more analytical bent 
in business journalism that envisioned a broader mission to serve average consumers 
rather than its historic readership of brokers and businessmen: “Financial reporting 
changed from reciting stock quotations, company earnings, and puff pieces on 
businessmen and individual companies to broader stories about the national economy and 
what economic trends meant for average Americans.”396 
Media	Business	1960s	-	Business	News	Grows	
The news media industry was among those that benefitted tremendously in this 
period of economic prosperity. In this era, the general public bought and read 
newspapers. In 1965 daily paid circulation was about 60 million, equivalent to 105% of 
households.397 In the media business, chain newspaper ownership increased in the 1960s 
and media companies began to sell stock to the public. Prior to this, media firms were 
mainly held by family-owned firms. Many newspaper companies had a patriarchal 
approach to newspaper ownership, which was the case with Strachan and National Thrift 
News.398 Reader surveys at this time show a demand for more local business news, more 
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stock market news and to a less extent, more news on government economic policy. In 
1966, Hubbard surveyed of 162 daily newspaper business and financial editors and 81 
percent said their readership's demand for business news had "increased substantially" 
since 1960.399 Gussow said that in the mid-1970s was when "the consumer press really 
`discovered' the appeal of business news for the general public and the revenue potential 
for advertising."400 Tambini described this period as “a golden age of financial 
journalism” in which a few players such as the Financial Times in London and The Wall 
Street Journal in New York “enjoyed a privileged monopoly provision as specialist 
business news providers…. Supported by ‘tombstone’ announcement401 advertising by 
large corporate clients and steady sales, with little serious competition, times were 
easy.”402 
 
In this environment of expanding advertising sales and reader thirst for business 
news, the National Thrift News launched in 1976. Business newspaper advertising was $1 
billion in 1976, up 40 percent in just six years.403 During the first 10 years of the National 
Thrift News, all business newspaper advertising for the entire industry rose 130 percent to 
$2.4 billion. Many other publications sought to catch the wave. In May 1978, The New 
York Times created a new daily separate section called "Business Day,” a business 
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journalism arms races in which virtually every major newspaper would add a business 
section.”404 The Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, The Washington Post and 
Philadelphia Inquirer were among papers that added separate business news sections. In 
the 1980s, new stand-alone business publications launched such as Investors Business 
Daily, which began in 1984. The Financial Times of London expanded into the U.S. In 
the 1980s and the Economist magazine saw U.S. subscriber growth. "The 1970s appeared 
to be a pivotal decade in the expansion of the specialized business press field,” Endres 
wrote, adding: “As runaway inflation, deregulation and recession clouded the economic 
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Figure 1. Total Advertising, 1920-1995 
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environment, the corporate leaders turned increasingly to new business publications for 
their informational needs.”405 
During this period, the media industry continued to prosper. Total daily 
newspaper advertising more than doubled in the 1980s, from $14.8 billion in 1980 to 
$32.3 billion in 1990.406 Newsroom employment grew 22%, from 45,500 in 1980 to 
55,700 in 1990.407  
The growth was not confined to newspapers. Fortune magazine went from a 
monthly to a twice-monthly publication schedule while BusinessWeek became “the 
biggest seller of advertising for any magazine.”408 Throughout the 1980s, weekly 
newspapers devoted to business news sprang up in major cities. According to Roush, “By 
the end of the 1980s, every major newspaper’s business section was competing against a 
weekly that focused solely on business news.”409 Another characteristic of the 1980s 
involved the growing specialization of financial news, which was sold increasingly 
through databases and specialized reports. Information increasingly became a commodity 
as technology expanded and the price of computing power dropped. Technological 
innovations in the 1980s included The Associated Press’ use of satellites for news 
transmission and the Microsoft Corp.’s development of its Windows operating system for 
personal computers. Other disruptive technologies became prominent. Individuals gained 
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greater control and selection over media ranging from the personal computer to 
videocassette recorders to the Sony Walkman music player.  
Television moved to meet a new audience interest in business and economics. 
Louis Rukeyser's weekly Wall $treet Week with Louis Rukeyser program (produced by 
Maryland Public Television) began in 1970. In 1979, a PBS affiliate in Miami launched 
Nightly Business Report, a pioneering daily business news show on public television. 
Cable television started to erode the traditional gatekeeping function of the news media. 
In 1980, all-news cable television channel Cable News Network or CNN started 
broadcasting, and with it, the financial news show MoneyLine with host Lou Dobbs. 
Figure 2. Advertising, business papers, 1950-1995.  
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(National Thrift News publisher Strachan was a frequent guest on CNN in the late 1980s, 
commenting on the economy and the thrift industry.) A number of broadcast business 
news outlets started, including the business news radio show Marketplace and Consumer 
News and Business Channel or CNBC in 1989. In 1981, Michael Bloomberg started a 
new financial data service, finding a niche in the growing bond market. (National Thrift 
News also was a beneficiary of the growing bond market.) The successful Bloomberg 
L.P. data terminal business led to the launch of a news service in 1989.410  These growing 
markets funded expansions of the newsrooms, particularly at Reuters and Bloomberg. 
Growing	Tension	
The growth in business news, particularly in the 1970s, also created considerable 
friction between the press and the corporate community. Historians attributed some of the 
tension to a growing cultural distrust of institutions.411 This distrust intensified in the 
post-Watergate Era, when journalists flexed their investigative reporting muscles. The 
dominant criticism of the business press throughout this period is it failed to fulfill a 
watchdog role.412  
However, business leaders and even some journalists voiced another concern in 
the 1970s: that business news coverage had become excessively negative. Some 
academic studies bear this out. Joseph Dominick performed a content analysis of business 
coverage on CBS, ABC, and NBC with 360 programs examined in a sample from April 
1977 to March 1979. He found 54 percent of the stories portrayed businesses in a 
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negative light, while only 10 percent were positive.413 Henry Louis Banks, former editor 
of Fortune, said of this period, “We are fed a daily diet of authoritative ignorance, most 
of which conveys a cheap-shot hostility to business and businessmen.”414  
Sethi interviewed business leaders and senior editors in the mid-1970s about 
persistent business complaints about an anti-business bias. He found “business charges 
against the news media can be grouped into three categories: the "economic illiteracy of 
most journalists, inadequate coverage and antibusiness bias among news people.”415  Joe 
Bob Hester and Rhonda Gibson compared economic news coverage in The New York 
Times and ABC newscasts between July 1988 and June 2002 and compared it to standard 
economic indicators. They found: 
 
Economic news was framed as negative more often than as 
positive, and negatively framed news coverage was one of 
several significant predictors of consumer expectations about the 
future of the economy. The study supports the argument that 
media coverage, particularly the media's emphasis on negative 
news, may have serious consequences for both expectations of 
and performance of the economy…In 1992, for example, 
Republicans argued that the media's focus on negative news 
about the economy misled the American people and influenced 
the outcome of the presidential election.416    
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Companies pushed hard to complain about what they considered unfair media 
coverage. Drier cited an aggressive public relations campaign by Mobil Corp in the late 
1970s with full-page newspaper ads that decried “the myth of the crusading reporter.” 
Corporate complaints about negative media coverage reached such intensity that in 1977, 
nearly 100 senior U.S. corporate executives and journalists — from Merrill Lynch CEO 
and future Treasury Secretary Donald Regan to Washington Post publisher Katherine 
Graham — gathered near Princeton N.J. to air mutual grievances. Their deliberations, led 
by a group of Harvard and Columbia law professors, were captured in a 1979 book, The 
Media & Business, with an introduction by then-U.S. Health and Education and Welfare 
Secretary Joseph Califano and Washington Post managing editor Howard Simons.417 
Simons and Califano, in summarizing the nearly two-day session, described a litany of 
corporate complaints, such as sloppy, unfairly negative and inaccurate business reporting 
by untrained journalists. The media representatives replied that businesses were acting 
without sufficient public scrutiny. Simons and Califano wrote: 
 
Illegal campaign contributions, social accountability, health and 
safety, asbestos, thalidomide, the environment, the energy crisis, 
investment in apartheid — this is the stuff that fosters suspicion 
and discontent and investigative reporting…Part of the 
antagonism comes from a growing awareness not just among 
journalists but the public at large of aspects of business which 
until a few decades ago were not questioned very often or very 
loudly.418 
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Peter Drier argued that companies received negative coverage in this era because 
of a long list of environmental and corruption scandals. As a result, businesses saw a 
decline in public opinion polls. Drier wrote: 
 
Since the late 1960s, when public opinion polls began to report a 
dramatic decline in public confidence in big business, corporate 
leaders have discovered a convenient scapegoat — the news 
media…The Santa Barbara oil spill, Hooker Chemical's Love 
Canal problems, and the Three Mile Island power plant incident 
were all technological accidents that became grist for journalists' 
mills.419 
 
Drier argued the news media held back on more aggressive coverage of business: 
"Much of it is simply boosterism—glowing stories of new investment plans, 
fawning profiles of corporate executives, summaries of quarterly and annual corporate 
reports.”420 But Tambini argued that business journalists in the era were engaged in a 
form of superficial “gotcha” journalism. They focused “on the micro aspect of conflicts 
of interest relating to single companies, and neglect broader issues such as the role of 
business reporting in relation to market sentiment in general.”421 One survey also faulted 
business journalism coverage, especially with smaller newspapers, where editors were 
unlikely to challenge businesses. J.T.W. Hubbard reported that two-thirds of editors of all 
newspapers with a circulation of 50,000 or less “indicated they would maintain a 
`generally cooperative relationship with business,’ only covering corporate irregularities 
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when `they are the subject of formal hearings conducted by courts or regulatory 
agencies’”422  
Strachan gained prominence in the 1970s as a seasoned and important financial 
trade journalist. Companies may have not welcomed his reporting, but his work displayed 
a knowledge and depth of the field. Strachan understood finance and the thrift industry 
and earned a reputation as hard-hitting but fair.  
What	Was	The	National	Thrift	News?	
The National Thrift News launched in September 1976, a date well timed to 
benefit from growth and innovation in the U.S. financial markets and the growing 
consumer culture and its demand for housing. Strachan and the National Thrift News 
were able to ride two waves in the U.S. economy. One involved a deregulatory trend that 
began in the 1970s and accelerated under President Ronald Reagan. The second was the 
dramatic growth of the U.S. bond and credit markets during the same period, partly 
fueled by globalization of finance and related innovations.423  Broadly speaking, these 
twin economic trends of deregulation and financial innovation are still felt today with the 
enormous volatility in the global financial markets.   
 The National Thrift News’ main investors were John Glynn, an executive of the 
Sperry Corp., and Wesley Lindow, former president of Irving Trust Co. Lindow wanted 
to create a high quality newspaper to cover the industry and serve thrift insiders. Their 
business proposal cited demand from savings and loan executives for greater news 
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reporting with more frequency. The newspaper would provide in-depth coverage of 
national news and developments affecting the savings and loan business and would 
include “analytical and interpretive treatment of events” while also serving as a forum for 
regional associations and allied firms.424 He recalled telling the head of the U.S. League 
of Savings Institutions that the National Thrift News, "would help build up the 
industry.”425 Glynn and Lindow recruited Strachan as the editor, a journalist with an ideal 
profile to lead a trade newspaper. He had extensive experience, contacts, visibility, and a 
personal belief in the industry’s importance.  
After stints as a general news reporter at various New York newspapers, Strachan 
began his financial journalism career in 1961 when he joined the American Banker 
newspaper as a junior reporter. He rose to assistant managing editor at the American 
Banker and then left in approximately 1971, where he worked as a freelance and 
independent journalist until he was recruited to run National Thrift News in 1976. Aside 
from his journalistic achievements, Strachan had a personal belief in savings and loans 
could be a force for good by providing middle class families with the financing to buy a 
house.426 All of this made Strachan a popular figure in the industry. Later in his career, 
Strachan would be applauded when he arrived at a savings and loan industry event and 
given a reserved seat in the front room.427 
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National Thrift News began as a very modest operation in the fall of 1976. Its first 
office was in an apartment on New York’s West Side neighborhood. Back issues of the 
newspaper were filed in the bathtub.428 The Oct. 14, 1976 edition listed six employees: 
Thomas Rollo, publisher; Strachan, editor; and managers for production, classified 
advertising, circulation, as well as an auditor.429 Rollo, who served as publisher the first 
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Figure 3. National Thrift/Mortgage News Subscription Trends, 1979-1998 
 131 
two years, later claimed he originated the idea of National Thrift News but never received 
his promised 30 percent ownership stake in the venture. Rollo waged an eight-year legal 
battle with Glynn, Lindow and Strachan over ownership of the paper but lost the case in 
U.S. District Court in 1982 and a related case in New York State Supreme Court in June 
1990.430  
Amid this legal fight, the paper grew in circulation and staffing. By 1979, 
National Thrift News reported 10,754 total circulation, of which 4,360 was paid 
circulation.431  Total circulation peaked at 15,863 in 1985; during these years, the 
newspaper was filled with numerous full-page ads from the largest institutions on Wall 
Street, including Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, and Shearson Lehman Brothers. Circulation 
fell to 9,057 in 1990, primarily due to the collapse of the savings and loan industry and 
the 1987 stock market crash, which led Wall Street firms to cut back on advertising as a 
cost-cutting move. By 2014, circulation had fallen to 8,000.432 The length of the National   
Thrift News doubled after President Reagan signed legislation to deregulate the thrift 
industry in 1982. Before the 1982 deregulation bill, page counts ranged from 20 to 34 
pages. After the 1982 bill, page counts increased from 37 to 66 pages through 1987, a 
period when the stock market was booming and savings and loan activity was busy. 
Some issues in the mid-1980s reached as many as 92 pages. By 1990, page counts fell to 
about 27 pages at the peak of the S&L crisis.  
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National Thrift News subscriptions in 1979 were $35 a year. In the early years, if 
readers failed to renew their subscriptions, the paper continued to mail out the papers 
“since National Thrift News must guarantee advertisers a minimum of 10,000 
circulation," according to the paper’s auditor, Robert Gehlmeyer.433 Internal company 
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records showed that National Thrift News lost $46,639 in its first year of operation but 
was profitable by 1979, earning $134,749.434 "National Thrift News, financially, was 
making money almost from the get go. It was quite successful," Muolo said.435   
Editors and reporters listed in the masthead rose from two in 1976 to a peak of 18 
in 1986. Even when the savings and loan industry collapsed in the late 1980s, the paper 
maintained a steady editorial payroll of about 13 journalists through 1993, when staffing 
rose again to 15 amid a rebounding economy. The troubles in the savings and loan 
industry forced Strachan to rename the paper to National Thrift and Mortgage News in 
June 1989, a year when some 327 thrifts failed, closed or merged. He changed the name 
again to its current National Mortgage News in May 1990, a year when 213 thrifts failed. 
(These name changes follow an industry norm where trade publications evolve with their 
industries. M.B. Flynn noted, “When the street car, drawn by horses, gave place to the 
trolley car, propelled by electricity, the Street Railway Journal became the Electric 
Railway Journal.”436)  
There was disagreement about whether the critical coverage by the National 
Thrift News caused problems with advertisers. No advertising records or correspondence 
were available to measure trends in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Extensive attempts to 
locate these records were not successful. Officials at Source Media Inc., the current 
owner, said they were unaware if the records were preserved in prior sales of the 
publication. The former circulation and advertising staff declined numerous requests to 
discuss the business. As a result, I could not determine specifically the mix of advertising 
and circulation revenues. Muolo did not recall National Thrift News suffering advertising 
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losses due to its controversial journalism. By contrast, Kleege and Ranieri said the critical 
journalism caused some advertisers to leave but the extent of this trend was unclear.437 
Kleege said the National Thrift News won the 1988 George Polk Award not only for its 
particular coverage but also for the “great personal risk” that the stories would anger and 
alienate its industry readers.438 He and other reporters recalled the business struggled 
after the 1987 stock market crash. Some of the paper's most critical coverage came as the 
industry began to unravel due to speculation and greed. “Eventually, I think the shrinking 
of the S&L industry caught up with the paper,” Kleege said.439  
Muolo estimated that by the early 1990s, National Thrift News and its affiliated 
publications generated about $4 million in annual revenues from a combination of 
subscriptions, advertising and conference fees. National Thrift News and its parent, 
Dorset Group, were sold to Faulkner & Gray in March 1995, a sale prompted by 
Lindow’s death. Andrew L. Goodenough, then a senior vice president at Faulkner & Gray 
who was closely involved with the sale, estimated National Thrift News and its affiliated 
businesses generated about $3.2 million to $3.3 million in revenues at the time of the 
sale. 
Some reporters began to leave in 1989-1990 due to a lack of raises. During these 
lean times in the late 1980s, Strachan and National Thrift News investor John Glynn had 
“quite a few battles over the editorial budget behind closed doors,” Muolo recalled. At 
one point, Glynn pushed to lay off staff, which Strachan firmly opposed. "Stan basically 
said if you want me to lay off staff, I'll quit," Muolo said. The owners backed off, fearing 
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Strachan’s departure would damage the newspaper.440 Fogarty said the co-owners might 
argue with Strachan over budget issues but they defer to him in the end, in part because 
he was able to innovate and launch new products to meet the growing market. 441 
	
Diversification	
Strachan sought to innovate as technology rapidly evolved in the 1980s. He 
launched newsletters, books, and even a television broadcast with the National Thrift 
News and its holding company, the Dorset Group. The Dorset Group registered eight 
trademarks for various publications launched in the 1980s and 1990s, according to the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office database, ranging from the newsletter Money Market 
Techniques in 1982 to the Resolution Trust Reporter in 1990. Dorset also published 
specialty books, such as “Creative Real Estate Financing” and sponsored financial 
seminars, such as "Are You Ready to Hedge?”442  In this fashion, Strachan was part of a 
longstanding tradition in the trade press of turning financial and industry information into 
new products and services. Strachan and his staff also explored specialized video news 
reports. The Dorset Group in October 1984 announced it would produce “Convention 
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Report,” six hours of television interviews focused on the Mortgage Bankers Association 
annual convention in San Francisco.443 Muolo recalled the video news productions 
involve Strachan and correspondent Lew Sichelman interviewing the major speakers, 
attendees and top vendors at the Mortgage Bankers Association conference. The program 
was broadcast on closed circuit cable television in the convention hotels, the Mark 
Hopkins and St. Francis in San Francisco. Muolo, with some television production 
experience from college, helped lead the production. Wall Street firms such as Shearson 
Lehman, Drexel Burnham Lambert and Freddie Mac advertised or sponsored the 
broadcast, he said. “We made some nice money on it,” Muolo said. This venture was 
launched around 1984, at a time when “Wall Street was banging on our doors” and 
spending heavily on advertising, Muolo said.444  
 
Jane DeMarines, former vice president for public affairs at the Mortgage Bankers 
Association, said she helped line up guests for Strachan to interview at the conference. 
The “Convention Report” production had one or two cameras, no studio space and a 
limited staff. Strachan conducted most of the interviews. DeMarines did not recall any 
advertising on the program.445 When Mortgage Bankers Association officials were going 
to be interviewed by a major television news organization, DeMarines or her staff would 
prepare scripts for the officials, she said. That was not the case for the Strachan 
conference video interviews. “I’m not sure we took it so seriously. People knew Stan and 
he was well-liked,” DeMarines said. “My memory is it was sort of softball stuff.”446 The 
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annual convention was generally a very busy event for attendees and people didn’t 
usually have time to watch a convention-oriented news broadcast. “I don’t know if 
anybody watched it,” she said. “I was interviewed several times for it but I don’t recall 
ever looking at it.”447 
The	Savings	and	Loan	Crisis	 	
The following section summarizes the financial, regulatory, economic and 
technological trends that contributed to the savings and loan crisis. It then summarizes the 
major works of journalism concerning the savings and loan crisis, with particular focus 
on the media coverage of the Keating Five and CenTrust cases. It concludes with a 
review of major criticism of news media coverage of the crisis.  
Economy	
The economic roots of the savings and loan crisis can be traced back to the 
macroeconomic strains in the 1970s that triggered a strong rise in inflation. President 
Lyndon Johnson’s decision to spend on an expanded Vietnam War and new “Great 
Society” social welfare programs strained federal finances and boosted federal budget 
deficits. Meanwhile, U.S. industry’s global dominance was challenged by the rise of 
sophisticated manufacturing in Europe and Japan, where factories retooled following the 
devastation of World War II and exported quality consumer goods to the U.S. market. 
These pressures exerted by a rising U.S. debt, intensified overseas competition and 
lagging U.S. industry led President Richard Nixon to move the U.S. dollar off the gold 
standard in 1971, a decision that advanced development of modern foreign currency 
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markets and signaled a demise of U.S. economic dominance. The 1973 Arab oil embargo 
significantly destabilized the U.S. economy, bringing on a condition known “stagflation,” 
or high inflation and stagnant economic growth. Some academics viewed the onset of 
inflation and revelations of corporate misbehavior in the 1970s as significant turning 
points for general business journalism.448 
The inflation through 1979-1982 caused the “first” savings and loan crisis: thrifts 
could not pay the high interest rates on deposits because of federal government regulatory 
limits. Depositors withdrew their funds and pursued a better deal elsewhere, such as in 
Treasury bonds.449 Inflation hurt the core business of savings and loans, which primarily 
issued long-term mortgages at fixed rates. As interest rates rose, these mortgages lost 
significant value, which in turn erased the thrifts’ net worth.450 Simply put, savings and 
loans faced a slow death due to this mismatch in interest rates and maturities. “Interest-
rate risk had destroyed the industry on a market basis and mortally wounded it on an 
accounting basis by 1982,” a presidential commission examining the crisis reported in 
1993.451 This was the economic underpinning of the savings and loan disaster in the 
1980s, at the time the worst financial crisis in the nation's history after the banking 
collapse in the 1930s.  
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Business	-	Deregulation	
This inflationary shock and resulting economic problems in the mid-1970s did not 
respond to traditional Keynesian economic solutions. A growing neoliberal movement 
pushed tax cuts and deregulation onto the federal agenda, and President Jimmy Carter 
began the process of loosening federal rules to help solve the savings and loan industry’s 
ills by letting them grow out of their problems. Before leaving office, Carter signed into 
law significant tax reductions in the 1978 Revenue Act as well as reduction in regulations 
with the 1980 Monetary Control Act. President Ronald Reagan accelerated that trend, 
broadly deregulating industries ranging from airlines to trucking to banking. This 
deregulation, combined with the explosion of computer technology and the unsettled 
international markets, set off a cycle of financial turbulence that exists to this day.452  
A close examination showed the industry faced severe financial trouble. David 
Stockman, director of Ronald Reagan's Office of Management and Budget, warned that 
in 1981 ”any honest evaluation" of the industry "would show that its equity has been 
wiped out".453 William Black, the Federal Home Loan Bank regulator central in the fight 
with Keating, observed that by 1982, the industry was insolvent by roughly $150 
billion.454 This figure was particularly unnerving when compared to the mere $6 billion 
left in the savings and loan deposit insurance fund, known as the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Fund or FSLIC, to pay off insured depositors of insolvent thrifts. 
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Congress responded to these warnings and the industry lobbying with the 1982 Garn St. 
Germain Depository Institutions Act, which deregulated the industry by allowing savings 
and loans to offer higher interest rates and expand their lending into riskier areas. Similar 
deregulatory legislation passed in states such as California. Deregulation was evident in 
other ways. Regulators decided to delay the reckoning and permit insolvent thrifts to 
remain open, and they become known as “zombies.”455 Regulators and lawmakers also 
eased capital standards, or the reserve funds to pay off loan losses and other problems. In 
a deregulated environment, some thrifts speculated in commercial real estate, and others 
were taken over by criminals who used the institutions to launder illegal proceeds.456 
Deregulation contributed to poor supervision of the mortgage markets and is a factor in 
the savings and loan collapse as well as the 2008 financial crisis.457  
Popular culture’s attitudes towards wealth and capitalism changed significantly 
due to the ascendancy of Reagan and his deregulatory and free market inclinations. This 
capitalist-friendly mindset was ascendant; George Anders observed the 1980s marked the 
end of a 50-year period of economic egalitarianism.458 The decade, Anders wrote, was “a 
legendary period of unchecked profiteering” on par with the Robber Baron era of the 
1880s and the stock speculation of the 1920s. The 1987 film Wall Street, starring actor 
Michael Douglas as the iconic trader Gordon Gecko, famously described an emergent 
                                                            
455 Robinson, Kenneth J. “Savings and Loan Crisis 1980 - 1989,” Federal Reserve 
Board, November 22, 2013.  
456 Pizzo, et al.,  Inside Job, 1989. 
457 National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement, “Origins and Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform,” 
Washington, D.C., United States, July 1993; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Authorized Edition: Final Report of the National 
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 1 
edition, PublicAffairs, 2011. 
458 Anders, George, Merchants of Debt: KKR and the Mortgaging of American 
Business, (New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1992), xiv. 
 141 
business ethos with the phrase “greed is good.”459 A bond market rally began in 1982, 
followed by a stock market rally, aided by the success of then Federal Reserve Chairman 
Paul Volcker in bringing down inflation, expanding the money supply and eventually, 
reducing interest rates. Foreign investment returned to the U.S. The years between 1982 
and 1990 “were one of the longest periods in post-World War II history without a 
downturn in the economy.”460 Stock averages tripled between 1980 and 1989, creating $2 
trillion in paper wealth.461 Several regulatory changes made the U.S. markets more 
attractive. The Securities and Exchange Commission altered its stock underwriting rules 
to allow companies to raise money in the markets faster through pre-arranged shelf 
registration of securities. The Federal Reserve allowed overseas German and Japanese 
banks to become primary dealers in the Treasury bond market, a prestigious designation 
previously reserved for U.S.-based banks.462 At the same time, regulators permitted banks 
to purchase brokerage houses, beginning the erosion of Depression-era laws such as the 
Glass Steagall Act, which separated banks from securities firm.463 
Debt financing, which faced a stigma back to the years of Benjamin Franklin and 
Thomas Jefferson, enjoyed new popularity in the 1980s. Some of the changes were due to 
demographics. The generation of debt-averse executives who grew up in the Great 
Depression began to retire; these business leaders had avoided debt after witnessing how 
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financial speculation ruined families and communities during the Great Crash. In their 
wake was a new generation more willing to take financial risks. Big companies were 
“learning to love leverage.”464 This idea, in turn, was embraced by business schools and 
universities that taught the benefits of leveraged financing to a new crop of MBA 
students. The Reagan era was marked by the rise of a “credit culture” throughout society; 
consumer debt tripled in the 1980s to $3.7 trillion.465  
In finance, there was a mass movement toward corporate mergers in the 1980s 
that were financed by high levels of debt. At its peak, there were 381 leveraged buyouts 
in 1988 and the value of deals peaked at $70 billion in 1989.466 The financing of this new 
merger wave was aided by the rise of the high-yield or “junk bond” market.467 Michael 
Milken at Drexel Burnham Lambert brought a new vision to this junk bond market as a 
way for new companies to access global financial markets and expand. These buyouts 
and mergers symbolized the ascendancy of financial capitalism in the 1980s, which 
placed banks and other financial intermediaries in the center of the economy. It also 
meant managers emphasized investment returns when making production and other key 
decisions. This displaced managerial capitalism, which gave managers greater discretion 
to invest and expand, sometimes without the approval of shareholders.468 A new ethos of 
“efficiency,” a hallmark of financial capitalism, crept into boardrooms and CEO corner 
offices.  
With these changes came a broad breakdown in ethical culture in the financial 
sector in the 1980s. One factor involved a growing distance between employer and 
                                                            
464 Anders Merchants of Debt, 1992,  xvi. 
465 Anders Merchants of Debt, 1992,  20. 
466 Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists, 1998, 42. 
467 Kaufman, On Money and Markets, 2000. 
468 Smith and Sylla, The Transformation of Financial Capitalism, 1993. 
 143 
traders, or between brokers and customers on Wall Street. This involved a shift to a more 
technocratic and transactional business away from the long-term and personal style of 
business through relationships. According to economist Henry Kaufman, this change had 
serious implications for the long term functioning of the financial markets:  “Close 
relationships were being pushed aside by the increased volume of transactions in the open 
market, and by the profit that could be captured by trading, underwriting and merger 
activity.”469 The ascendancy of financial capitalism and this erosion of ethical standards 
helped account for the behavior of aggressive financiers such as Milken at Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, or David Paul at CenTrust or Charles Keating at Lincoln Savings, all 
of whom wound up in prison due to their excesses. 
 
Innovation	
Other demographic and financial forces swept through the U.S. business 
community. The inflationary shock and globalization of financial markets were problems 
in search of solutions, and a new wave of innovation in the bond and credit markets arose 
to meet these challenges. In the savings and loan industry, the financial strain limited 
thrifts’ ability to finance a homeownership surge from the Baby Boom generation, a 
major demographic phenomenon in the post-World War II society. Out of this 
predicament came the creation of modern mortgage-backed bonds, which became 
popular with investors and set off a trading boom in the bond market. Between 1970 and 
1998, the U.S. bond market grew at an annual rate of 19.5 percent to $13 trillion. “One of 
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the most profound transformations in postwar finance was the explosion of domestic non-
financial debt,470" economist Kaufman wrote.471  
Strachan's newspaper possessed great expertise on these issues, and was well 
suited to benefit from this growth in the bond and credit markets, particularly with the 
rapid rise of mortgage securitization. This refers to a process in which a group of 
mortgage contracts are bundled together into a type of bond and the homeowners' 
monthly payments represent the bond's revenues. Such a transaction was a revolution for 
local banks and thrifts.472 They could sell mortgage loans to firms such as Salomon 
Brothers, which repackaged the loans into a bond. By selling the mortgages, a local bank 
was able to free up millions of dollars for new investments. Mortgage securitization also 
helps make the mortgage market national in scope and this business brought considerable 
advertising revenue to the National Thrift News.  "National Thrift News was loaded with 
all of these tombstone ads from Wall Street," Muolo recalled.  "He rode quite a wave for 
probably about 10 very good years.”473 Strachan was right in the middle of this revolution 
of modern finance: "Stan had luckily timed it perfectly.”474  
Other news organizations capitalized on the market turbulence and resulting 
innovations. Reuters created a news service to report on the global foreign currency 
markets, which grew dramatically in wake of the collapse of the gold standard in the U.S.  
This Reuters trading platform integrated its news coverage with tools for real-time 
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trading of currencies, futures contracts, and myriad derivatives. Michael Nelson, a senior 
Reuters executive, said growth of the international currency trading "was going to 
revolutionize the markets and we'd better see how we could exploit it.”475 Kjaer and 
Slaatta wrote how Reuters developed new hardware and software in the 1970s “to suit the 
logic of a new, expansive global market economy.”476 Business for Reuters’ new foreign 
exchange quotation system soared in the mid-1970s. "Reuters had stumbled upon a way 
of making money … and in so doing had created the first global electronic 
marketplace.”477  
Mortgage bonds and the Reuters foreign currency news and data service were 
examples of innovations that helped expand the global financial markets. Parsons wrote 
that “during the 1970s, there occurred not only the break-up of the old economic 
consensus but also the build-up of the new information systems which increased the flow 
of information and the capacity of markets to function internationally.”478 This period 
also led to an explosion of news about white-collar criminal investigations, which were 
detailed in these new business journals. One signature case involved Ivan Boesky and his 
financing of hostile corporate takeovers. He pleaded guilty in 1986 and was imprisoned 
on insider trading and securities fraud charges.479 The Boesky case led to an investigation 
of Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert, the innovative and brash investment bank at the 
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center of the fast-growing junk bond market.480 Milken, in turn, had significant dealings 
with Keating and Paul, whose thrifts purchased junk bonds. For example, the Federal 
Home Loan Bank investigated Lincoln Savings in 1987 and found it had purchased 
shares in companies that were Boesky takeover targets. It also found Lincoln Savings had 
“almost exclusive use of Drexel Burnham Lambert as its broker.”481 CenTrust was 
actively trading junk bonds with Lincoln Savings in deals arranged by Drexel from 
December 1987 through June 1988. Milken and Drexel transformed CenTrust and other 
thrifts “into huge buyers of its junk bonds.”482 The Wall Street Journal and other 
publications devoted considerable staff and resources to covering the Milken and junk 
bond investigation, memorably captured in James Stewart’s award-winning book, Den of 
Thieves, which described broad corruption in the financial markets. 
 
S&L	Crisis	Summary	
The political might of the savings and loan industry and its influence over the 
regulatory system were major themes in the crisis. There were more than 4,000 savings 
institutions by 1980, which gave the industry a physical presence in all 535 congressional 
districts.483 “Effective lobbying of Congress by the industry exploited powerful political 
advantages to downplay potential losses while continuing to shield the industry from 
corrective but painful market forces. The Administration gave the S&L problem low 
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priority,” according to a 1993 presidential commission that examined the industry’s 
collapse.484 At this time, it was impossible for someone to be nominated chairman of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board without support of the U.S. Savings League, the main 
trade association for thrifts.485 The U.S. Savings League’s influence extended to other 
realms. Before the National Thrift News launched in 1976, one of its owners paid a visit 
to the U.S. Savings League to win the group’s blessing for the proposed industry 
newspaper.486  
One illustration of the thrift’s effective lobbying was the 1982 Garn St Germain 
legislation to deregulate the savings and loan industry. In this bill, the thrifts won a 
significant victory to boost deposit insurance to $100,000. This change effectively 
exposed taxpayers to greater losses in the event of extensive thrifts failures because the 
U.S. government became the lender of last resort if the deposit insurance fund was 
exhausted. Many interpret this boost in deposit insurance coverage as evidence of the 
industry’s political muscle. Tim McNamar, a former deputy Treasury Secretary, told 
Barron’s that the savings and loan industry could have pushed for even more deposit 
insurance coverage, which would have exposed taxpayers even further. “We were lucky 
they didn't get a million” or that the deposit insurance didn’t rise to $1 million per 
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account, McNamar said: “The thrifts were so powerful in Congress they could get 
anything they wanted.”487   
Regulatory	Issues	
And as the industry grew, regulators discovered they lacked the resources to 
oversee the industry properly. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board in Washington and 
its 12 District Banks had insufficient manpower to keep track of all the new owners or the 
time to develop any expertise in the new loans and investments being made by the 
industry.488 There was a more substantial problem, however: some regulators lacked the 
ability or apparently even the will to do their jobs. For example, a simple background 
check about Keating’s regulatory history was not conducted before regulators approved 
his application to buy Lincoln Savings and Loan. Keating had settled fraud charges with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1979, but the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board did not review the public record on Keating’s consent decree settlement.489  
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This industry’s power had its limits, however. Losses at Texas savings and loans 
became dramatic in 1985 during a crash of the state’s oil market. This prompted the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, led by chairman Edwin Gray, to impose new 
regulations on the industry, particularly on the use of the direct investments in 
   Figure 5. Chronology of Savings and Loan Crisis 
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commercial real estate and other ventures. Gray’s moves were fought bitterly by Keating 
and led to a rift in the Reagan administration, where the Federal Home Loan Bank 
chairman sparred with Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, an advocate of deregulation. 
Gray pushed to restrict the use of brokered deposits, a source of funding thrifts can obtain 
from a national network of securities brokers, such as Merrill Lynch. These Wall Street 
firms collect deposits from individuals and then deposit the funds at thrifts offering the 
highest rate.490 Gray and other regulators believed brokered deposits created incentives 
for shaky thrifts to stay in business longer than they should. They paid high rates to 
obtain this unstable funding source, which would be withdrawn quickly if better rates 
were available elsewhere. Regan, prior to joining the government, oversaw the expansion 
of a brokered deposit business at Merrill Lynch. With Gray at odds with the more 
powerful Treasury Secretary and others at the White House, his term was not renewed. 
An industry-friendly conservative, M. Danny Wall, replaced Gray in June 1987. Wall did 
not advance Gray’s regulatory agenda and eased enforcement efforts. Yet at the same 
time, regional banking regulators in Atlanta and San Francisco were trying to clamp 
down on thrift industry abuses as well as on Keating at Lincoln Savings and Paul at 
CenTrust. Their efforts were not supported at the national office, led by the industry-
friendly Wall.491 The delayed enforcement at the national level kept Lincoln and 
CenTrust open longer and further expanded the cost of the taxpayer bailout. Meanwhile, 
Wall sought to deal with the mounting losses in the savings and loan industry by 
launching the "Southwest Plan" to consolidate and package insolvent Texas thrifts and 
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sell them to the highest bidder. The strategy was controversial as critics accused the 
Federal Home Loan Bank of providing wealthy investors a dramatic discount and tax 
breaks on sale of troubled thrifts.492 
A related political drama continued in Congress during the Keating and CenTrust 
episodes. House Speaker Jim Wright, D-Texas, and his top lieutenant, House Majority 
Whip Tony Coehlo, D-Calif., were allies with leading savings and loan executives, who 
contributed generously to their political efforts. Wright and Coehlo stalled legislation to 
recapitalize the savings and loan industry’s depleted deposit insurance fund after thrift 
lobbyists complain about harsh federal regulations. Instead, Wright and Coehlo backed a 
watered-down bill in 1987, the Competitive Equality Banking Act, which reduced the 
Federal Home Loan Bank enforcement powers and delayed a refunding of the thrift 
industry’s deposit insurance fund, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp.493  
George H.W. Bush entered the White House following the 1988 election and the 
regulatory pendulum began to swing back toward regulation. By February 1989, the new 
Bush White House described its plan to strengthen regulation of savings and loans and set 
up a mechanism to bail out insolvent thrifts. By August 1989, Congress and the White 
House agreed to enact landmark banking legislation, The Financial Institutional Reform 
and Recovery Act, or FIRREA. This bill abolished the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
and replaced it with the Office of Thrift Supervision.494 It also created the Resolution 
Trust Corp., a government entity that could acquire troubled mortgage loans and other 
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assets of dying thrifts and repackage them for sale to investors. Debate over this 
legislation ushered in a new climate of regulatory enforcement. Federal regulators seized 
Keating’s Lincoln Savings in April 1989 and Paul’s CenTrust in February 1990. The 
savings and loan crisis became front-page news in the fall of 1989 with dramatic hearings 
about Keating in the U.S. House Banking Committee, hearings that lead to Wall’s 
resignation in December.  
The House hearings illustrated how the deregulatory environment, combined with 
the economic problems and a culture of greed, can lead to a disaster: "What it produced 
was reckless lending, poor judgment and outright fraud, much of it linked to the real 
estate boom and bust across the Sunbelt.”495 All told, about one-third of the 3,200 
institutions fail or were merged by the early 1990s, leaving taxpayers with a bill of at 
least $124 billion for the cleanup.496   
 
Media	Coverage	
The national news media missed the evolution and growing scale of the savings 
and loan crisis.497 A 1993 federal commission named to study the savings and loan 
disaster, the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement, cited the news media failure as one of the factors in the savings and loan 
crisis: 
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The news media were largely silent during the period when most 
of the damage was being done. The news media missed one of 
the most costly public debacles in U.S. history. Ordinarily, issues 
often do not become pressing in Washington until made so by the 
news media. Failure of the news media to point out mounting 
problems in the S&L industry helped the process run 
unchecked.498  
 
Journalists at top-tier news organizations agreed they were late to the story and 
unable to see how the savings and loan industry’s problems were a national story. "We 
nibbled at it," Albert Hunt, former Wall Street Journal Washington bureau chief, told 
Howard Kurtz. "We should have been covering it more in '86 and '87. It was elusive. It 
was a Texas story. It was a Michigan story. It was a Maryland story. It was a California 
story. But no one put it together.”499 Meanwhile, regulators minimized the Texas and 
Arizona thrift problems as regional issues and not part of a national trend. Allen Pusey of 
the Dallas Morning News recalled: "The national press took its cue from the regulators, 
who were downplaying the whole thing.”500  
The failure of the national press overshadowed the important work by regional 
newspapers. They included Pusey and Christi Harlan of the Dallas Morning News whose 
series on condominium speculation in the Dallas I-30 corridor in 1983 was one of the 
first clear warning signs of the crisis. Pete Brewton of the Houston Chronicle did 
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important work on the Texas thrifts in the 1980s. James O'Shea reported a major series in 
the Chicago Tribune on the Texas S&L fraud and Don Dixon of Vernon Savings in 1988. 
The St. Petersburg Times closely reported on CenTrust’s failings. Other magazines 
offered blunt warnings, such as Forbes in May 1987: "The failure rate for savings and 
loans is now greater than during the Great Depression ... Congress won't own up to the 
real cost.”501 In the trade press, the American Banker published important stories in 1983 
about Mario Renda and a brokered deposits scheme, a form of short-term financing 
linked to numerous S&L failures. The legal newspaper Miami Review in 1988 published 
details about the fraudulent resume of Paul, the CenTrust Savings founder.  
Why did the national media overlook this coverage? In this era, regional news 
media was far more isolated than in the current age, so the excellent journalism at 
regional newspapers such as the Dallas Morning News took longer to gain attention.502  
Reporters, regulators, politicians and others were using standard U.S. mail or fax 
machines to share articles. The consumer Internet would not be launched until 1994 and 
most reporters lacked email addresses. The regional papers also did not have the ear of 
Washington politicians and lawmakers like established East Coast newspapers such as 
the Washington Post and The New York Times.  
At the National Thrift News, however, Strachan was speaking to a broad range of 
regulators nationwide and he scooped up the Dallas, Florida, and California coverage 
through his sources and a newspaper clipping service. A regulatory source forwarded to 
Strachan some newspaper articles from a tiny weekly newspaper in Northern California, 
The Russian River News, about problems with a local thrift called Centennial Savings and 
                                                            
501 Kurtz, Media Circus, 1993. 
502 Harlan, Christi, Interview with Christi Harlan, August 21, 2015. 
 155 
Loan. This small weekly newspaper run by Stephen Pizzo hired Mary Fricker to assist 
reporting on the Centennial investigation. Strachan put a young reporter, Paul Muolo, on 
a plane to California and he met with Pizzo and Fricker. This 1986 meeting began a 
major investigation of the national savings and loan crisis, elements of which were 
reported in the National Thrift News and published in the book written by Pizzo, Fricker 
and Muolo, Inside Job.503  
Why didn’t the national newspapers do this kind of national investigation? Kurtz, 
in his review of savings and loan coverage, observed: "The clues were staring us in the 
face for years, yet almost no one in the press managed to piece them together.”504  
According to Kurtz, this was due partly to the norms of the newspaper industry at the 
time, where the business desk lacked status in the newsroom. The metro, business and 
political desks failed to cooperate, acting at times like warring tribes. "A basic fact of 
newspaper life is that political reporters work on one side of the room and financial 
reporters on the other.”505 Paulette Thomas, a former Wall Street Journal reporter, 
recalled the savings and loan beat "has never been a particularly high profile beat for any 
financial reporter over the years. And I think the Wall Street Journal's Washington 
bureau has had a different reporter on this beat every year since 1981.”506 G. Christian 
Hill, San Francisco bureau chief of The Wall Street Journal and its main S&L writer in 
the 1980s, agreed with this critique. "No national publication did a good job uncovering 
the savings and loan scandal. With us, it was a question of territorial imperatives. The 
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Balkanized structure of the bureaus didn't allow for national cooperation and 
coordination.”507  
Other forces conspired to make savings and loan coverage difficult. The subject 
matter was complex and required journalists to gain some level of specialized knowledge 
to write about banking, fixed income markets and real estate. Some industry figures used 
their power to suppress coverage by threatening the news media with expensive libel 
suits. Mario Renda sued the American Banker for $90 million in 1983 following a story 
about Renda's involvement in a Midwestern bank swindle.508 As described below in 
greater detail, both Keating and Paul were highly litigious and sued business foes 
regularly. 
This following section provides biographical material about the three central 
characters in the content analysis, Charles Keating, David Paul and Stan Strachan. This 
background will inform the issues and controversies they faced during the savings and 
loan crisis and some broader context about their lives. 
 
Who	Was	Keating?	
Charles Keating first gained national recognition in the 1950s as a crusader 
against pornography. Described as “a devout Roman Catholic,” Keating formed a 
organization called Citizens for Decency Through Law in 1957.509 As a corporate 
attorney in Cincinnati, Keating pursued Hustler publisher Larry Flynt and “made Flynt 
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the object of a one-man obscenity crusade… Keating helped get Flynt sentenced to 25 
years in prison (later overturned on appeal), beginning a series of court battles that 
followed Flynt for years.”510 
Shortly after the state of California deregulated its savings and loan industry, 
Keating turned his eye towards real estate development. His American Continental Corp. 
in 1984 bought Lincoln Savings, a small southern California savings and loan, for $5 
million as a way to help finance commercial developments. Under Keating's control, 
Lincoln made only 11 home mortgages.511 He used Lincoln’s deposits to buy high-risk 
junk bonds as a way to finance construction of a huge new resort hotel complex in 
Scottsdale, the Phoenician resort.512 Keating’s business dealings attracted the attention of 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which began investigating the developer’s 
activities. The board opposed Keating’s attempts to loosen federal rules so Lincoln could 
expand into real estate development projects, traditionally something off limits for the 
staid and narrow savings and loan industry. Gray began a move to re-regulate the savings 
and loan industry in 1985, following an examination of the failed Empire Savings and 
Loan and its speculative real estate ventures outside of Dallas. The fight between Keating 
and Gray underpinned the Keating Five saga and was the focal point of this dissertation’s 
content analysis of media coverage. The content analysis of the Keating coverage 
concluded at Jan. 1, 1990, following the first round of congressional hearings that made 
Keating a household name. Keating was convicted of 17 counts of securities fraud 
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following a trial in Los Angeles County Superior Court, sentenced to 10 years in prison 
and fined $250,000.513  
 Keating's political influence was well summarized in a 1989 The New York Times 
report on the thrift scandal:  
By all accounts, he was a frenetic and effective advocate for his 
business interests - here distributing campaign funds, there 
offering a former chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board a job or pushing the Reagan Administration to appoint one 
of his business associates to the bank board. Mr. Keating was for 
years almost ubiquitous in Washington and at the state and local 
level.514  
 
Keating's influence was felt at the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Treasury Department and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board. For example, Keating hired a former SEC commissioner to lobby on his behalf. 
Keating was close to House Speaker Wright, who supported a House resolution opposing 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board rules restricting thrifts’ speculative investments. “We 
were impressed by his extensive lawyers and economists,” Home Loan Bank examiner 
Black recalled. “We were utterly amazed, however, by his political power."515 
Well before the Keating Five senators’ meeting, journalists reported on Keating’s 
attempts to influence the regulatory and political process through campaign cash and use 
of powerful allies. United Press International's Gregory Gordon wrote about Keating's 
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campaign contributions and his attempt to influence regulators in 1986.516 Mesa (Ariz.) 
Tribune journalists Bill Roberts, Andrew Mollison, and others did early work on 
Keating's political influence in 1985. Journalist Michael Binstein wrote an important 
expose on Keating in Regardie's Magazine and Arizona Trend in 1987.517  
 
Who	Was	Paul?	
David L. Paul was a real estate developer and an aggressive dealmaker with a 
degree in economics from the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and a law 
degree from Columbia University. His start in finance began as a real estate developer 
and contractor where he took over failing apartment projects in New Jersey.518 He moved 
to commercial real estate deals in New York and Connecticut in the 1970s and acquired a 
Connecticut-based real estate investment trust, Westport Co., in 1981. Paul later said he 
was successful with these ventures and had made $150 million by the time he moved to 
Miami in the early 1980s.519 In 1983, he purchased a money-losing thrift in Miami, Dade 
Savings and Loan Association. He renamed it CenTrust the next year and began a rapid 
expansion. “By 1988, through brokered deposits and substantial investments in junk 
bonds, Mr. Paul turned the failing thrift with $1.9 billion in assets into the largest thrift in 
Florida and the Southeast, eventually amassing $10 billion in assets,” according to a 
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House Banking Committee report.520 From 1983 through 1988, the thrift’s profits were 
driven by trading and investment activities, not from the traditional savings and loan 
business. “The company was in the Fortune 500 and it was in the top three to four 
companies by earnings in the country for years,” Paul recalled in an interview.521 
CenTrust attracted top talent; in October 1987, Lewis S. Ranieri, former vice 
chairman of the investment bank Solomon Brothers, joined CenTrust’s board. Raneri, a 
Wall Street legend instrumental in creating the mortgage backed securities market, was 
friendly with Paul and a close friend of Strachan. CenTrust became a publicly traded 
company in June 1986; the stock’s ticker symbol was DLP, or Paul’s initials. Paul built 
the bank’s headquarters to match his ambitions. Designed by noted architect I. M. Pei, the 
CenTrust headquarters cost $160 million in 1987. Paul installed a custom lighting system 
so his headquarters, in the words of The New York Times, "glows in the nighttime sky."522 
For Pope John Paul II’s 1987 visit to Miami, the CenTrust tower was specially lit in the 
colors of the Vatican flag. CenTrust Tower became a fixture of the Miami skyline in the 
1980s and the headquarters was featured in opening credits of the television show 
"Miami Vice."523 
According to investigators, Paul financed a lavish lifestyle and used CenTrust “as 
his personal expense account.”524 His compensation totaled $16 million from 1984 to 
1989. He also received $6.1 million in mortgages to build a mansion and a large dock on 
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La Gorce Island in Miami. A $3.1 million mortgage was granted in March 1989, at a time 
when CenTrust began losing millions. 
 
 
Figure 6. CenTrust Earnings, 1985-1989. CenTrust began losing money in June 1988. By March                            
1989, regulators deemed CenTrust a “troubled institution.” 
 
CenTrust’s losses began to mount after 1988. In March 1989, regulators 
designated CenTrust a “troubled institution.” Passage of the new savings and loan 
regulations in August 1989, the FIRREA law, restricted CenTrust’s investment activities 
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and its source of brokered deposits, eliminating a main funding source and further 
accelerating its losses. Regulators seized CenTrust on Feb. 2, 1990, and taxpayer losses 
from the thrift were later estimated at $2 billion, at the time one of the largest failures in 
U.S. history.525 Paul later was convicted of 68 counts and he pleaded guilty to 29 
additional counts involving racketeering and fraud. He was sentenced to 11 years in 
prison, ordered to pay $60 million in restitution and a $5 million fine. He was released 
from prison in 2004. 
Some 12 years after prison, Paul was still bitter and unrepentant about the case 
brought against him. “The stuff that they published, that the regulators gave out, was 
absurd,” he recently told me in an interview for this dissertation. Like other savings and 
loan executives, Paul contended Congress with the 1989 savings and loan reform 
legislation “voided a contract” over how he would account for losses at CenTrust. The 
1989 law resulted in CenTrust having a negative net worth, or when debts exceed assets. 
Paul also said regulators ordered him to buying back CenTrust bonds as a discount to 
their face value as a means to boost the thrift’s net worth. This is now something 
regulators order other banks to do to boost their financial condition. “In my case, it was 
considered criminal,” Paul said. 
“When I and my family, and very close friends, own 82 percent of something, you 
don’t steal from it,” Paul said, referring to his ownership in CenTrust. “It’s ridiculous. 
My case was very political, and my mistake is that I was very outspoken and frankly 
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shouldn’t have had the profile that I had. In retrospect that was my mistake. But it’s a 




Stanley Kenneth Strachan was born in Finsbury, England on Aug. 22, 1938 to 
working-class parents, George and Rebecca Strachan.527 George Strachan was a tailor’s 
presser, or an assistant to a tailor. When Strachan was eight, he, his parents and younger 
brother sailed on a passenger liner to New York, passed through Ellis Island and settled 
in Brooklyn. Strachan’s daughter, Hillary Wilson, believed that immigrant identity was 
important to her father’s worldview and his sense of idealism. 
“He believed in the American dream and the standards that America was 
supposed to be built on, and he didn’t want to compromise those,” Wilson said. “When 
he saw those being compromised, it was outrageous to him.” Her father’s sense of 
outrage at cheating and wrongdoing “came from moving here and being an 
immigrant.”528  
According to family legend, Strachan at an early age was willing to take a stand 
on principle. Wilson recalled a family story that her father confronted a Mafia boss and 
complained his associates were selling drugs in a playground where his little brother was 
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playing. The Mafia leader agreed and the playground drug dealing stopped, according to 
family lore, Wilson said.529  
During the Civil Rights era, Strachan signed up to join the civil rights Freedom 
Marches in the South. He underwent training in non-violent civil disobedience in New 
York, a screening process to determine if a person can withstand the personal and 
physical abuse that activists suffered while standing with African-Americans seeking 
equal rights in the South. At a meeting in Brooklyn, the trainers would yell and scream 
and even punch the prospective volunteers.  
“When they punched him, he punched them back,” Wilson recalled. “And so he 
wasn’t accepted to go down and march.”  
Strachan was not afraid to express his emotions. Fogarty recalled attending the 
funeral of Strachan’s brother, Ron Strachan, in 1989. Stan Strachan gave the eulogy. 
"Tears were rolling down his cheeks and he didn't bother to brush them away,” Fogarty 
said. “He didn't think it was inappropriate to cry over your brother dying early.”530  
Strachan attended public schools in Brooklyn but not attend college. He had to 
drop out of high school to work to help support his family, eventually completing his 
high school studies at night school, according to Wilson. Strachan’s journalism career 
began as a copy boy for the New York Journal-American, an afternoon daily newspaper. 
Strachan then worked as a sports writer and police reporter for a weekly newspaper in 
Toms River, N.J. His proficiency with numbers and statistics were honed with sports 
reporting.531 Praised for his productivity, Strachan rose to become assistant managing 
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editor. Former American Banker editor Brad Henderson recalled Strachan was “one of 
the most prolific reporters the paper ever employed.”532 Strachan left the American 
Banker around 1971533 and was an independent journalist and freelance writer. He 
worked a brief stint in public relations for Bank of America in San Francisco in late 1975 
through early 1976, but then became homesick for New York. He and his wife, Tobyann, 
moved back to New York and he began as National Thrift News editor in August 1976. 
Strachan’s unusual personality shaped the newspaper. "He was the paper to some 
degree," Muolo recalled. Strachan’s daughter and former employees said he had a 
formidable memory and he made decisions rapidly. Debra Cope, a former National Thrift 
News Washington bureau chief, recalled her unconventional job interview with Strachan, 
conducted at lunch at an industry conference. After some discussion, Strachan eyed a 
slice of cheesecake on Cope’s plate. Is she going to eat it, he asked? Cope sniffed: “If it 
was from Junior’s, I’d eat it.” Strachan was impressed by Cope’s knowledge of Junior’s, 
the legendary New York bakery: “This woman knows her cheesecake!” Strachan 
exclaimed. “Let’s hire her!”534  Cope continued: “That’s the kind of guy he was. He was 
very instinctive.”  Fogarty also said that Strachan hired him after a brief conversation, 
perhaps just three minutes. This unconventional style reflected Strachan’s autonomy; he 
was, after all, co-owner of the newspaper. Fogarty recalled Strachan that would arrive in 
the office around 7 a.m. In some instances, he would read an article in The Wall Street 
Journal about a hearing that day in Washington and then head out the door to the train 
station or airport. "Without any planning in advance, he saw something that we should 
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cover, he would jump” out the door and go to Washington to cover it, Fogarty said. “He 
did that frequently.” 
Others painted a less flattering view of Strachan. Irwin Huebsch, National Thrift 
News advertising director in 1977, recalled: 
  
Stanley is a volatile type that screams at everybody. He used to 
scream at me. When he was involved in getting the paper out, he 
was a real pain in the ass, to put it very mildly… But nothing that 
doesn’t go with his nature and temperament and the job. Nobody 
hated anybody. When it was over, it was over.535  
 
Strachan’s personality and mannerisms were on display at a May 1, 1989 National 
Press Club event on the savings and loan crisis, an event captured on video by C-Span. 
Strachan appears as the quintessential old-school journalist – a balding, portly man in a 
somewhat rumpled suit, a large beard, and large glasses. However, Strachan’s 
presentation is anything but rumpled. Without notes, he spoke fluently, with precise 
recall of dates and facts, providing numerous historical references about the savings and 
loan crisis and its evolution, all with a distinct New York accent.536 Strachan’s daughter 
said that videotaped event captured her father’s spirit well: “All of it was in his head.” 
 
Strachan	and	Reporting	Culture,	Values,	and	Autonomy	
By all accounts, Strachan created a culture of investigative reporting that ran 
counter to norms in the trade press, and at the time, for many in business journalism 
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publications. “We pulled no punches in our reporting and played no favorites, actions that 
were considered unusual, if not unique, for a trade publication,” Strachan wrote. “And we 
still have the strong sense of outrage that makes it difficult for swindlers to evade our 
notice for very long.”537 Years after his death, Strachan left a strong impression on his 
reporters. Several described how Strachan pressed them to dig deeper into a story. They 
all recalled his sense of idealism. “He would say, `Where is your sense of outrage?’” 
Fogarty recalled.538 Lew Sichelman, a longtime housing correspondent for National 
Thrift News, recalled asking Strachan for advice on how to frame a story. It involved a 
study that showed how lenders were making major errors on adjustable rate mortgages in 
the banks' favor and harming consumers. "His response was, `Get angry.' And `Don't let 
them get away with that’,’’ Sichelman said.539  
Yet Strachan did not begin as a crusader. His colleagues and competitors 
described him as a solid, intelligent journalist, trying to do his job well. “It didn’t start out 
as moral outrage,” Muolo recalled. “He was trying to make a living but then the S&L 
crisis happened540.” The National Thrift News was a classic trade journal that celebrated 
the industry at times. Take for example Strachan’s Jan. 3, 1980 editorial, entitled “Hip 
Hip Hoorah,” that praised developments in the industry.541  An April 10, 1980 editorial 
was somewhat positive about a major deregulation law, the Financial Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act 1980, which President Carter signed and was an important step in 
the beginning of the deregulatory trend that accelerated in the Reagan administration. 
These industry-friendly editorials stand in contrast to the sterner tone in Strachan’s 
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writing later in the decade as S&L executives were jailed for fraud. Kleege, a former 
National Thrift News associate editor, recalled that Strachan had a fundamentally positive 
view of the savings and loan business:  
 
He saw the savings and loan industry as basically a good thing. It 
was set up to allow people to save money and make loans to 
purchase houses. He saw that it had been perverted in some way, 
it has been perverted by the deregulation of the 1980s. He felt 
that he was a defender of the industry. And defending the 
industry means reporting that some savings and loan executive 




Strachan’s role as industry insider and journalist was on display in an Aug. 27, 
1984, editorial. In it, Strachan took The Wall Street Journal to task for its reporting on the 
struggling Financial Corp. of America, parent of what was then the largest U.S. thrift, 
American Savings and Loan Association. Strachan’s nuanced editorial first defended the 
Journal for its coverage of the industry’s problem in 1981-1982, a period when industry 
officials were upset with the Journal’s reporting. He then described the responsibility 
journalists face in writing about troubled banks, and used his own newspaper as an 
example. He faulted the National Thrift News’ decision to use the term “run” to describe 
deposit outflows from American Savings, noting this charged term can lead to depositor 
panic. The editorial then took the Journal to task for citing an anonymous source on a 
highly sensitive matter involving American Savings’ ability to obtain a new round of 
financing in the markets. The Journal cited an unnamed trader as saying American 
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Savings’ parent was considered too risky to gain financing. Such a statement, printed in 
the nation’s largest financial newspaper, could be devastating to American Savings and 
could deny it access to any future financing. The editorial concluded with a warning that 
financial reporters must consider the far-reaching impact of such articles, which can lead 
to a loss of investor confidence and perhaps a bank’s failure. “Articles which reach for 
the dramatic — as the Journal appeared to do — tend to be self-fulfilling,” Strachan 
wrote. “The problems on which they focus get worse." The editorial’s headline 
highlighted the media’s sensitive role: “Observers or Protaganists?”543 
 
In keeping with trade press norms, the newspaper used its close relationship with 
the industry as a reporting tool. "That kind of close engagement with the industry was 
how we got to those stories first because we were in there," Fogarty said. "Because of our 
sources and our method of attack we got to know those things." Business executives and 
regulators became comfortable with National Thrift News reporters and provide material 
off the record. Sichelman recalled that being a reporter for the National Thrift News was 
an asset: “The publication was well respected. It got me in the door where ever I wanted 
to go and talk to people I wanted to.”  
 
Strachan developed many close associations and some friendships with industry 
executives. For example, Strachan “was friendly” with businessmen such as U.S. League 
of Savings Institutions President William O’Connell and lawyer William McKenna.544 
Ranieri, the Wall Street bond legend, was a close personal friend of Strachan and his 
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family.545 Sichelman recalled he was hired after Strachan called the National Association 
of Homebuilders, asking if they knew of any decent reporters.546  
There was an unflattering account of Strachan failing to back up one of his 
reporters on a sensitive story. Former Washington Post banking reporter Kathleen Day, in 
her book S&L Hell, characterized Strachan as being cozy with industry officials and 
caving to industry pressure in 1987 to walk back from a controversial story, even though 
it was accurate. The article in question was written by Debra Cope, then the new 
Washington bureau chief for National Thrift News. Cope quoted a prominent thrift 
executive as saying the industry was preparing to ask Congress for taxpayer funds to bail 
out the thrift industry’s deposit insurance fund. Reaction to the story was negative. 
Industry lobbyists sought to discredit the controversial story and push for a correction. 
Strachan ran a “clarification” to Cope’s story, even though another industry official 
confirmed Cope’s account. Day contended Strachan faced pressure from major 
advertisers such as Michael Milken’s Drexel Burnham Lambert.547  
While unflattering, this episode is notable because it is the only one of its type to 
surface in the interviews and literature review. Fogarty, the former news editor, did not 
recall the specific issues involved in this episode. He, Muolo and others challenged 
assertions that National Thrift News bent to industry pressure. While the paper would 
issue corrections when warranted, it would not do so when an official says something 
“politically incorrect,” Fogarty said. "Are you asking, `Did we cave in to the industry 
pressure?' I would say the evidence of the Polk Award is we didn't." Other longtime 
Strachan employees and thrift officials said Strachan did not soft-peddle stories in the 
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face of industry pressure. “Our stories cost Stan some longstanding friendships and 
shattered his faith in many whom he had highly respected,” recalled Pizzo.548  
Conclusion	 	
Strachan would encounter Keating and Paul as the savings and loan crisis 
escalated in the late 1980s. All three were operating in an environment shaped by the 
broader forces of deregulation and market upheaval that began in the inflation spiral of 
the 1970s and continued into the following decade.  All three found business 
opportunities in the growing markets — Keating and Paul through banking, Strachan by 
providing both a news service for the industry. The three were affected by deregulation 
but in different ways. Paul and Keating sought to push the far boundaries of the industry 
through new investments and lines of business while fighting the regional regulators 
determined to rein them in. Strachan relied on these government sources to leak news 
about abuses. The New Deal framework was under attack during the mid-1980s, yet 
important vestiges remained and these regulators ultimately caught outliers such as 
Keating and Paul. The National Thrift News reporting at this time represented an 
evolution of interpretive journalism with roots in the pioneering magazines The 
Economist, Fortune and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. How the National 
Thrift News and other select top business publications performed in these episodes is the 




                                                            




























The following chapter describes how the power of journalistic professionalism 
prevailed in an unlikely area -- in the financial trade press. The content analysis of the 
National Thrift News points to the enduring power of professional norms, such as the 
watchdog ideal and professional autonomy, in journalism. This small newspaper was “a 
reporter’s paper” where journalists were encouraged to pursue substantive news and even 
investigative projects about the industry. Such themes were evident in a review of the 
paper’s coverage of the Keating Five scandal.  
The following content analysis of 334 articles from 1986 to 1990 in the National 
Thrift News, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and the American Banker 
measures how the National Thrift News' reporting on the savings and loan crisis differed 
from mainstream business publications. The analysis also sought to understand how the 
status of the National Thrift News as a trade publication helped or hurt its reporting on the 
savings and loan crisis. The analysis also sought to shed light on how reporting by the 
National Thrift News on the savings and loan crisis aligned with or defied standard norms 
of trade journalism. The study is divided in two time periods: before and after the Lincoln 
collapse on April 13, 1989.  
 
The National Thrift News’ access to regulators and its aggressive reputation led 
the paper to break a major political story on Sept. 28, 1987: five senators had pressured 
regulators from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to ease up on an examination of 
Lincoln Savings and Loan. The thrift was owned by Keating, who gave an estimated $1.3 
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million to the campaigns of the five senators: Republican John McCain of Arizona; 
Democrats Dennis DeConcini of Arizona; Alan Cranston of California; John Glenn of 
Ohio; and Donald Riegle of Michigan, who later became chairman of the Senate Banking 
Committee. Most mainstream news organizations failed to follow up on the National 
Thrift News reporting until federal regulators stepped in and seized Lincoln on April 13, 
1989, a day that coincided with the bankruptcy of Lincoln’s parent company, American 
Continental Corp. The correlation of government action with the enhanced media 
coverage tends to support the indexing hypothesis of media communication, where the 
media looks to government and official institutions to define legitimacy of news 
events.549 The Lincoln collapse represented a watershed moment as the news media 
revisited earlier reporting on Keating and began to pull together strands about his 
influence and manipulation of the political and regulatory process. Following that point, 
revelations of Keating’s mishandling of Lincoln Savings emerged in press coverage. This 
developed into a major national news story in the fall of 1989 as congressional hearings 
described political favors and fraud. Keating and Lincoln Savings transformed from a 
business news story into front-page news and Keating became a villain in popular 
political culture. Lincoln’s failure resulted in a taxpayer bailout estimated at $3.4 billion. 
Some 25,000 bond investors lost an estimated $250 million550 as American Continental 
Corp. bonds proved worthless following the bankruptcy.  
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News	Coverage:	Before	&	After	Lincoln	Failure	
The following chart shows the contrast in news coverage before and after the 
seizure of Lincoln Savings. The chart measures the Lincoln Savings news stories as a 
percentage of total savings and loan news coverage for the newspapers during the Jan. 1, 
1986-Jan. 1, 1990 time period.  For another perspective, the frequency of coverage was 
Figure 7. Keating Coverage. Before and After Lincoln Seizure 
This chart shows how coverage of Keating and Lincoln Savings surged after regulators seized the 
thrift in April 1989. Coverage of Keating went from less than 1 percent of all articles mentioning 
“savings and loan” in The Wall Street Journal prior to the seizure to 11.1 percent of savings and 
loan coverage. This suggests the newsworthy nature of the Keating revelations and raises questions 
about why these news organizations did not cover Keating’s misdeeds — particularly the 1987 
revelations about the Keating Five senators meeting — more closely.   
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examined within the subset of the 334 articles on Keating and Lincoln Savings between 
1986 and 1990. Prior to regulators’ seizure of Lincoln, National Thrift News mentioned 
Keating and Lincoln Savings in 37 percent of all articles reviewed. This is the highest 
percentage of any of the newspapers, suggesting the National Thrift News was following 
Keating earlier as well as more closely than anyone else. At the American Banker, 35 
percent of its Keating articles came prior to the government seizure of Lincoln; The Wall 
Street Journal, 17 percent of its coverage was prior to the seizure; and at The New York 
Times, 11 percent of its coverage was before the Lincoln seizure.551 The National Thrift 
News and American Banker doubled their coverage of Keating after the seizure, 
publishing 61 articles each in the April-December 1989 period. The intensity of coverage 
at the two other papers is dramatic after the seizure: The Wall Street Journal’s coverage 
rose by nearly fourfold and The New York Times coverage by six-fold.552 
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To look more closely at the Keating coverage, the analysis examined 
measurements of beat reporting, such as consistency of staffing, or how long a journalist 
followed a particular issue and how many stories he or she produced. Staffing was 
examined through byline counts, which revealed general patterns. The National Thrift 
News’ main reporter on the Keating story, Stephen Kleege, produced the greatest number 
of stories prior to the crash, whereas reporters at The Wall Street Journal and The New 
Figure 8. Bylines for Keating coverage. 
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York Times produced far fewer articles. The Keating story staffing at the American 
Banker differed from the others. The American Banker had a primary Keating reporter, 
Jim McTague, who wrote nine articles, but some 15 separate journalists reported on 
Keating during the pre-crash period, many of them writing only a single story. At the 
National Thrift News, Kleege wrote 11 articles on the Keating drama prior to Lincoln’s 
collapse. Kleege’s work represented one-third of the newspaper’s articles on Keating 
prior to the crash; five other journalists, including Strachan, wrote articles about Keating 
during this period. The majority of the articles lacked bylines. David Hilder was the 
Journal’s primary Keating reporter, but he produced half as many reports as Kleege, or 
six Keating stories prior to the crash; this represented one-third of the Journal’s coverage 
of Keating in the period. John E. Yang wrote a quarter of the Journal’s stories. At The 
New York Times, Richard W. Stevenson wrote four stories, or less than half of the 
newspaper’s pre-crash Keating stories, with three other journalists contributing and The 
Associated Press contributing two others.  
Key	Narratives	
The content analysis analyzed key narratives in the Keating coverage between 
1986 and 1990 that were derived from reading the 334 articles as well as a review of 
numerous histories on the savings and loan crisis.553 These narratives involved the 
broader regulatory and deregulatory trends in the savings and loan industry and were 
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viewed through the leadership of the Federal Home Loan Bank; its successor agency, the 
Office of Thrift Supervision; the thrift cleanup agency, Resolution Trust Corp.; and 
individuals such as Edwin Gray and M. Danny Wall. Keating’s fights with regulators 
informed the backdrop of the April 1987 Keating Five senators’ meeting.  A related 
narrative concerned media leaks from regulators involving Keating’s activities and 
confidential examinations. The media leaks supported the idea of watchdog reporting 
since regulators, constrained in a political environment that weakens their power, leaked 
stories to the press to punish Keating. Keating’s unsuccessful attempt to sell Lincoln 
Savings and Loan to investors was another important narrative, as this failed deal resulted 
in the collapse of Keating’s empire with the bankruptcy. The content analysis examined 
coverage of the Keating Five senators’ meeting and its aftermath, such as the U.S. House 





Keating’s fight with regulators grew out of a broader conflict involving the 
Reagan administration’s attempts to deregulate the savings and loan industry. A priority 
for the Reagan administration and the industry’s allies in Congress was the easing of 
regulatory oversight of thrifts and allowing them into new lines of business, which 
hopefully would let them grow out of their financial problems. This deregulatory 
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narrative was not straightforward, however. Divisions surfaced among the White House, 
the Treasury Department, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board over how to 
implement the red-tape cutting. FHLB Chairman Gray was out of sync with the Reagan 
White House and began a move to increase regulation of the thrift industry, an action he 
took after learning about excessive real estate speculation and significant thrift industry 
losses in Dallas in early 1984.554 Gray faced a significant bureaucratic fight with 
deregulatory advocates in the Reagan administration such as Treasury Secretary Donald 
Regan, an ally of Keating.  
 
It is against this background that Keating waged a lengthy and public battle with 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. He attempted to use Lincoln Savings to break into 
new lines of business, such as financing real estate developments and making 
unconventional investments in junk bonds. Keating also fought over Lincoln’s optimistic 
property valuations of bank-financed projects. Keating complained regulators were 
imposing unrealistic accounting standards that devalued his loan portfolio. Subsequent 
analysis showed such loans were inflated and actual property values were far less than the 
inflated market rates.555 This fight was a driving force leading to the Keating Five 
senators’ meeting in April 1987 and spoke to forces behind Lincoln’s collapse. The 
National Thrift News and the American Banker both covered regulatory developments in 
the industry more closely than The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal in the 
crucial period prior to Lincoln’s seizure, from January 1, 1986, to April 12, 1988. This is 
in keeping with the trade press’ normative behavior of closely covering its target 
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industry. The National Thrift News and the American Banker each had 18 articles dealing 
with regulatory issues, or slightly more than half of their coverage. The National Thrift 
News coverage, however, emphasized the conflicts involving Home Loan Bank Board 
member Lee Henkel, a Keating ally and industry advocate. The New York Times had 
three articles, or a quarter of its coverage primarily on regulatory developments, and The 
Wall Street Journal had eight, or more than half, during the same period. 
 
Manipulation	of	Regulators	
One example of Keating’s aggressive influence of the regulatory process was the 
appointment of Lee Henkel, a Keating ally and a business associate, to an open seat on 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Henkel was an Atlanta lawyer whose development 
company borrowed more than $69 million from Keating’s companies.556 President 
Reagan nominated Henkel to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 1986 and Henkel 
immediately proposed investment regulations favorable to Lincoln. This set up a clash 
with Gray, who already was fighting with Keating over an extensive audit of Lincoln 
Savings. As such, the Henkel episode was a prelude to the Keating Five story, an early 
example of Keating’s attempt to manipulate the regulatory process to serve his ends. 
Keating attorney Michael B. Gardner, in an Aug. 28, 1985, spelled out how to put a 
Keating ally on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to fill the opening of departing board 
member Donald Hovde: 
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Instead of trying to sack Gray, who unquestionably is a disaster 
but still a `nice guy’ to the Reagan-inner circle, our efforts should 
focus primarily on getting the White House to take a less 
controversial (and therefore highly desirable) remedial course of 
action: identifying and nominating a (Donald) Hovde 
replacement that would be acceptable to you and other 
enlightened industry leaders. 557 
 
There was no contemporary news coverage of this memo, yet it clearly 
established Keating’s plan to manipulate the regulatory process. This theme was evident 
in the National Thrift News coverage.  An examination of the Henkel coverage also 
helped measure the depth and extent of beat reporting prior to the Keating Five meeting 
and could suggest which newspapers were paying close attention to Keating and his 
tactics. The term “Henkel” was mentioned in 17 of 34 National Thrift News articles, or 
half of the stories captured in the search from January 1, 1986, to April 16, 1989. 
“Henkel” was mentioned in 7 of 31 articles in the American Banker, in 5 of 15 articles in 
The Wall Street Journal but just in 2 of 10 articles in The New York Times. National 
Thrift News first reported Henkel’s ties to Keating on August 11, 1986, and mentioned 
this conflict in three subsequent articles that year. The National Thrift News linked 
Henkel’s politics to the deregulatory trends: “Both Lee Henkel, former Atlanta attorney 
and real estate developer, and Lawrence White, a New York University economics 
professor, are said to favor broader deregulation of the industry than does Mr. Gray.”558 
The following month, The Wall Street Journal carried two similar and detailed stories 
about Henkel’s proposal to loosen direct investment rules and how this represented a 
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conflict of interest based on Henkel’s links to Keating.559 The American Banker first 
mentioned Henkel and Keating in a Dec. 30, 1986, story; The New York Times carried its 
first report on Henkel on February 17, 1987, by publishing a dispatch from The 
Associated Press. Allegations of Henkel’s conflict of interest lad him to refute the 
charges in a January 1987, press conference. Henkel later resigned in the face of a Justice 
Department inquiry later in 1987. Despite his denials, Henkel in 1992 was banned from 
the U.S. banking and thrift industries in a settlement with the U.S. Office of Thrift 
Supervision for his unethical conduct regarding the failed Lincoln Savings.560  
Keating also attempted to manipulate the regulatory process by offering to hire 
Gray, the home loan bank chairman. The American Banker reported this story on Oct. 7, 
1986. The National Thrift News had similar information on August 11, but it was buried 
at the bottom of an article and not as fully developed as the American Banker report, 
which treated it as an extraordinary political development. Here was one example where 
the National Thrift News missed the opportunity to fully develop the related social and 
political context around an issue. Such lack of social and political context is a common 
critique of trade journals.561 Like the Keating Five event, major news media was slow to 
pick up on this story. The database searches show The New York Times first mentioned 
the Gray job offer seven months later, on May 25, 1987, and The Wall Street Journal first 
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mentioned it three years later, on Nov. 8, 1989, as part of Gray’s congressional 
testimony.   
 
Keating	Sues	Regulators	
Keating had a well-earned reputation for filing lawsuits and fighting his perceived 
enemies in court. As Keating proclaimed in 1989, he would “challenge in court those 
who would destroy us,” a threat carried out against various news organizations over 
coverage of his business empire.562 Keating battled the press as much as he battled 
regulators. During his November 1989 House Banking Committee appearance, Keating 
sought to ban press coverage of his testimony. As described below, Keating sued the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board six separate times between 1987 and 1989 to challenge 
the examination and seizure of Lincoln Savings. In March 1987, Keating sued the Federal 
Home Loan Bank in federal court to block new rules restricting his direct real estate 
investment activities. National Thrift News reported on the lawsuit and its implications 
for Lincoln’s business on March 23. The search did not show a corresponding story by 
the American Banker; instead, the newspaper led a March 27 article with Lincoln’s own 
announcement from its annual meeting that it would increase home lending. The lawsuit 
was mentioned in passing in the third paragraph and carried no outside comment or 
analysis.563 A second American Banker article on April 29, 1987, led with Keating’s 
pledge to limit purchases of raw land and launch new home lending activities; it carried 
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extensive quotes from Keating.564 The New York Times mentioned the lawsuit on May 25, 
1987, in a critical and thorough story documenting the pattern of Keating’s regulatory 
challenges. This article carried a broader warning about aggressive investment activities 
in the savings and loan industry.565  
One of the major themes throughout the Keating Five saga involved regulators 
leaking damaging information about Keating and his operations to the news media. 
Keating complained these leaks were evidence of that regulators had a vendetta against 
him. He sued to stop the leaks. National Thrift News reported the leaks came from the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Keating's regulator, as well as other regulatory 
agencies. The leaks represented a significant development in the savings and loan crisis. 
On one level, they showed how regulators, faced with a reduction of their power due to 
deregulatory trends, sought to assert control over a renegade savings and loan by 
providing damaging information to the press. The Keating Five senators' meeting was 
evidence of this trend. A leak of a transcript of the meeting of the five senators allowed 
the press to report on the event, which later became a significant development in the 
savings and loan crisis. The leaks also affirmed the power of the press as a watchdog over 
society. Facing a reduction in their power, regulators were turning to another institution, 
the press, to reign in a bad actor.  
Keating sued the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in July 1987, charging the staff 
with leaking confidential bank examination information about Lincoln to the journalists. 
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This was done, he charged, as retribution for his criticism of the agency. National Thrift 
News reported on the suit on July 27, 1987. This article described leaks to The Wall Street 
Journal concerning Henkel’s conflicts of interest as well as reporting in the Mesa (Ariz.) 
Tribune on Lincoln’s junk bond investments. It also described reporting in Regardie’s, a 
Washington, D.C.-based magazine, asserting that Lincoln was operating at a loss when it 
publicly claimed to be profitable. 566 National Thrift News reported it had filed a Freedom 
of Information Act request for the documents cited in the Mesa Tribune and Regardie’s 
articles, a sign it was playing catch-up. National Thrift News quoted an unnamed source, 
presumably from Lincoln, saying the thrift intended to take depositions from reporters 
and would seek a court order to compel them to disclose their sources, if necessary. The 
article cast Keating in a critical light, describing him as engaged in a “personal battle” 
with Home Loan Bank Board Chairman Gray, and said the “politically active and 
conservative” banker was engaged in a high profile “battle for deregulation.”567 The 
National Thrift News article fulfilled one of the trade press normative functions by 
providing readers details about a significant industry development, regardless of who 
reported the material first. This article also served a watchdog function by framing 
Keating’s lawsuit in the broader context of a regulatory battle. Keating’s leak lawsuit was 
withdrawn a month later but it still had an impact. National Thrift News reported that two 
days after Keating’s lawsuit, Federal Home Loan Bank Board Chairman M. Danny Wall 
issued a memo to all staff warning them of disciplinary action against leakers.568    
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Lincoln’s	Deal	With	Wall	
For a short period, Keating gained an upper hand in his fight against the Federal 
Home Loan Bank. Gray departed in June 1987 and was replaced by M. Danny Wall, a 
former aide to U.S. Sen. Jake Garn, an Idaho Republican and member of the Senate 
Banking Committee. Wall brought a new industry-friendly message to the agency. Wall 
settled a lawsuit with Keating over the lengthy examination by the Federal Home Loan 
Bank of San Francisco, the primary regulator for California-based Lincoln Savings. In an 
unusual development, Wall ordered an internal investigation of Keating’s complaints 
about the regulators’ exam. In May 1988, Wall assigned the national staff of the Federal 
Home Loan Bank, which he directly supervised, to take over the Lincoln examination. 
This change stalled the aggressive regulation of the San Francisco examiners, who were 
prepared to recommend seizure of Lincoln. A more significant impact was this decision 
kept Lincoln Savings open for nearly another year, further increasing the eventual cost of 
the taxpayer bailout. Wall’s agreement also reflected Keating’s influence of the 
regulatory process and his ability to remove a critical regulator from supervision. Wall 
and the Federal Home Loan Bank later drew criticism of the deal in congressional 
hearings. 
The newspapers, except for National Thrift News, treated the settlement 
announcement as a significant news story. The database search did not reveal a National 
Thrift News story that mentioned this settlement until June 27, more than a month after 
the announcement.569 This omission was striking as it was an important development in a 
saga the newspaper had documented thoroughly up to this point. The paper’s lack of 
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coverage stands in contrast to the emphasis other news media outlets placed on the event 
– as well as subsequent historical accounts of the Keating affair. The American Banker 
previewed such a settlement on May 10, citing an American Continental Corp. filing with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and then reported the details on May 24. The 
newspaper noted in the sixth paragraph that industry analysts regarded this decision as “a 
strong rebuff” of the San Francisco home loan bank board examiners.570 The Wall Street 
Journal on May 23 called the development “a major victory for Lincoln and a defeat for 
regional thrift examiners in San Francisco and that Lincoln would not have to write down 
the value of its real estate investments.” This real estate accounting detail was missing 
from the American Banker article.571 The New York Times noted the real estate detail and 
the unusual nature of the settlement in its brief May 23 story.572  
Departure	by	American	Banker	
 The American Banker took a lighthearted approach to the news leak issue on 
May 6, 1988, by leading an article with the question: “Loose Lips sink thrifts?” The 
article then reported how Home Loan Bank officials spoke to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation about ways to halt news leaks.573  The article emphasized the narrative of a 
“press leak” rather than the investigative reporting conducted by The Wall Street Journal, 
National Thrift News, the Mesa Tribune, or Regardie’s magazine. Neither The Wall 
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Street Journal nor The New York Times reported on the leak lawsuit prior to the 
bankruptcy filing.  
The American Banker published three articles in June and July 1989 that were 
sympathetic to Keating’s complaints about news leaks. The June 16, 1989, article, 
“Keating Says Tape Proves Regulators Leaked Data,”574 and two others on June 23, 
1989, and July 5, 1989, explored the bizarre case of Phoenix Gazette reporter Leslie 
Irwin, who had misplaced a cassette tape recording containing regulator interviews about 
the Keating affair. Irwin was interviewing a Keating ally and a major borrower, real 
estate developer Conley Wolfswinkel and she inadvertently left her cassette tape 
containing interviews with other regulator in his office — along with her purse.575 
Wolfswinkel turned the tape over the Keating, who claimed the tape was evidence the 
regulators had a vendetta against his business empire. A Keating lawyer made copies of 
the tape and turned over a copy to the FBI. The American Banker’s June 16, 1989, report 
reflected Keating’s attempt to frame the event, even though the journalist had not 
independently verified the material on the tape: “For years, real estate developer Charles 
H. Keating Jr. has charged that federal regulators were conspiring to sink his financial 
and real estate empire by leaking confidential data to the press. Now he claims he has the 
`smoking gun’ to prove his case.”576 The Phoenix Gazette sued Keating to return the tape, 
which was the subject of a June 23, 1989, American Banker article. By July 5, 1989, the 
American Banker finally obtained its own copy of the tape and wrote a story that 
contradicted Keating’s initial claims as well as contradicted suggestions from the 
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newspaper’s earlier reporting. The article said there was no smoking gun after all: “A 
reporter's tape recording of confidential conversations with her sources on Lincoln 
Savings and Loan Association reveals little information not already on the public 
record.”577 
The other newspapers approached the missing tape saga differently, framing it as 
an escalation of Keating’s fight against regulators.578 National Thrift News reported on 
June 26, 1989, “Charles H. Keating Jr. has intensified his legal battle to regain control of 
Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, Irvine, Calif., saying he has a tape recording that 
proves he has been the victim of a campaign of illegal and inaccurate news leaks by 
federal regulators.” The Journal described the tape episode as Keating’s attempt to 
manipulate the press to advance his public relations campaign: “Here in Arizona, Mr. 
Keating has managed both to criticize the local press and feed it information in a way that 
has kept his views on the front page.”579  
Libel	Suit	
Perhaps the most dramatic legal fight between Keating and the news media was 
his $35 million libel lawsuit against Arizona Trend magazine in 1988 over its publication 
of an investigative article by journalist Michael Binstein. The Arizona Trend article 
featured a confidential bank examiner’s report and questioned Lincoln’s solvency. It was 
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published in Arizona Trend because Binstein could not convince his employer, 
investigative journalist Jack Anderson, to publish a Keating investigation. Anderson's 
libel insurance premiums had skyrocketed and he could not afford another lawsuit.580  
Keating and Arizona Trend settled the libel case, according to the American Banker, for 
two free ads with an “estimated value (of) about $500.”581 Howard Kurtz later reported 
the lawsuit cost Arizona Trend $150,000. Regardless, Keating successfully delivered his 
message. "That's the terror of the libel suit,” Binstein told Kurtz. “The message gets 
telegraphed to people who cover the S&L industry: If you want to write about Charlie 
Keating and Lincoln, it'll cost you $150,000. That's the admission price.”582 Kurtz 
reported that Charles Bowden, the editor of City Magazine in Tucson, considered printing 
a version of Binstein's work. Bowden dropped the story after he received a letter from 
Keating’s lawyers, noting that Binstein had “illegally obtained confidential documents, 
full of unnamed errors.” Bowden told Kurtz, “The magazine's major investor lost interest 
in freedom of the press and heroic journalism, and the story died.”583 
The Keating libel lawsuit was the second against a news organization over critical 
coverage of savings and loan fraud. Mario Renda, a Long Island, N.Y.-based deposit 
broker, filed a $90 million libel suit against the American Banker in 1983 following a 
story about Renda’s involvement in a Midwestern bank swindle 584. 
 An American Banker article also described Keating’s ability to intimidate critics 
with lawsuits: "Mr. Keating refused to be interviewed for this article.  Few who know 
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him will allow their names to be used with their comments, saying they fear lawsuits or 
other reprisals."585 National Thrift News also reported Keating spent more than $11 
million of Lincoln's money to overturn the Bank Board's policies and regulations.”586 It 
was unclear how Keating’s litigation affected news coverage at the newspapers reviewed 
in this study, yet libel suits have been a constant worry and deterrent to investigative 
journalism. Roush cited the pressure from libel suits were a factor in the demise of 
muckraking journalism.587 The Binstein and Bowden comments, along with the Renda 
lawsuit and the American Banker reporting on intimidation, suggest it was a factor of 
some magnitude.  National Thrift News was well aware of Keating’s reputation: “There 
was concern that Keating was a litigious kind of person and he might sue,” recalled 
Stephen Kleege.588 It was noteworthy that Keating did not sue National Thrift News 
following the Keating Five story. 
Keating	-	Litigation	
Even regulators said Keating’s reputation for litigation put them in edge. Gray, 
the former Home Loan Bank Board chairman, told Congress that his agency’s lawyers 
were afraid to take action against Lincoln Savings earlier because “they did not want to 
risk losing in court.”589 The Journal reported that "Mr. Keating engaged platoons of 
lawyers -- ultimately, 77 law firms in all. Two regulators would testify that Mr. Keating 
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told them in 1987 he had spent $50 million fighting regulators in San Francisco and 
Washington."590 Keating even was willing to take significant risks in court, such as 
challenging the integrity of a prominent federal judge assigned to one of his cases. The 
American Banker reported on Keating's unsuccessful attempt in September 1989 to 
disqualify U.S. District Judge Stanley Sporkin in Washington, D.C., from his case based 
in Sporkin's involvement in an enforcement case when Sporkin was SEC enforcement 
director.591  
Prior to the savings and loan crisis, Keating earned a reputation for aggressive 
lawsuits in another aspect of the media industry - adult bookstore owners and 
pornographers. His Citizens for Decency Through Law group was active in suing 
pornographers through the 1970s and 1980s. As noted earlier, Keating’s pursuit of Larry 
Flynt help put the Hustler publisher in jail in the 1970s, which led to Keating being 
featured in the movie, “People V. Larry Flynt,” an account of the Flynt’s life story.592 
Any media organization doing a cursory review of Keating’s background would have 
seen the anti-pornography crusade as evidence of the banker’s willingness to use the 
courts to advance an agenda. The National Thrift News put the issue into perspective, 
noting the testimony of Michael Patriarca, head of supervision of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank in San Francisco. Patriarca told Congress that Keating attempted to gain "control" 
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of all three branches of government, “if one defines his frequent use of lawsuits as an 
attempt to control the judicial branch,”593 the newspaper wrote. 
 
 
Figure 9. Keating News Media Litigation.  
Sources: American Banker, The Wall Street Journal, National Thrift News, The Associated Press, 
Arizona State University 
 
Lincoln	Sale	
Keating’s activities drew close press attention in late 1988 as he sought to sell 
Lincoln Savings to a various investors, an ill-fated process that led to the American 
Continental bankruptcy filing in April 1989 and the decision by regulations to seize the 
thrift. This episode shows the most consistent beat reporting of the four newspapers, as 
they generally report on the details of the sale and offered context about Keating’s 
background and his fights with regulators. The National Thrift News, however, did not 
report as many articles about this development, one that was central to the collapse of the 
Keating empire. The content analysis showed the National Thrift News coverage was 
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lacking, behind the competition and out of step with the trade press norms of closely 
following a major industry development.  
The Lincoln sale raised other questions. Why was there more consistent beat 
reporting by the other three newspapers on this topic and not the others? One reason 
could be the stories were pegged to an official source, a company announcement, as 
opposed to the Keating Five senators’ meeting or tales of regulatory intrigue that required 
source development. Such a development would fit within the indexing hypothesis 
advanced by Lance Bennett.594 The American Banker was early to report about the 
likelihood of a sale on July 3, 1987, some 18 months ahead of the competition. This 
article reported Keating was upset with ownership of Lincoln and clearly suggested 
Lincoln would be for sale at some point. 595 This reporting was commendable but also 
curious at the same time. It raises the question of why the American Banker could be 
enterprising and forward looking on one significant aspect of the Keating story. On the 
other hand, the newspaper failed to follow up on the Keating Five senators meeting, also 
a significant news event. 
One significant story came on March 2, 1989, when The Wall Street Journal 
reported that Lincoln was under a fraud investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
Los Angeles.596 This story, coming as Keating was struggling to sell Lincoln to outside 
buyers, could have killed the sale; Keating filed for bankruptcy six weeks later. The 
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article quoted an unnamed source as saying a pending offer for Lincoln “is a dead duck. 
Frankly, I don't see it ever coming back together, because of the financing. And the 
economics of the transaction never made sense."597  
The other newspapers covered the details of Keating’s attempts to sell Lincoln, 
beginning in December 1988. The Wall Street Journal carried six articles addressing the 
Lincoln sale; The New York Times carried five; the American Banker, five; National 
Thrift News, four. The Lincoln sales stories generally reflected a skeptical tone. The New 
York Times on Feb. 25, 1989, printed this headline: “Regulators Express Doubts On 
California Savings Deal.”598 American Banker led its Dec. 21, 1988 report by noting the 
thrift’s “risky investment strategy” had “pitted it in a high-profile battle with 
regulators.”599 The newspaper followed up on February 28, 1989, reporting about rumors 
that the buyers were unable to raise funds and investors’ belief, based on American 
Continental’s falling stock price, that the deal won’t go through.600 The critical tone was 
not consistent, however: on the eve of the bankruptcy filing, American Banker reported 
an investor group “appears to be moving closer to acquiring” Lincoln. As measured by 
this database search, the National Thrift News was behind the competition on this story. 
The newspaper’s first story exploring the implications of the Lincoln sale was on Jan. 3, 
1989, which focused on Keating’s difficulties in closing the sale.601 It followed up Feb. 
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13, March 6, and March 20. Again, this seems to be a situation where the newspaper did 
not aggressively follow significant corporate developments involving Keating. 
News	Coverage	After	Regulators	Seize	Lincoln	Savings	
Elderly	Investors	
Another regulatory issue involved an abuse of individual investors, many elderly, 
who purchased American Continental bonds through Lincoln Savings offices. American 
Continental Corp. sold some $250 million in bonds through 29 Lincoln branch offices in 
California; the sale was controversial because these bonds lacked federal deposit 
insurance but were sold from the Lincoln branches, particularly to elderly investors, who 
would expect something sold from a bank would carry such protection against loss.602 
This “swindled elderly” narrative was an important step for the Keating story to move 
from the business page to the front page and this narrative would figure in the 
congressional hearings later in the year. This story line also humanized a story about 
banking, a topic difficult to portray on television or in general interest newspapers. 
Martin Mayer wrote, “Because the disaster could be personalized, television began 
paying attention.”603 The Wall Street Journal, particularly its editorial writers, seized on 
this topic and wrote several biting and vivid articles about the plight of the elderly 
investors. This represented a critical turn in the mainstream news media’s coverage 
against Keating. 
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The American Banker raised concerns about the bond sales on Feb. 23, 1987  — 
two years ahead of National Thrift News — but quoted the head of California’s savings 
and loan department as not having any objections. National Thrift News began to 
aggressively cover this story immediately after American Continental Corp.’s 
bankruptcy. There is a significant contrast in how these two trade publications reported 
on the Keating story. The American Banker found significant material, such as the bond 
sale or Keating’s wish to sell Lincoln Savings, yet did not always follow through with 
reporting on the implications of these events. The National Thrift News had its misfires as 
well (such as coverage of the Lincoln sale), yet it tended to more aggressively follow 
stories. For example, a National Thrift News article on April 24, 1989, spelled out the 
plight of some 20,000 investors, primarily senior citizens, who stood to lose their savings. 
It also cited regulators’ concerns about misleading marketing of the investments.604 It 
devoted a significant feature story on May 8, 1989, to focus on the elderly investors, 
noting that Keating’s company had been charged with a “bait and switch.”605 The article 
reported: “An 80-year old Southern California woman who was legally blind was 
chauffeured by officials of American Continental Corp. to a branch of its S&L affiliate 
here after being persuaded into investing $30,000 in what was now considered worthless 
unsecured debt, said an attorney here.”606 In a July 24, 1989, article, National Thrift News 
then pointed to the irony of Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., an aggressive Keating 
advocate, was seeking to help Keating’s victims, the elderly investors left holding 
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worthless American Continental Corp. Bonds.607 A related story in that issue described an 
investor lawsuit against the state Department of Corporations for allowing sale of the 
bonds in the first place.608 The newspaper editorialized on the topic on Aug. 14, 1989, 
with the headline, “Too Late, Sen. Cranston?”609 Such coverage fulfilled journalism’s 
normative watchdog function and the trade press normative values criticizing industry 
abuses. Like the Keating Five story, this was an instance in which National Thrift News 
served both its core industry audience as well as a general audience. 
While the National Thrift News displayed energetic beat coverage of this elderly 
bond sale issue, the stories were dense, with a technical industry term “sub debt” used 
throughout to refer to subordinated debt, the formal classification of the debt securities 
issued by American Continental Corp. This was an example of a trade publication using 
jargon and technical language and failing to translate the issues for an average audience. 
For example, the headline on an April 24, 1989 article is: “Lincoln Challenges Takeover; 
Sub Debt In Danger.”610  
The Wall Street Journal addressed the plight of the individual bondholders on 
April 17, 1989, and it published an editorial on June 13, 1989, while The New York Times 
first mentioned them on Aug. 1, 1989. The Wall Street Journal’s April 17, 1989, article 
described “some 25,000 small investors …were left to fret over what now may be $200 
million of worthless paper. The switchboard at American Continental's Phoenix, Ariz., 
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headquarters was flooded with calls from irate noteholders.”611 The Journal’s editorial 
page was hard-hitting, linking the elderly investors’ losses to Sens. Cranston and 
Deconcini and their ties to Keating. The newspaper called Cranston and Deconcini the 
“World’s Greatest: Senatorial Shills.”612 The New York Times was the latest of the four 
papers to explore this story. The newspaper published an extensive report on the elderly 
bondholders in late November, a report pegged to the revelations from the House 
Banking Committee hearings.613 It followed up on November 24, 1989, noting the 
California state Attorney General had launched a criminal investigation of Lincoln for 
misleading sales of the bonds.614  
Accounting	
One underlying theme in the articles analyzed in this dissertation involved thrift 
industry trends, which eventually require a discussion of complex accounting issues.615 
The Wall Street Journal provided the most detailed exploration of savings and loan 
accounting problems, and in particular, emphasized the responsibility of Keating’s 
outside accountants in the fraud. An August 7, 1989, article reported the federally 
appointed auditors found "accounting gimmickry" at Lincoln, and quoted an examination 
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report comparing the thrift’s books as trading of  "two one-million-dollar cats for a two-
million-dollar dog."616 This article delved into the company background and identified 
Keating’s outside accounting firm, Arthur Young & Co., even though the firm was not 
specifically named in the regulatory report. This is an important piece of reporting that 
identified the accounting firm responsible for enabling the improper financial 
transactions. In a November 15, 1989, article, The Wall Street Journal again took 
Lincoln's accounting firms to task, reporting that more than half of Lincoln’s profits were 
the result of "sham" transactions “approved by the accounting firm of Arthur Young & 
Co.”617 The New York Times explored Lincoln’s “accounting quagmire” in a 3,684-word 
article on Dec. 28, 1989, a hard-hitting article with a lead that accused Lincoln’s 
accounting firms of failing to do their jobs.618 The New York Times also delivered a major 
analytical article on July 9, 1989, spelling out Keating's influence and the Lincoln 
collapse, which reported on the Keating Five meeting and Keating's influence in various 
regulatory agencies.619 
The American Banker lacked such biting coverage. It carried a lengthy interview 
with Keating on June 29, 1989, where he defended his accounting polices.620 Another 
articles focused on the criticism of Arthur Young, but noted the firm had not been sued or 
charged by regulators. This story arose from the House Banking Committee hearings but 
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not from enterprise reporting such as at The Wall Street Journal or The New York 
Times.621 National Thrift News raised allegations of improper accounting in its September 
1987 Keating Five story. The newspaper identified Arthur Young and Co. as being 
accused of improperly advocating for Keating and charges that an Arthur Andersen and 
Co. accountant was being investigated for fraudulently handling accounting records.622  
The newspaper returned to this theme on August 14, 1989, with a story, “Accountant: 
Lincoln Profits Based on Gimmicks.”623 The review of coverage showed the National 
Thrift News out ahead early by naming prominent accounting firms and describing 
significant allegations of mismanagement, themes The Wall Street Journal pursued well 
after the seizure of Lincoln Savings.  
Congressional	Oversight	
U.S. House Banking Committee Chairman Henry Gonzalez, D-Texas, had two 
main goals for his hearings on Lincoln Savings in the fall of 1989.624 He sought to make a 
dramatic case against deregulation by focusing on the abuses of Keating and pushing for 
the ouster of Wall, the Federal Home Loan Bank chairman who had eased up on the 
regulation of Lincoln Savings. The period of the hearings lead to a surge of coverage: 
Lincoln and Keating appear in 131 news items in October and November in the four 
newspapers, or about 40 percent of the total articles in this study. This hearing presented 
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the news media an opportunity to tell the complex savings and loan story in a more 
tangible fashion. Gonzalez had directed an investigation of Keating, Lincoln, and the 
regulators, and was ready to describe them even in terms the Washington media could 
understand: He called the collapse of Lincoln a “mini-Watergate,’’ for example.625  
This was the period when the Keating Five narrative solidified and became a 
shorthand reference for the scandal. The Wall Street Journal first used the “Keating Five” 
term in an October 16, 1989, editorial that said  “the lack of attention to the Keating 
drama was astonishing in light of the magnitude of the savings-and-loan disaster."626 
There was no mention that National Thrift News broke the story two years earlier. The 
“Keating Five” term appeared in The New York Times news coverage on November 5, 
1989.627 The American Banker first used the “Keating Five” term on November 16th and 
the National Thrift News first printed the term on November 27th, the last of the four 
newspapers to adopt the phrase.  
Highlights of the hearings included: 
—October 17th testimony from William Seidman, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corp. chairman, who said he would have closed Lincoln in 1986. 
—October 26th testimony from San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank 
regulators that Wall, the agency’s chairman, had prevented them from closing Lincoln. 
—November 7th testimony from Gray describing his private meeting with 
Cranston, DeConcini, Glenn, and McCain and the pressure to ease up on Lincoln. 
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Richard Breeden criticized the 
                                                            
625 n/a, “Lincoln Inquiry Reopening Due,” The New York Times, August 30, 1989. 
626 n/a, “The Keating Five,” The Wall Street Journal, October 16, 1989. 
627 A Times editorial on Oct. 23, 1989 used the term “The Senate Five.” 
 204 
accounting firm Arthur Young & Co. for its optimistic assessment of Lincoln’s property 
values. 
—November 21st appearance by Keating, who declined to testify, citing his Fifth 
Amendment protections against self-incrimination. Wall defended his supervision of 
Lincoln. A group of elderly investors who lost millions investing in American 
Continental bonds testified about their financial hardships.628 
 A direct comparison of themes in the hearing coverage was slightly skewed since 
the American Banker, The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times published daily 
editions whereas National Thrift News published weekly or semi-monthly during this 
period. The comparison also would suggest the small National Thrift News, with a 1989 
circulation of about 9,000, would be outgunned compared to the daily circulation 
American Banker, more that double the circulation of about 20,000, The Wall Street 
Journal’s circulation of about 1.9 million and The New York Times circulation of 1 
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million.629 Yet given its resources and publishing schedule, the National Thrift News was 
competitive by total word count. As the chart below describes, National Thrift News 
published 26,673 words on Keating in October and November, second only to the 31,187 
words published by The New York Times during this period.  
Keating coverage in The New York Times during these two months illustrated the 
enormity of the story, as one of the nation’s leading general newspapers published 39 
articles from nine different reporters on the topic, according to the search. A review of 
the coverage also demonstrated the writing and reporting talent of the journalists 
involved, such as this November 1, 1989, article by Brooks Jackson, The Wall Street 
Journal’s investigative reporter:  
 
Federal and state thrift examiners said they saw evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing in the collapse of Lincoln Savings & Loan 
Association, and a California regulator described an attempted 
`whitewash’ by deputies of chief federal regulator Danny Wall. 
In a riveting day of hearings before the House Banking 
Committee, the examiners described finding shredded 
documents, a mysterious Panamanian subsidiary, millions of 
dollars funneled into a Swiss bank, and a complacent attitude by 
Mr. Wall's deputies, one of whom was portrayed as acting more 
like a public-relations man for the thrift than a federal 
regulator.630 
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Divergence	in	Coverage	
There was one clear example of how coverage of the mainstream newspapers 
diverged from the trade newspapers. In the second hearing, testimony surfaced that 
Lincoln Savings was wiretapping telephones used by regulators during their onsite 
examination of the thrift. The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal on October 
27, 1989, led their stories with the wiretapping angle, whereas the National Thrift News 
and American Banker buried it in the bodies of their respective stories. The New York 
Times and The Wall Street Journal published significant investigative and feature stories 
right before or after the hearings, usually focusing on the political consequences. An 
October 24, 1989, The Wall Street Journal article, for example, devoted 1,349 words to 
describe the plight of Sen. Cranston and the maverick nature of House Banking Chairman 
Gonzalez.631 A November 9 Times article, labeled as a “special report” at 2,142 words, 
profiled Keating and documented his political influence over regulators.632 Politics was 
the focus of a November 9, 1989, article that contained a vivid summary of Keating’s 
activities: "By all accounts, he was a frenetic and effective advocate for his business 
interests - here distributing campaign funds, there offering a former chairman of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board a job or pushing the Reagan Administration to appoint 
one of his business associates to the bank board. Mr. Keating was for years almost 
ubiquitous in Washington and at the state and local level."633 A November 4, 1989, article 
examined the Senate Ethics Committee’s emerging investigation of the Keating Five 
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senators.634 A November 5, 1989, article focused on the influence of political 
contributions and the Keating Five senators’ elastic definition of “constituent service.”635  
The Wall Street Journal addressed a similar constituent service theme the next day.636 
The New York Times report on November 18, 1989, discussed Alan Greenspan’s role in 
the Keating drama. Prior to joining the Federal Reserve Board, Greenspan was an 
economic consultant hired by Keating at one point. Greenspan sent a letter to Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board backing Keating’s position on real estate investments. The New 
York Times news article contained a remarkable apologia to Greenspan: “To be sure, no 
one in Washington was saying that Mr. Greenspan had compromised either his integrity 
or that of his office. And they add that consulting work done when he was a private 
economist should pose no conflict in his current role as one of the nation's top banking 
regulators.”637 The Wall Street Journal, by contrast, addressed the role of Greenspan, the 
U.S. Senators. and senior White House officials in the Keating affair, with 3,141-word 
article on Nov. 20, 1989 that bluntly asked, “How could Washington have been so 
stupid?”638  
The New York Times tackled the fundamental causes of the savings and loan crisis 
in its Sunday, November 12, 1989, “Week in Review” section, with an article entitled “A 
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Savings Failure That Illustrates Everything Wrong With the Industry.”639 It framed 
Lincoln’s collapse as “microcosm — in the extreme” of the failure of hundreds of other 
thrifts. A Nov. 30, 1989 article examined the elderly people who were duped into 
investing in the now worthless bonds of Keating’s American Continental Corp.640 
American Banker also reported on the political fallout of the Keating Five, 
focusing on McCain and DeConcini’s plight with a novel angle: interviews with radio 
talk show hosts in Phoenix about listeners’ distaste for the two politicians.641 One of the 
newspaper’s important contributions came on October 30, 1989, when it reported about 
Keating’s Kuwaiti investment partners and their role in blocking a full federal takeover of 
Keating’s marquee resort, the Phoenician Hotel in Scottsdale, Arizona.642 The National 
Thrift News disclosed on May 1, 1989, and again on October 23, 1989, that a Kuwait 
businessman owned 45 percent of the Phoenician, but its reporting did not develop the 
implications of this partnership;643 The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal 
followed up on the American Banker report a few weeks later. 
Another noteworthy item was the American Banker’s November 14, 1989, 
exclusive that described Sen. Riegle’s relationship with Keating, noting the senator took a 
March 1987 trip to Phoenix to tour Keating’s properties.644 The American Banker’s 
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report was significant since it established Riegle’s relationship with Keating at a time 
when the senator was seeking to distance himself from the thrift executive.645 Also 
noteworthy was the American Banker’s November 6, 1989, report on the declining 
political influence of the thrift industry in Congress due to the Keating hearings.646 The 
Wall Street Journal’s coverage delved more deeply into the business and economic issues 
surrounding the Keating affair, as noted earlier with its significant reporting on the 
accounting issues. A November 7, 1989, article in the Journal reported 800 thrifts would 
fail to meet new capital requirements, a story that suggested significant problems and 
additional bank failures were likely since the institutions lacked a sufficient financial 
cushion to absorb loan losses.647  
National Thrift News did not publish major investigative articles at the time of 
these hearings. It continued to chip away at the specific revelations relating to Keating, 
however. An October 16, 1989, article described Keating’s campaign contributions to 
then-California Gov. George Deukmejian. It also followed up on an Arizona Republic 
report about the role McCain’s wife, Cindy McCain, in investing in a project by 
Lincoln’s parent company.648 An October 23, 1989, article raised the allegation by an 
anonymous House Banking Committee staff member that FHLB Chair Wall was 
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“tampering” with witnesses.649 These issues were covered, but not emphasized, in the 
other newspapers’ coverage.  
Attack	on	Wall	
One of the major themes in the House Banking Committee hearings was an attack 
on Wall, culminating criticism that had been building much of the year. The Wall Street 
Journal editorial writer John Fund wrote one of the early and toughest articles about 
Wall's connections to the S&L industry in far greater detail than other news outlets.650 
The article detailed the political power of the U.S. League of Savings Institutions, the 
lobbying arm for the savings and loan industry, as it pushed for deregulation and the 
expansion of deposit insurance. It described a campaign by industry lobbyists to cultivate 
Wall, “who is largely self-taught on banking matters and had a reputation for not being 
skilled with numbers” and reported about his “reputation for taking all-expense paid 
junkets” as a Senate aide. The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and American 
Banker also reported on the consumer group Common Cause calling for Wall’s 
resignation. The American Banker on October 30th published a news analysis 
challenging the Gonzalez hearings, “Gonzalez Turns Guns on Wall, But Attack Could 
Backfire,” a theme in other news media coverage but not an explicit lead to a story.651 
This angle offered some sympathy to Wall; a November 24th American Banker article652 
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quoted a Wall spokesman as calling the hearings “a kangaroo court.” A November 9, 
1989, American Banker article further criticized the Gonzalez hearings and cited remarks 
by Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Richard Breeden, who said the House 
investigation might spoil his agency’s own investigation of Keating.653 The sympathetic 
coverage of Wall came as other newspapers began reporting on his expected departure. 
The Wall Street Journal first reported November 14th that President George H.W. Bush 
had signaled his lack of support for Wall.654 Wall announced his resignation the 
following month.  
Keating	Portrayal:	Before	Lincoln’s	Seizure	
Before the collapse of American Continental Corp. and the seizure of Lincoln 
Savings, the newspapers generally did not provide a positive portrayal of Keating.  
Negative portrayal was determined by four general areas for this research: descriptions of 
adverse regulatory action, violations of bank industry norms, manipulation of the political 
or regulatory process, and guilt by association.655 The New York Times was the most 
severe, portraying Keating in a negative light in 60 percent of articles in the period from 
January 1, 1986 through April 12, 1989. The National Thrift News and American Banker 
portrayed Keating negatively in about a third of their pre-crash articles while The Wall 
Street Journal had a negative portrayal in about 20 percent of its articles in this time 
period. There was ample evidence in the public record about Keating’s unsavory 
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background. The American Banker noted in 1986 that Keating settled fraud charges with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission seven years earlier concerning his dealings 
with Provident Bank in Cincinnati.656 During this January 1, 1986, to April 12, 1989, 
period, many of the negative portrayals involved Keating’s attempt to manipulate the 
political or regulatory process for his own ends.  
The New York Times’ critical tone began on May 25, 1987, with a 1,744-word 
article, “California’s Daring Thrift Unit,” which described Keating as a risky outlier in 
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Figure 11. Negative Portrayal of Keating. 
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the industry, or “one of the most prominent examples of a new and controversial breed of 
savings and loan institution… the new breed sees thrift units as a low-cost source of 
funds that can be used in potentially more lucrative - and often riskier - investments.”657 
Other examples of negative portrayals included a discussion of a pending federal criminal 
investigation.658 The newspaper described Keating as outside the norms of the industry, 
noting on Dec. 21, 1988 that he “aggressively expanded the institution” which “brought 
intense scrutiny from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board of San Francisco.”659 A Feb. 
25, 1989, article reported Keating was “one of the most aggressive proponents of using 
federally insured deposits for activities that, while generally permitted by California's 
liberal regulations, are deemed too risky by many regulators.”660 
Keating	Portrayal:	After	Lincoln’s	Seizure	
The portrayal of Keating turned negative in all four newspapers after regulators 
seized Lincoln and Keating’s American Continental Corp. files for bankruptcy on April 
13, 1989. Many of the negative references were due to the bankruptcy and the regulators’ 
action against the thrift, references that violate the normative values of safety and 
soundness in banking. The New York Times again led the four newspapers, with critical 
portrayals of Keating in 78 percent of the articles evaluated after April 13, 1989. The 
Wall Street Journal had negative references in 59 percent of articles evaluated; for the 
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American Banker, 63 percent and National Thrift News, 49 percent.661 Looking broadly at 
the articles, the National Thrift News carried negative portrayals including references to 
the failed business — the term “conservatorship” was used 72 times, “bankruptcy” 47 
times, “receivership” 33 times, “failure” 29 times, and “insolvent” 21 times in the 61 
articles. The term “criminal” arose 19 times; “unsafe” 19 times; “unsound” 16 times; 
“racketeering” 15 times; “scandal” and “fraud” 10 times each. 
After the American Continental bankruptcy, The Wall Street Journal published 
negative portrayals that were often in colorful terms:  
 
An angered Charles H. Keating Jr. put on a show for reporters 
yesterday, blaming regulators for forcing American Continental 
Corp. into bankruptcy-law proceedings and seizing its Lincoln 
Savings & Loan Association unit last week. Using his harshest 
fighting words, the arch-conservative chairman of American 
Continental took a gunslinger's stance and vowed to do battle in 
court with his enemies -- in this case, thrift regulators led by the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board in Washington.662  
 
The news articles referred to Keating as an “arch-conservative” twice.663 Like the 
other newspapers, The Wall Street Journal associated collapse of Keating’s thrift with an 
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estimated $2 billion taxpayer bailout.664 The term “bailout” was used 47 times in The 
Wall Street Journal’s reporting; it referred to “seized” or “seizure” 35 times. The only 
item coded as positive towards Keating in this April 13-December 31, 1989 time period 
was Keating’s June 22, 1989 letter to The Wall Street Journal that spelled out his defense 
and rebuttal to the newspaper’s critical coverage.665 
	Keating	Five	Coverage	
The `Keating Five’ senators pressured the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
regulators in an April 1987 meeting to back off on Lincoln Savings. Strachan, in a 1989 
television appearance, called the political pressure on the regulators “an absolutely 
unprecedented event."666 Mike Patriarca of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board told the 
House Banking Committee: ''I can tell you for a fact there aren't any of the largest banks 
in the country who can get two senators in a room together to argue with its regulator 
about the examination. I think that this meeting was an example of some extraordinary 
political influence, the likes of which I'd never seen in my career.''667 The National Thrift 
News obtained a transcript of the private meeting between the regulators and the five 
senators from a person present at the April 1987 meeting. (This person was, later reported 
to be William Black, then deputy director of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corp., which insures deposits at thrifts.) National Thrift News correspondent Stephen 
Pizzo later remarked the transcript was so detailed it appeared to be from a tape 
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recording.668 Strachan and Kleege wrote the 2,362-word story, with Muolo reporting on 
the details.669 This was an explosive political story. The Senate Ethics Committee later 
investigated and found “substantial credible evidence” of misconduct by Sen. Cranston. 
While the other senators received less severe rebukes, their political reputations were 
damaged.670 For McCain, the Keating Five meeting remained an issue for the rest of his 
political career; he faced criticism for his role during his presidential runs in 2000 and 
2008.  The Wall Street Journal described the personal impact on McCain: "Sen. McCain 
ruefully observes that during five years he spent as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam, 
‘even the Vietnamese didn't question my integrity.’ "671 
Kleege recalled the National Thrift News faced competition to first publish the 
Keating Five revelations. At some point in mid-1989, Michael Binstein, a reporter who 
worked for investigative journalist Jack Anderson, approached National Thrift News, 
pitching a story about the Keating Five meeting. Binstein had tried to sell it to The New 
York Times and some other places but they were not interested, Kleege recalled672. “They 
didn’t think it was that important,” he said. “That was something the general press didn’t 
recognize.” There was also concern Keating would sue the media outlets that would 
publish the story.673 Strachan also passed on Binstein’s pitch, saying the National Thrift 
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News staff needed to get such a story on its own and not rely on a freelance writer. 
Strachan and Kleege begin to pursue the transcript of the Keating Five meeting. Muolo 
recalled Strachan came into the newsroom in September, holding the transcript of the 
Keating Five meeting and proclaiming, “I got it.”674 The staff then began to carefully 
report out the story. Kleege said they called all of the senators and spoke to Keating about 
the meeting: 
We basically had the whole thing on the record without the 
document… We had a long phone conversation with Keating – 
there were four or five of us standing around a speakerphone. 
And on the other end, Keating would take the question and put us 
on hold and ask the lawyers what he should say, and answer it … 
The message was you can’t take shortcuts with these kinds of 
stories. You’ve got to make the calls. You can’t just rely on the 
anonymous source.675  
 
Slow	to	Follow-Up	
The reaction from the rest of the press corps to this National Thrift News story 
was mostly silence. Major media largely ignored the Keating Five exclusive for the next 
two years.676 The Los Angeles Times carried an item inside its business page the day after 
the story broke. The Washington Post followed up in May 1988. The Detroit News in 
1988 reported about the campaign contributions to Riegle from Keating and his 
associates, which added up to more than $300,000.677 The Associated Press declined to 
                                                            
674 Paul Muolo, “’S&L Hell' an '80s Low-Water Mark,” National Mortgage 
News, December 20, 1999. 
675 Kleege, Stephen, Interview with Stephen Kleege, June 15, 2015. 
676 Database searches in Lexis-Nexis, Factiva and Proquest; search terms in 
bibliography. 
677 Stephen Kleege and Steven Pizzo, “Gray: Senators Offered Deal,” National 
Thrift News, June 5, 1989. 
 218 
follow up. Fricker said she called The Associated Press business desk in September 1987 
to alert them about the Keating Five exclusive in the National Thrift News. Fricker 
recalled that an AP editor said they were not interested. Fricker said the editor accused 
her of having a conflict of interest and said she was just trying to promote her book. “I 
was stunned,” she recalled.678  
The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times did not mention the Keating 
Five meeting until after regulators’ seizure of Lincoln Savings. According to the database 
search, The New York Times made its first reference to the Keating Five senators meeting 
on July 9, 1989, in the twenty-first paragraph of an article describing the Keating’s 
political influence, 22 months after the National Thrift News article. After regulators 
seized Lincoln, press coverage intensified: The New York Times mentioned the Keating 
episode in 40 articles and The Wall Street Journal in 37 articles. “It wasn't until nearly 
two years later — in July 1989 — that the Keating Five became a major national story,” 
according to Columbia Journalism Review.679 Indeed, some 40 percent of the total 
articles in this study were published in the second half of 1989. For the rest of 1989, the 
Keating Five meeting would be cited in a quarter of the 66 The New York Times articles, 
including three editorials. The New York Times on July 9, 1989, delivered a major 
analytical article spelling out Keating's influence and the Lincoln collapse, which stitched 
together the Keating Five meeting and Keating's influence in various regulatory 
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agencies.680 The earlier absence of coverage and the heavy resources devoted after the 
bankruptcy illustrated the newsworthy nature of the Keating Five meeting. 
The Wall Street Journal’s first reference to the Keating Five meeting, according 
to the database search, was on April 14, 1989, a one-sentence item in the American 
Continental Corp. bankruptcy story that did not identify the five senators.681 It referred to 
the meeting later in the week and in a two-sentence item on May 26, 1989, in the paper’s 
closely read “Washington Wire” column; still, the senators were not identified. (By 
contrast, the National Thrift News identified all five senators in each reference to the 
Keating Five meeting). The Wall Street Journal item reported federal investigators were 
examining Keating’s political donations in wake of Lincoln’s collapse.682 The next 
month, however, The Wall Street Journal intensified its coverage of the Keating Five, 
publishing a scathing and remarkable editorial on June 13, 1989, “World's Greatest: 
Senatorial Shills,”683 which described the plight of the elderly investors who lost millions 
buying American Continental Corp. Bonds. The Wall Street Journal published the office 
telephone numbers of Sens. Cranston and DeConcini and urged the defrauded investors 
to call. The newspaper again aggressively targeted the five senators in an October 16, 
1989, editorial: 
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Take $10 out of your wallet. That's how much the collapse of 
Lincoln Savings & Loan will cost you and every other American. 
Liquidating the Irvine, Calif., thrift will drain the federal deposit 
insurance fund by more than $2.5 billion, making it the largest 
thrift failure in history. Now, finally, there may be an 
investigation to explore how five senatorial shills helped 
perpetuate this fiscal black hole.684 
 
This editorial mentioned the work of other newspapers but failed to credit the 
National Thrift News: "Details of the affair have become public gradually over the past 
two years, mostly as a result of reporting by several newspapers.” In a similar vein, a 
November 15, 1989, editorial criticized the rest of the Washington press corps for being 
late on the story, without mentioning The Wall Street Journal also was late:  
 
It is a commentary on the culture of Washington that it has taken 
so long for this story to achieve its current prominence. We and 
Brooks Jackson of our Washington bureau have been writing 
about it for six months. The Arizona Republic, San Francisco 
Chronicle, Cleveland Plain Dealer and Detroit News have also 
been probing. But the Capitol Press Corps stirred itself only when 
a Congressman held a hearing, apparently the local benchmark of 
news.685 
 
Still, The Wall Street Journal’s editorials were commendable for distilling the 
thrift bailout into terms that an average family could understand: "A lot of members of 
Congress still don't want taxpayers ever to learn who bears responsibility for the S&L 
crisis that will cost each American family at least $4,000.” 686  
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The American Banker first mentioned the Keating Five meeting in two sentences 
on May 24, 1988, referring to “five congressmen” interceding on Keating’s behalf with 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Chairman Gray. The article noted the event “gained 
widespread publicity” even though this was the first reference in the newspaper since the 
National Thrift News exclusive some eight months earlier. The item was in the eleventh 
paragraph of a story about Keating winning his battle with the San Francisco Home Loan 
Bank.687 Even more curious was the newspaper’s May 17, 1989, article describing 
allegations by former Federal Home Loan Bank Board member Roger F. Martin that an 
unnamed congressman had put political pressure on him. The article, without any 
apparent irony, quoted Sen. Riegle as warning his colleagues not to place undue pressure 
on thrift regulators. “Mr. Riegle said, `I want people to be on notice: If any pressure was 
applied or responded to, we will make an effort to find out about it.’ ”688 The 1,503-word 
article referenced Riegle’s participation in the Keating Five meeting in the last paragraph. 
The article offered this remarkable quote: "Karl Hoyle, the Bank Board's executive 
director of congressional affairs, said he was unaware of any pressure from Congress."  
After breaking the Keating Five story in September 1987, the National Thrift 
News returned to the topic sporadically. A major follow-up came on March 21, 1988, 
when it reported Sen. Riegle was returning $76,100 in campaign contributions from 
Keating and his employees.689 It cited press coverage by Detroit newspapers as 
prompting Riegle to return the money. This article surveyed the four other senators, who 
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said they had no plans to return Keating’s money.690 Another significant follow-up was 
on July 25, 1988, in an article about the fight between Keating and the regulators.691 
About six weeks after Lincoln’s collapse, the newspaper reported further details from 
Gray about the senators’ meeting.692 
On the topic of campaign contributions, Strachan wrote an editorial titled “Money 
& Politics,” to accompany the September 1987 Keating Five exclusive. It spelled out 
Keating’s attempts to buy influence in the regulatory system through the senators and his 
proxy on the Federal Home Loan Bank, Lee Henkel. It called for strict limits in campaign 
contributions. “And we think businessmen need to play a role in politics. But that 
participation should be limited to exchanging views and providing information,” Strachan 
wrote.693 For his part, Keating was unapologetic about his financial support for 
politicians. Asked later if the campaign money was aimed at influencing politicians to 
support his cause, Keating replied, “I want to say in the most forceful way I can: I 
certainly hope so.”694  
Significant	Contributions	
Once engaged, the three newspapers made significant contributions to the story. 
On November 20, 1989, right before Keating's scheduled appearance, The Wall Street 
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Journal printed a 3,141-word investigative article that examined the business and 
regulatory failures that lead to the Keating scandal:  
 
And indeed, what has come out so far isn't a pretty sight. The tale 
begins in February 1984, when regulators allowed Mr. Keating to 
buy Lincoln even though only 4 1/2 years earlier he had been 
accused of fraud…Alvin Smuzynski, an official at the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board who handled Mr.Keating's application, 
says he didn't know about the consent decree at the time. `It 
would have made a difference,’ he says.695 
 
The Wall Street Journal published a December 13, 1989, analysis of the Keating 
Five affair by Jill Abramson (who later would become editor of The New York Times). 
The article contained a compelling portrait of famous astronaut John Glenn and his role 
in the Keating affair. Abramson wrote: “ `My reputation hangs on this in the seventh 
decade of my life,’ says an emotional Mr. Glenn, pounding the steering wheel of a rented 
sedan as he drives through the Ohio Appalachian foothills where he spent his 
boyhood.”696 
Criminal	Probes	
The National Thrift News made another significant contribution to the Keating 
coverage with Pizzo’s reporting about criminal investigations of Keating. An August 14, 
1989, story, citing sources, described an impending racketeering lawsuit being prepared 
against Keating.697 On Sept. 18, 1989, Pizzo followed up with a story by quoting a draft 
                                                            
695 Jackson, “Sleeping Watchdog,” 1989. 
696 Abramson and Duke, “The Keating Five,” 1989. 
697 Pizzo, Stephen P. “FDIC Will Sue Lincoln, Parent,” National Mortgage News, 
August 14, 1989. 
 224 
of the racketeering lawsuit that would seek $1.1 billion in damages; it was unusual for a 
journalist to obtain advance copies of such a sensitive legal document. The American 
Banker carried a similar report on September 14th and The Wall Street Journal noted the 
lawsuit on September 18th. Pizzo’s article reported about a case being brought by the 
Resolution Trust Corp., a federal agency designed to clean up the failed thrifts. The Wall 
Street Journal later advanced the story, noting that Sen. DeConcini had sponsored a bill 
to overhaul the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO, that would 
have made retroactive changes to protect Keating and others from huge damage awards. 
DeConcini dropped the provision after the Keating exemption became public.698 The New 
York Times wrote about the matter in an October 18, 1989, editorial.699 Another notable 
Pizzo story was on December 18, 1989, when he described the emerging investigations 
by the House Banking Committee and Justice Department into the role of Michael 
Milken’s Drexel Burnham Lambert, which financed the expansion of a variety of thrifts 
and inside financial dealings involving these institutions.700  
The Wall Street Journal published other articles about the criminal element of the 
scandal, following up on an exclusive in The Washington Post about the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation questioning regulators about Keating’s attempts to manipulate the 
regulatory process.701 The American Banker on November 1, 1989, reported regulators 
testified they had turned material over to the FBI, but had not confirmed an inquiry was 
                                                            
698 Abramson, Jill, and Christi Harlan, “Supporters of RICO-Reform Bill To 
Scrap Retroactivity Provision.” The Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1989. 
699 n/a. “A ‘Reform’ That RICO Doesn’t Need.” The New York Times, October 
18, 1989. 
700 Pizzo, Stephen P. “Congress to Investigate ‘Daisy Chain’ of Thrifts,” National 
Mortgage News, December 18, 1989. 
701 Jackson, Brooks, “FBI Probe Focuses On Senators’ Ties To Keating ‘s S&L,” 
The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1989. 
 225 
under way.702 National Thrift News reported in the spring that the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
in Los Angeles was investigating the Keating affair. It also reported on Nov. 6, 1989, that 
regulators referred material to the FBI and the FBI had subpoenaed documents, but the 
article did not lead with an FBI investigation703 and subsequent coverage referred to an 
ongoing FBI probe as background. Similarly, The New York Times referred to the FBI 
investigations as background in articles and did not lead an article with the probes.704 
 
Aftermath	
Strachan, appearing at a May 1, 1989, National Press Club forum on the savings 
and loan crisis, faulted his colleagues for the lack of follow-up to the Keating Five story. 
“When reporters from other papers called about the story, they were told by the 
spokesman for Federal Home Loan Bank Board, this was not at all unusual,” Strachan 
said. But in fact, such a political intervention in a bank examination “literally had never 
happened before. But most reporters had accepted that this was run of the mill political 
business, for five senators to intervene in the examination of a savings and loan 
institution.”705 “The press could have been a little more aware of what was happening 
there and a little less trusting of officialdom,” he said. “I think that’s been a major 
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problem." A reader sensed Strachan’s frustration when he wrote an editorial in the middle 
of the Gonzalez hearings, “Better Late Than Never”:706 
 
When this newspaper disclosed in September 1987 that five 
United States Senators had met with regulators from the Federal 
Home Loan Bank of San Francisco to discuss the examination of 
Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, Irvine, Calif., we 
expected a sharp reaction from the press, the political 




The review of these four newspapers’ coverage from 1986 to 1990 showed that 
while the National Thrift News was far ahead of the competition on the Keating Five 
story, it was eclipsed by the other news organizations on other important developments 
on this story. Its beat reporting was admirable but inconsistent at times. The National 
Thrift News trailed the competition on significant stories such as on the sale of Lincoln 
Savings and the settlement between Wall and Keating. It was also behind on some 
aspects of the Lincoln and regulatory relationship first reported in the Mesa Tribune and 
Regardie’s magazine. In this sense, National Thrift News did not always provide 
comprehensive coverage of a dominant and controversial player in its industry.  
National Thrift News’ coverage of Keating did not always describe the banker’s 
role in the broader narrative savings and loan saga. An example was on August 14, 1989: 
"The now-defunct Lincoln Savings and Loan Association was a healthy institution when 
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American Continental Corp. acquired it in 1984, says Lincoln's former chief executive 
Donald Crocker. Mr. Crocker's comments follow months of public statements by ACC's 
current chief executive, Arizona developer Charles Keating, that the thrift was already 
ailing when he acquired it in early 1984."707 This story does not make the connection of 
why a profitable Lincoln was important in the saga of the S&L debacle. However, the 
other newspapers reviewed here have even more significant coverage gaps, particularly 
The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, which do not cover Keating closely 
before regulators seized Lincoln Savings. The delay in covering the Keating meeting and 
reporting on its consequences was a factor that allowed the fraud to continue for another 
two years, which expanded the cost of the taxpayer bailout. 
This is a media failure. Evidence of this failure is seen in the enormous coverage 
these same newspapers gave to the Keating scandal during the Gonzalez hearing. It was 
newsworthy, by any measure, and they missed it. After Lincoln failed, The New York 
Times and The Wall Street Journal provided some excellent and interesting reporting on 
the case, exploring the vulnerable elderly bondholders and the complicit accountants. 
They called politicians such as Sen. Cranston to account. The analysis of the coverage 
shows the mainstream media was not incompetent; far from it, there were some excellent 
watchdog stories and reporting. Evidence of that talent includes The Wall Street 
Journal’s reporting by John Fund and Brooks Jackson. The Wall Street Journal's post-
Lincoln Savings collapse coverage was solid and energetic. At least three stories were 
framed around a complaint from a consumer group, Common Cause. The editorial page 
wrote important pieces that contributed to the understanding of the causes of the crisis. 
                                                            
707 n/a, “Former Lincoln Chief Says S&L Was Profitable,” National Mortgage 
News, August 14, 1989. 
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The New York Times also had aggressive and extensive beat reporting on the case after 
regulators’ seize Lincoln. One would wish they were on the story earlier, before 
widespread damage was done to the national economy and to elderly people who lost 
their savings. 
Keating’s reputation for litigation against his opponents weighed on the press 
coverage, yet the extent was difficult to discern. The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal published strong and critical stories about Keating, yet most of them fall after 
regulators intervened on April 13, 1989. Certainly, there was significant evidence 
available in the public record to cast questions about Keating’s background and behavior 
before the bankruptcy, such as the 1979 SEC fraud settlement and the significant 
reporting by Binstein in Regardie’s magazine. With the benefit of hindsight, we see the 
importance of early press coverage of these regulatory stories in a deregulated 
environment when government agencies were not always doing their job. 
The review also shows most of the four newspapers’ coverage was clustered 
around official events such as congressional hearings or pegged to an official source, 
such as a company announcement. Yet some of this coverage revealed a surprising 
disconnect. The newspapers had ample coverage of the 1988 deal between Keating and 
Wall, yet they neglected to write in detail about the Keating Five senators meeting, which 
was part of Keating’s complaint against the agency. In this respect, National Thrift News 
performed a significant watchdog function by using sources to report on the Keating Five 
and the racketeering investigations. They did not wait for a regulator’s press release. The 
newspaper advanced the cause of transparency and accountability in other ways: National 
Thrift News repeatedly identified the Keating Five senators by their individual names, 
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even in routine background references in other stories. The Wall Street Journal and The 
New York Times only began doing this after the Gonzalez hearings. The pattern of The 
New York Times and The Wall Street Journal ignoring good trade press coverage 
continued late into 1989. The American Banker delivered important reporting about 
Keating’s Kuwaiti investors in October 1989, which gained little attention in the large 
newspapers. In light of The Wall Street Journal’s late start on the Keating story, its 
November 20, 1989, headline during the Gonzalez hearings was quite ironic: “Sleeping 
Watchdog.” The news media’s surveillance function is explored even further in the 
following chapter and its study of media coverage of CenTrust, one of the largest thrift 









































This case study examined media coverage by the National Thrift News of the 
failed CenTrust Savings and Loan in Miami and its owner David Paul, who had a 
personal and professional relationship with Strachan. This CenTrust analysis began 
Janurary 1, 1984, at a time when the savings and loan crisis was not on the national 
agenda, and concluded December 31, 1993, when the crisis had peaked and was 
beginning to fade from the public agenda. The Keating and Lincoln Savings study, by 
contrast, looked at the 1986-1990 time period, when the crisis built and became a national 
news story. As such, CenTrust served as a valuable case study of media coverage of the 
crisis since it covered this broader time period. 
Theory	
This case study allowed an in-depth exploration of the central theoretical question 
in this dissertation, the role of autonomy as a professional norm in journalism. The 
content analysis and research of the National Thrift News coverage challenged key 
aspects of the political economy theory, since research showed Strachan acted 
independently of commercial pressures.708 The analysis of all five newspapers offered 
some support for the media theory known as the indexing hypothesis709 since the negative 
                                                            
708 Political economy was discussed in Chapter 2. Key leaders of this theory are 
Herman and Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent, 1988; McChesney. “The Problem of 
Journalism,” 2003; Smythe, Dallas W. “On the Audience Commodity and Its Work,” In 
Dependency Road: Communications, Capitalism, Consciousness, and Canada, Norwood, 
NJ: Ablex, 1981. 
709 Bennett,  “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations,” 1990; Entman 
“Cascading Activation” 2003. 
 232 
newspaper coverage primarily started only after regulators criticized Paul and CenTrust 
for the $25 million in rare art purchases. In this case, the media took its cue from an 
official institution, which is also the hallmark of the indexing theory. The political 
economy and indexing theories are described below.  
The news coverage of CenTrust permits an examination of journalistic 
independence. Did Strachan’s relationship with Paul influence the newspaper’s coverage 
of CenTrust? Strachan’s former reporters said no. To the contrary, they said Strachan 
allowed his young reporters to pursue negative stories about his source, and these stories 
were printed in National Thrift News. In this respect, Strachan’s independence would 
challenge key tenets of the political economy theory. Under this theory, a trade 
publication such as National Thrift News would tread gently to avoid alienating 
advertisers and major corporate actors. One key element of the political economy theory 
is the financial power of corporations, such as banks and thrifts, both frame the 
parameters of coverage and the sourcing, resulting in a news product that rarely 
challenges the corporate status quo.710 The Strachan and Paul relationship should be a 
classic example in support of the political economy theory. He was publisher of a 
newspaper financially dependent on the savings and loan industry and established to 
serve this industry. He had a social and professional relationship with a dynamic and 
politically active banker who advertised in the newspaper. The analysis of news 
coverage, however, does not support the outcome expected by the political economy 
theory. 
                                                            
710 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 1988; McChesney, “The 
Problem of Journalism,” 2003. 
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The study does not find evidence National Thrift News gave more favorable 
treatment to Paul and CenTrust than the other newspapers. National Thrift News, in fact, 
printed some highly critical stories of Paul later cited by congressional investigators. The 
study finds the National Thrift News’ reporting turned critical at about the same time as 
the other newspapers, except for the leader in the overall coverage, the St. Petersburg 
Times. National Thrift News made some significant contributions, for example, with 
investigative reporting into CenTrust’s involvement in the international bank scandal of 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International. The Strachan case challenges the political 
economy theory because, as described earlier, this theory fails to account for individual 
agency. As described in more detail in this chapter, Strachan’s idealism and commitment 
to professional ideals of journalistic independence guided the reporting that challenged 
powerful financial interests. 
At the same time, the five newspapers’ coverage of CenTrust and Paul aligns with 
critical theory that official institutions help set the agenda for news coverage. Bennett, 
Entman, Hall, and others describe how government officials legitimize certain news 
narratives.711 In this case, bank regulators’ criticism of CenTrust and Paul put the story in 
play.  With one exception the National Thrift News and the other newspapers did not 
write negative stories about Paul until regulators revealed the $25 million in art 
purchases. The exception was a May 1988 St. Petersburg Times profile of Paul that 
reported he had falsified his resume.712 The media narrative turned decidedly negative in 
                                                            
711 Entman describes how government officials, from the president on down, can 
spread news frames to reporters and the public. See Entman, “Cascading Activation: 
contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11,” 2003; also Bennett,  “Toward a Theory 
of Press-State Relations,” 1990; Hall et al “Social Production of the News,” 1978. 
712 Swasy, Alecia, “On Top and in Command: David Paul Is on a Mission to 
Build His CenTrust Kingdom,” St. Petersburg Times. May 16, 1988. 
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March 1989, reflecting the rogue bank narrative. Yet this happened primarily because an 
official institution — not the press --  put this narrative into play. So in this respect, the 
journalism was not fully autonomous. 
 
Figure 12. Negative coverage of CenTrust-David Paul. 
This chart shows negative articles about CenTrust began primarily after regulators criticized Paul’s 
decision to use bank funds to buy rare art, such as a Rubens painting. 
 
The CenTrust analysis examines the research question about aspects of a critical 
and autonomous business press. To do this, the dissertation examines the arc of CenTrust, 
its rise and fall, and organizes the material into two broad narratives: first, the rise of 
CenTrust as a rogue bank and second, the systemic questions about lax supervision that 
contributed to the savings and loan crisis. Such news coverage is compared across five 
newspapers: National Thrift News, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, 
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American Banker and the St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times,713 an influential regional 
newspaper that covered CenTrust closely.  It examines which newspapers first reported 
about the wrongdoings and in how much depth, and which ones picked up the story later 
or even missed the story altogether. This emphasis on timing, which newspapers were 
first, is important since one significant marker for a critical business press involves 
whether it uncovered wrongdoing at an early stage or at least raised questions about 
improper behavior.  
 
Rogue	Bank		
Under Paul, CenTrust grew rapidly and became the largest thrift in the Southeast. 
Its collapse cost taxpayers $1.7 billion, and represented the fourth largest S&L failure in 
history.714 Paul later was sentenced to 11 years in prison on bank fraud charges, including 
his scheme to use the bank to acquire $25 million in rare art, including the Rubens 
painting. Unlike Keating, Paul and CenTrust were not as well known. Major histories of 
the savings and loan crisis provided mostly a passing mention of Paul and CenTrust, 
unlike the detailed examinations of the Keating and Lincoln Savings saga.715 The Lincoln 
Savings case drew more attention because of Keating’s public battle with regulators and 
explicit influence peddling of congressmen. The Lincoln case also came before the 
CenTrust collapse and was featured in a major congressional hearing in October and 
November 1989. Key trends in the Paul and CenTrust story, from the battles with 
                                                            
713 It is now known as the Tampa Bay Times. 
714 n/a, “CenTrust Chairman Sentenced to 11 Years,” Los Angeles Times. 
December 2, 1994. 
715 See Mayer, The Greatest Ever Bank Robbery, 1990. CenTrust is mentioned in 
detail in two pages. Keating and Lincoln Savings are featured in two chapters. 
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regulators to his opulent spending to his risky investments in junk bonds, were broader 
themes in the savings and loan crisis as a whole. Because of these activities, David Paul 
became known as the "Charles Keating of Florida."716  
News coverage after March 1989 portrayed CenTrust as a rogue bank,717 one that 
spent money irresponsibly on art, took excessive risks with junk bonds and trading, and 
argued with regulators whether its books and records accurately reflected the bank’s 
financial condition. The analysis explores when the coverage first became skeptical, such 
as when outside experts were cited in the articles challenging CenTrust’s official version 
of events. It also examines when the newspapers launched investigative reporting projects 
on CenTrust that cast a negative light on the company. In essence, the analysis examines 
when the newspaper coverage departed from the routine business reporting to reporting 
that questioned about CenTrust’s legitimacy. The rogue bank analysis focuses on three 
developments: CenTrust’s securities trading and junk bond investments, its rapid growth, 
and its art investments.  
The singular event in the CenTrust-rogue bank narrative were revelations in 
March 1989 that Paul had purchased $25 million of rare art with the thrift’s funds. The 
                                                            
716 n/a, “Review & Outlook: The People’s Business,” The Wall Street Journal, 
October 25, 1990. 
717 The literature review provides some insight about the elements of the rogue 
bank narrative. Mayer, The Greatest Ever Bank Robbery, 1990, spells out the following 
elements: 1) Heavy reliance on the national brokered deposit market versus deposit 
gathering from the community. Also, paying interest rates well above market rates to 
attract deposits (p 36); 2) Participating in land flips to fraudulently boost the price of real 
estate (p 54); 3) Using bank funds to speculate in the financial markets or risky land deals 
(p 166); 4) Nepotism in management (p 166); 5)  Selling risky bonds to customers as safe 
investments (p 168); 6) Making campaign contributions with intent of having politicians 
pressure regulators to modify or end examinations (p 168). Mayer, The Greatest Ever 
Bank Robbery, 1990. Pizzo et al in Inside Job, 1989, provide other elements of the rogue 
bank narrative: 1) Using bank funds to finance a lavish personal lifestyle (p 5) 2) Sudden 
and rapid growth (p 5); 3) Use of outside investors with marginal reputations (p 5). 
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origin of this information was from Florida state regulators, not from a media 
investigation. Still, reports about the expensive art marked the point at which CenTrust 
gained notoriety, primarily due to a detailed March 1989 article about Paul’s opulence in 
The New York Times. The New York Times barely covered CenTrust prior to the art story 
but after this point, it set the tone for other media to examine Paul more closely. Other 
news organizations, including National Thrift News, began more probing and negative 
coverage after this point.  
Yet there were red flags about CenTrust’s activities prior to the art story. The 
analysis examines the routine beat reporting on CenTrust, such as corporate earnings 
announcements and executive changes, to see if the newspapers warned readers about the 
speculative activities that were central to the thrift’s failure. Some news organizations 
provided investors and the public with important clues about the rapid growth while 
others stuck to more routine coverage that appeared to rely on press releases - or ignored 
CenTrust altogether. The St. Petersburg Times challenged Paul and CenTrust’s growth 
narrative with a detailed profile of Paul in 1988.718 The Wall Street Journal provided 
detailed beat reporting and some important early warnings about Paul’s controversial 
business plan, which essentially involved using the cheap funds from depositors to 
finance speculative trading in high risk junk bonds in companies. Some of these junk 
bond issuers later sought bankruptcy protection. In addition to The Wall Street Journal, 
the St. Petersburg Times and National Thrift News provided warnings about the junk 
bond strategy. The American Banker coverage had some warnings but did its reporting 
focused primarily on routine business coverage. The analysis below shows the 
newspapers that did this sort of basic reporting tended to have faster and more aggressive 
                                                            
718 Swasy, “On Top and in Command,” 1988. 
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coverage of CenTrust when its problems mounted. Related to the junk bond narrative was 
CenTrust’s involvement with controversial financier Michael Milken, another factor 
examined in the rogue bank narrative.  
The rogue bank framework helps explore a research question, how the National 
Thrift News' reporting differed from mainstream and general interest business 
publications. As the following analysis shows, National Thrift News did not lead on key 
developments in the CenTrust saga, in contrast to its leadership role in the Keating and 
Lincoln Savings stories. The St. Petersburg Times produced early reporting that raised 
questions about Paul’s business activities while The Wall Street Journal described 
significant concerns about CenTrust. Still, the National Thrift News did produce some 
significant and detailed reporting on CenTrust, which included its 1991 coverage of 
CenTrust and its ties with to the Pakistan-based Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International, which was involved in money laundering and financing other criminal 
activities.  
The CenTrust news coverage analysis also helps explore another research 
question, how the National Thrift News' status as a trade publication helped or hurt its 
reporting, and whether it followed or defied trade journalism norms. To answer this 
question, the analysis explores whether the news coverage of Paul and CenTrust served a 
specialized business audience, a norm for the trade press and whether it challenged 
powerful corporate or economic interests. In some instances, the National Thrift News 
coverage served primarily an industry audience with its narrow focus and technical 
language, in keeping with the trade press norms. Yet as CenTrust neared collapse, the 
newspaper’s reporting was more suitable for a general audience with less technical 
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language and greater context that placed CenTrust within the broader problems facing the 
savings and loan industry. It also examines whether National Thrift News used routine 
company announcements, such as quarterly earnings reports or executive management 
changes, as a launching pad to tell a broader story about CenTrust and the industry, a 
technique commonly used by general circulation newspapers such The Wall Street 
Journal.    
  
Systemic	Failings	
Lastly, the study examines when the more systemic questions about lax regulation 
and supervision arose in news coverage. When did the newspapers begin questioning the 
public officials responsible for protecting the public about CenTrust? The analysis 
examined when the coverage began to question if regulators supervised the thrift properly 
and whether regulators were influenced by CenTrust’s lobbying activities. It examines 
coverage of Paul’s campaign contributions and influence with local and national 
politicians. Much of the reporting about systemic problems about CenTrust, and its 
attempts to manipulate the regulatory process came primarily after its demise. By 
contrast, considerable reporting on Keating and Lincoln Savings focused on lobbying and 
influence peddling before its failure. For CenTrust, much of the political coverage was 
carried in the St. Petersburg Times, which focused on attempted manipulation of state 
regulators. There was little coverage of Paul’s activities with national politicians, such as 
Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., when compared to the Keating case. One possible explanation 
is timing: the Paul political manipulation revelations came amid an enormous surge of 
news coverage on the savings and loan crisis, which the downfall of much larger actors 
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such as Milken and the emergence of the international BCCI banking scandal dominating 
the news cycle. 
 
Media	Coverage	Before	CenTrust	Seizure	
This section describes how the news organizations covered CenTrust and David 
Paul during the thrift’s expansion period from 1984 through January 1989, when the thrift 
began to lose money and the news narrative became more negative and probing. Paul’s 
fraud was growing rapidly during this time. The second phase of the analysis then 
examines coverage of CenTrust’s decline, from January 1989 to February 1990, when 
revelations surfaced about Paul using CenTrust funds to acquire an expensive art 
collection. This section concludes with regulators’ seizure of the thrift on February 2, 
1990. 
Paul was a real estate developer who graduated from Wharton Business School 
and Columbia Law School. His real estate firm, Westport Co., in 1983 bought a money-
losing thrift in Miami, Dade Savings and Loan Association, which he renamed as 
CenTrust. CenTrust engaged mortgage bond and junk bond trading, and made more 
money with its securities activities than its mortgage business in its early years. Paul 
became friends with Lewis S. Ranieri, former vice chairman of the investment bank 
Solomon Brothers, who joined the CenTrust board in 1987. Raneri, a Wall Street legend 
instrumental in creating the mortgage backed securities market, had formed a friendship 
with Paul and was also very close friends with Strachan of the National Thrift News. 
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Rogue	Bank	Painting	and	Opulence	
The news media narrative turned negative against Paul and CenTrust in March 
1989. This is when the St. Petersburg Times and The New York Times reported that Paul 
used the bank’s money to acquire $25 million of rare art, which marked the beginning of 
the rogue bank narrative in news coverage. The Rubens painting tale provided a vivid 
Figure 13. Rubens, “Portrait of a Man as the God Mars.” 




symbol of excess and opulence that served to define Paul in press coverage from this 
point forward. It would be one of the signature details of CenTrust’s downfall.  
The St. Petersburg Times on March 8, 1989 first reported on regulators’ 
objections to Paul using CenTrust funds to purchase a painting, "Portrait of a Man as the 
God Mars," by Flemish master Paul Peter Rubens.719 The New York Times followed up 
with a 1,760-word story interviewing art dealers who described how Paul had overpaid 
for the Rubens painting.720 The press reports said Paul had overpaid as much as $10 
million for the painting and the artwork was hanging in his home instead of the CenTrust 
office. After The New York Times story, the tone of CenTrust media coverage shifted and 
became increasingly negative. While the art tale was entertaining, it represented a deeper, 
ongoing battle between Paul and the regulators over management of CenTrust. Florida 
regulators, in ordering Paul to sell the art, made their concerns public in a letter that 
described fundamental problems with the bank. The National Thrift News picked up on 
this theme, noting CenTrust’s art investments totalled $25 million, or “3% of its 
regulatory net worth”; while the article did not fully explain this concept, it spoke to the 
highly speculative nature of the thrift’s basic financial cushion. The article contained an 
interview with Paul, who defended his decision to have the painting hang in his house: 
“the thrift's new office tower has yet to be completed and he fears that humidity in the 
`uncompleted office space’ could harm the paintings.”721 
                                                            
719 N/A, “CenTrust Ordered to Sell Pricey Painting,” St. Petersburg Times, March 
8, 1989. 
720 The story was reported by The New York Times’ art critic, not a member of the 
business reporting staff. See Glueck, Grace, “Florida Bank Ordered to Sell Part of $28 
Million Art Holdings,” The New York Times, March 15, 1989. 
721 Muolo, Paul, “CenTrust Told to Sell Rubens,” National Mortgage News, 
March 20, 1989. 
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The American Banker, however, did not lead with any articles about the CenTrust 
art controversy, according to the database search.722 Subsequent reporting on August 7, 
1989 claimed that CenTrust booked a profit with the sale of its art,723 whereas other 
media described Paul as taking significant losses in sale of the paintings.724  The Wall 
Street Journal was late to report on the art controversy, with its first article published on 
April 12, 1989, and the article that did not provide new details.725 The newspaper 
eventually published a detailed and highly critical story on Oct 18, 1989, which did not 
break any new ground from the prior reporting by The New York Times, St. Petersburg 
Times, or National Thrift News. But The Wall Street Journal’s 3,313-word article was 
striking for its negative tone, which described Paul as a "flamboyant chairman." The 
article reported that funds for Paul’s $28 million art buying spree were  “plucked from 
the funds of this federally insured institution even as CenTrust was losing money hand 
over fist… Embittered shareholders (some of whom are suing) say the chairman and his 
collection epitomize the excesses of speculation that set off the national S&L crisis."726 
The article continued: 
                                                            
722 The art sale was referred to in the 4th paragraph of Cox, Rebecca, “Miami’s 
Ailing CenTrust May Sell Some Branches,” The American Banker, July 17, 1989. The 
most extensive report was January 1991, nearly two years after the first article about 
Paul’s art buying spree, and it primarily focused on art collecting by other banks. 
Michaelis, Vicki, “As Banks Slim Down, So Do Their Budgets for Artwork,” The 
American Banker, January 24, 1991. 
723 The American Banker cited a securities analyst, not an art broker, for the profit 
claim. Cox, Rebecca, “CenTrust Posts $5 Million Loss After Hiking Junk-Bond 
Reserves,” The American Banker, August 7, 1989. 
724 Brannigan, Martha, “CenTrust Says Florida Forced It to Sell Its Art Collection 
at Unfavorable Prices,” The Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1989. 
725 de Cordoba, Jose, “Art Before Profit May Be Noble, But For a Savings Bank? 
--- Florida Tells Shaky CenTrust To Unload Its Collection, Which Features a Rubens,” 
The Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1989. 
726 Brannigan, Martha, “Musty Masters S&L’s Art Collection Ordered to Be Sold 
Faces Skeptical Market,” The Wall Street Journal, October 18, 1989. 
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Meanwhile, Mr. Paul and CenTrust executives are getting 
squeamish about opulence. Mr. Paul has been characterized as 
"the Great Gatsby or something," complains Karen E. Brinkman, 
an executive vice president of CenTrust. The media, she says, 
have distorted his personal life. Mr. Paul nods in agreement. "I 
don't think I have a life style that is, frankly, so flamboyant," he 
says. But at just that moment, he is interrupted in his office by a 
servant in tuxedo who pours coffee from silver into a cup of 
china and dabs the brim with linen.727  
  
This art story became the brief contextual sentence used to describe Paul in 
subsequent coverage for the years ahead. References to Paul’s “extravagant” or “opulent” 
lifestyle were images with considerable staying power: as recently as January 2000, The 
Wall Street Journal referred to Paul and art purchases.728  The review of news articles 
captured in the 1984-1993 search contained 53 references to “lavish” or its variations; 35 
references to “extravagant” and 15 to “opulent.” Paul, when asked about media coverage 
of the art, said the $25 million art investment was never significant relative to the size of 
the bank, $5 billion. “The art was insignificant…The point is relative to our size, the art 
was an excuse” to embarrass the company and make the case against Paul. “And by the 
way, the art ultimately sold more than what we paid for it. And I don’t know a major 
bank in a country that doesn’t have an art collection."729  
A second narrative arose after the paintings story, the tales about Paul’s 95-foot 
yacht, the “Grand Cru,” a French phrase for superior vineyards. The St. Petersburg Times 
                                                            
727 Brannigan, “Musty Masters,” 1989. 
728 Bensinger, Ken, “Relic of S&L Scandal Rubens Painting Has Deflated 
Auction Prospects --- Portrait Now a Familiar Face At Sotheby’s Played a Role In,” The 
Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2000. 
729 Paul, David, Interview with David Paul, April 17, 2016. 
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said the $7 million ocean liner, with an interior “studded with 14-karat gold nails,” set 
“the standard for nautical narcissism.”730 The yacht featured comforts such as $700 bed 
sheets and a skeet-launching device to allow guests shoot clay pigeons at sea. Tales of 
this yacht first arose in the St. Petersburg Times profile of Paul in May 1988.731 The 
yacht then became the foundation for a political bribery story involving the mayor of 
Miami Beach. Paul’s house on Miami Beach’s La Gorce Island had a dock that required 
an extension to accommodate a 95-foot yacht. He sought a variance from the Miami 
Beach city council and was accused of bribing the Miami Beach mayor, Alex Daoud, 
$35,000 to vote for the dock extension. Daoud was convicted of bribery in 1992 related 
to the dock vote.732 Paul used the Grand Cru to throw political fundraisers and to 
entertain influential community figures, including journalists. Strachan and his family, 
along with Ranieri, visited with Paul on the Grand Cru.733 As with the paintings, Paul 
used CenTrust funds to pay for maintenance and services related to the yacht.734 
 
Before	the	Rogue	Bank:	Search	for	Warnings	
This analysis looked closely at the CenTrust coverage to see if there were clues or 
warning signs about the bank’s problems prior to rogue bank narrative. The next two 
sections analyze the regular beat reporting on CenTrust, such as the corporate earnings, 
                                                            
730 Grieff, James, “Burning A Hole In the Bank,” St. Petersburg Times, January 
22, 1990. 
731 Swasy, “On Top and In Command,” 1988. 
732 n/a, “Former Mayor Guilty of Bribery,” St. Petersburg Times, September 26, 
1992. 
733 Ranieri, Lewis, Interview with Lewis Ranieri, August 12, 2015. 
734 n/a, “Paul, CenTrust’s Ex-CEO, Receives 11 Years in Jail,” The Wall Street 
Journal, December 2, 1994. 
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merger announcements, and executive changes. First, the analysis will examine how the 
newspapers covered CenTrust’s rapid growth. From 1984 to 1989, CenTrust's assets 
quintupled to more than $11 billion and it became the largest thrift in the Southeast.735 A 
close examination of how the newspapers covered this growth is significant since a bank 
or thrift’s rapid growth is a warning sign about excessive risk without controls against 
potential loan losses.736  
News coverage of CenTrust prior to 1988 focused on acquisitions and attempted 
takeovers: the attempted takeover of Mass Mutual Mortgage & Realty Investors and 
ensuing litigation in 1984 and 1985 as well as the proposed purchases of Freedom 
Savings and Broward Savings in 1986 and Florida Federal Savings in 1988. Interestingly, 
all three of these mergers fell apart as they moved to completion and many wound up in 
the courts as Paul sued on various issues. In 1986, CenTrust acquired an insurance 
company, Kansas City, Mo.-based Old American Insurance Co. The Wall Street Journal 
observed on April 11, 1988, that CenTrust was “an aggressive thrift that has grown 
explosively” with assets of $8.7 billion and 64 branches.737 CenTrust acquired a stake in a 
small West German bank, Rheinisch-Westfalisch Kreditgarantiebank AG, in 1988. This 
was an unusual international purchase for a U.S.-based thrift, since this sector of the 
industry normally focuses on the domestic housing market. “Analysts said they did not 
                                                            
735 Volsky, George, “Hard-Driving Banker Hits High-Rate Wall,” The New York 
Times, March 25, 1989. 
736 As noted on the methodology chapter, in the discussion of normative behavior 
of banks, regulators have long considered rapid growth a warning sign of credit problems 
at a bank. See n/a. “An Examiner’s Guide to Problem Bank Identification, Rehabilitation 
and Resolution,” 2001. Also note the comments by Ron Goff, vice president of Allen C. 
Ewing & Co. in Tampa. "If you look at companies that have grown rapidly, some have 
problems later on,” Goff told the St. Petersburg Times. See Swasy, “On Top and in 
Command,” 1988. 
737 n/a, “CenTrust Savings Offers $6.50 a Share For Florida Federal,” The Wall 
Street Journal, April 11, 1988. 
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know of other U.S. thrifts that have invested in overseas banks or thrift like companies,” 
the American Banker reported. "I doubt the thought has even flickered across the minds 
of half a dozen thrift executives," Jonathan Gray, a thrift stock analyst with Sanford C. 
Bernstein & Co., New York, told the newspaper.738  
The early coverage in the American Banker and St. Petersburg Times showed 
some skepticism of Paul’s merger and expansion activities. A 1984 American Banker 
article noted, for example, how Paul “suffered two setbacks” in one week as he had “to 
withdraw a merger offer for one Florida thrift and was then sued by another.”739 It 
described the thrift’s active investment activities. The American Banker and others noted 
in passing that CenTrust was not a typical thrift and that its “earnings have not been from 
traditional sources.” ''It is not an easy company to analyze,'' Freedom Savings and Loan 
Chairman Robert Singer told the newspaper.740 Other articles, such as an April 11, 1988, 
report, described the acquisitive nature of CenTrust in the lead.741 Yet in other instances, 
the American Banker did not explore a clear warning about CenTrust’s growth. The 
thrift’s commercial loans grew 788% in 1986, an extremely rapid rate of growth out of 
norm with the industry. This was mentioned only in passing in the bottom of a 700-word 
earnings roundup.742  
                                                            
738 Roosevelt, Phil, “Centrust Buys Stake in West German Bank,” The American 
Banker, February 18, 1988. 
739 n/a, “Double Trouble for Miami’s Dade S&L,” The American Banker, May 4, 
1984. 
740 Basch, Mark, “CenTrust Makes Friendly Proposal To Acquire Freedom 
Savings and Loan,” The American Banker, February 27, 1986. 
741 Ellis, Linda, “Centrust Offers $61 Million for Florida Federal; Miami Suitor Is 
Interested in Buying Certain Branches If Merger Is Unacceptable,” The American 
Banker, April 11, 1988. 
742 Hicks, Kenneth J. “Commercial Loan Growth Slows at Top Thrifts,” The 
American Banker, May 8, 1987. 
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On Nov. 4, 1987, the St. Petersburg Times had a forward-looking report that 
suggested the unusual and risky nature of CenTrust’s business model. Most thrifts made 
money through the basic business of extending home mortgages and gathering deposits. 
CenTrust, however, earned its most of profits from trading securities and junk bonds. St. 
Petersburg Times found it newsworthy, then, to report in 1987 that CenTrust had made 
money from its basic banking business. This suggested Paul was using a risky investment 
strategy but that point was not developed explicitly in the reporting.743 
The National Thrift News covered CenTrust during this period but its coverage 
lacked the skepticism about the growth. Merger announcement stories up through 1988, 
for example, mostly were unbylined, brief stories that carried a statement from Paul with 
little outside commentary. Other articles only mentioned CenTrust in broader industry 
roundups. An October 19, 1987, article addressed the tremendous growth of CenTrust but 
                                                            
743 Stertz, Bradley, “Savings and Loan’s Gains Help Boost Earnings for 
CenTrust,” St. Petersburg Times, November 4, 1987. 
Figure 14. Reporting on CenTrust Expansion, 1985-1989. 
A bank’s rapid expansion has long been a red flag for future trouble with loan quality.   
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only in the eighteenth paragraph of an industry roundup.744 The National Thrift News 
articles on this subject were not as detailed at The Wall Street Journal or the St. 
Petersburg Times. One exception was on June 6, 1988, when the National Thrift News 
reported on an important accounting change for trading of stocks and bonds. The effect 
on CenTrust was described beginning in the eighth paragraph, but the explanation was 
technical, spelled out in a 99-word sentence that quoted a bond circular that was not 
translated for general readership.745 
The Wall Street Journal closely followed the merger and investment 
developments of CenTrust during this period. The St. Petersburg Times carried 19 items 
on CenTrust’s expansion while The Wall Street Journal carried 18 articles versus eight 
by National Thrift News. The American Banker carried 13; the New York Times had two. 
For example, The Wall Street Journal published five articles about a merger and legal 
fight between Paul and Massachusetts Mutual Mortgage; the National Thrift News carried 
two articles.    
Coverage of CenTrust’s earnings announcements by these five newspapers was 
inconsistent at best, particularly before the rogue bank narrative emerged in March 1990. 
This represented a missed opportunity by the newspapers to alert readers and investors 
about potential abnormalities at the thrift. The New York Times had minimal coverage of 
CenTrust’s earnings announcements, relegating important developments to brief 
statistical tables, such as the thrift $5 million loss in August 1989.746 Most of the six 
                                                            
744 n/a, “Thrifts Face ‘Tremendous Wave of Consolidation’ as Spreads Narrow,” 
National Mortgage News, October 19, 1987. 
745 Hughes, John, “Rules on Accounting To Cause Controversy,” National 
Mortgage News, June 6, 1988. 
746 n/a, “Centrust Bank Reports Earnings for Qtr to June 30,” The New York 
Times, August 10, 1989. 
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earnings stories in The New York Times were reported as statistical tables. The Wall 
Street Journal covered had six brief stories but rarely reported any outside analysis of the 
earnings announcements. It also missed an important announcement on January 16, 1990, 
when CenTrust reported losing $97.3 million for the latest quarter. These earnings 
announcements were widely available as 11 were carried either on PRNewswire or 
BusinessWire, the common electronic services for company announcements.747 
Another missed opportunity was the October 28, 1988, announcement that 
CenTrust posted a $2.7 million loss for its most recent quarter. The Wall Street Journal 
wrote a separate item about the loss, albeit brief, and National Thrift News also led a 
package of earnings stories with the loss in a November 7, 1988, article.748 The St. 
Petersburg Times carried a brief item and The New York Times ran a statistical summary. 
This was an opportunity to issue a warning sign of the thrift’s troubles since it had been 
reporting quarterly profits up until that point.   
The St. Petersburg Times reported 11 earnings announcements, in keeping with 
the paper’s close beat coverage of a major bank in the state. The American Banker 
reported earnings in eight articles, including a February 27, 1986, report that failed to 
correctly reflect CenTrust’s actual net income or profits.749 Yet, other American Banker 
earnings stories had more context and depth than the competition.  
                                                            
747 Search of LexisNexis for CenTrust on the press release wires. 
748 n/a, “CenTrust Savings Bank Lost $ 2.7 Million in Its Fourth Fiscal Quarter,” 
National Thrift News, November 7, 1988. 
749 See Basch, Mark, “CenTrust Makes Friendly Proposal To Acquire Freedom 
Savings and Loan,” American Banker, February 27, 1986. This article failed to report the 
complete net income figure, which subtracts taxes and extraordinary items such as 
merger costs. It said CenTrust reported net income of $7.6 million “before extraordinary 
items” which is a misleading measurement since the “extraordinary items” reduce net 
income and could even mean the thrift reported a net loss. This is an earnings reporting 
error that is out of sync with The Associated Press style for earnings reporting. 
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One example was CenTrust’s $5 million quarterly loss on August 7, 1989, which 
had significant detail.750 National Thrift News carried 11 brief articles on CenTrust’s 
earnings announcements, but it did not use these routine announcements to explore 
deeper problems at the thrift. Most of the other earnings coverage was a routine recitation 
of the numbers without any additional analysis.  
                                                            
750 Cox, Rebecca, “CenTrust Posts $5 Million Loss After Hiking Junk-Bond 
Reserves,” The American Banker, August 7, 1989. 
Figure15.  CenTrust-Paul stories by year, 1985-1993. 
Coverage patterns of CenTrust by the five newspapers shows a spike in 1990, when the thrift failed 
and more detailed revelations surfaced about Paul’s mismanagement.  
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Simple reporting on company announcements can yield important insights. For 
example, the American Banker reported on October 2, 1987, that CenTrust appointed 
Ranieri to its board of directors.751 This fit into the ongoing narrative about CenTrust’s 
growth and emphasis on Wall Street trading strategies over core banking activities. The 
Wall Street Journal mentioned Ranieri’s appointment in a 51-word brief item but later 
mentioned how Paul invoked Ranieri’s name when he tried to convince regulators that 
the thrift’s unusual business strategy was sound.752 The New York Times briefly 
mentioned Ranieri’s appointment but the St. Petersburg Times and National Thrift News 
did not. This is particularly odd since Ranieri was a valuable source and a personal friend 
of Strachan.  
Accounting-Junk	Bonds	
The rogue bank narrative for CenTrust and Lincoln Savings can be traced back to 
accounting. In these two institutions, and for many similar banking scandals, the issues 
can be broken down to general themes. Were bankers trying to mask the actual losses in 
their lending or trading? Do they have enough money in reserve, or capital, to handle the 
losses? With CenTrust and Lincoln, accounting disputes figured prominently in the 
demise of the companies. Paul, for example, had a long-running argument with Federal 
Home Loan Bank regulators over accounting issues related to the formation of CenTrust 
and the value of its securities trading portfolio. This dispute was significant since one 
issue dealt with the thrift’s capital cushion against loan losses and regulators believed 
                                                            
751 Roosevelt, Phil, “Who’s News,” The American Banker, May 1, 1987. 
752 McCoy, Charles, Richard B. Schmitt, and Jeff Bailey, “Behind the S&L 
Debacle -- Hall of Shame  Besides S&L Owners, Host of Professionals Paved Way for 
Crisis --- Auditors, Advisers, Officials,” The Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1990. 
Ranieri said he served on the board for six months and never attended a meeting. 
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CenTrust had far less capital than Paul claimed. The second dispute about value of 
securities holdings was important to the thrift’s solvency. The regulator’s interpretation 
of market valuation for CenTrust’s stock and bond investments, if upheld, would greatly 
reduce the value or even render as worthless significant portions of CenTrust’s portfolio.  
As early as May 1984, The Wall Street Journal provided some of the initial and 
most important warnings about Paul’s controversial accounting practices. It reported on 
May 17, 1984, that Salomon Brothers had devised “a way of increasing earnings for a 
savings and loan client using an accounting method that some critics consider 
controversial.” This accounting technique would create “instant earnings” through the 
purchase of government bonds and an accounting for goodwill, a type of intangible asset 
represented by brand recognition and franchise value. Paul and regulators fought 
constantly over this goodwill accounting issue through the decade.753 
Several early stories also addressed the CenTrust investments in junk bonds. A 
Feb. 12, 1990, National Thrift News article noted the role of junk bond financing in 
CenTrust’s demise. "This is the first thrift killed by junk," one analyst said.754 The Wall 
Street Journal had several articles on broader risks in the junk bond market and thrifts’ 
relationship with Drexel Burnham Lambert. On December 19, 1986, The Wall Street 
Journal mentioned CenTrust in a roundup with other thrifts, describing the perils of junk 
                                                            
753 Berton, Lee, “Salomon Brothers Uses Novel Method to Lift S&L Client’s 
Profit,” The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1984. 
754 Muolo, Paul, “MeraBank and CenTrust Seized,” National Mortgage News, 
February 12, 1990. As an aside, it’s worth noting that Ranieri held a different opinion. 
"No thrift ever failed because of junk bonds,” Ranieri told The Wall Street Journal on 
June 19, 1989. 
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bond holdings.755 CenTrust was a heavy purchaser of junk bonds; at the time of its 
seizure by regulators in February 1990, CenTrust had a $922 million junk bond portfolio, 
“which includes such troubled debt offerings as Braniff Airlines, Integrated Resources, 
Hillsborough Holdings, and Eastern Airlines.”756 In a January 1991 lawsuit, the 
Resolution Trust Corp. alleged CenTrust at one point owned $4.4 billion in junk bonds, 
many issued by Drexel Burnham Lambert.757  
St. Petersburg Times in April 1988 sounded one of the early explicit warnings of 
this strategy: “In large part, he invested in junk bonds to boost earnings instead of 
concentrating on traditional banking operations,” observing this was “considered 
unorthodox in the thrift industry.”758 The National Thrift News on June 6, 1988, explored 
the implications of new Federal Home Loan Bank accounting rules on CenTrust’s junk 
bond portfolio, yet this story was confined to jargon of industry accounting issues.759 A 
much-improved explanation of CenTrust and its fight with regulators over accounting 
came on January 8, 1990, when National Thrift News discussed the implications of 
regulators forcing CenTrust to write down the value of defaulted bonds to market value. 
This would mean a 96% reduction in the value of the specific bonds at issue.760 All of the 
                                                            
755 This article came a month after Ivan Boesky’s plea on insider trading charges. 
Hilder, David B. “Thrifts With Junk-Bond Holdings Recover Some Recent Losses, but 
Uncertainties Linger,” The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1986. 
756 Muolo, Paul, “MeraBank and CenTrust Seized,” National Mortgage News, 
February 12, 1990. 
757 n/a, “FDIC, RTC Suing Milken on S&L Junk Losses,” National Mortgage 
News, January 28, 1991. 
758 Swasy, Alecia, “CenTrust Savings Offers to Buy Florida Federal,” St. 
Petersburg Times, April 9, 1988. 
759 Hughes, John. “Rules on Accounting To Cause Controversy.” National 
Mortgage News, June 6, 1988. 
760 Muolo, Paul, and Debra Cope. “CenTrust Bank, Miami, Seeks Merger With 
Ensign Bank, New York.” National Mortgage News, January 8, 1990. 
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newspapers had more extensive reporting on accounting disputes after the failure of 
CenTrust, and these reports are described in the section describing post-seizure coverage. 
 
Turning	Point:	1988,	Miami	Review	-	Faked	Credentials	
One foundational moment in CenTrust’s rogue bank narrative emerged in 
February 1988, when a local business and legal newspaper, the Miami Review, reported 
that Paul had falsified his resume. This article came as CenTrust had arrived on the social 
and business scene in Miami. By 1988, CenTrust had grown substantially and was 
finishing a new office tower in downtown Miami. Paul was active in the local symphony, 
arts, and philanthropic efforts. With this higher profile, the media began to take notice of 
CenTrust and its growth, and reporters began asking questions. The Miami Review 
reported Paul falsely claimed to have a doctorate from Harvard and a master’s in business 
administration from Columbia University in company biographies and this was had been 
reported in numerous publications.761 Paul did graduate from Wharton Business School 
and Columbia Law School, however. Following on the Miami Review revelations, Alecia 
Swasy, then a St. Petersburg Times business reporter, wrote in an extensive profile of 
Paul. “When asked why he embellished his resume, the 49-year-old Paul says `there's no 
excuse for it. But it's not like I've killed anyone’.”762  The American Banker published an 
August 2, 1984, article incorrectly saying Paul had a degree from Harvard.763 The New 
York Times and National Thrift News and the St. Petersburg Times published articles 
                                                            
761 Swasy, “On Top and in Command,” 1988. 
762 Swasy. “On Top and in Command,” 1988. 
763 n/a. “Dade Savings Names David L  Paul President.” American Banker, 
August 2, 1984. 
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criticizing Paul for faking his credentials. The Swasy profile provided vivid details of 
Paul’s lavish lifestyle and described the warnings about CenTrust’s growth: 
 
Most Florida bankers and analysts remain skeptical of the thrift, 
which Paul took over five years ago when it was the very sick 
Dade Savings & Loan. They say Paul is growing too fast and 
eventually will fail. They say he has relied too much on slick 
accounting and high risk deals instead of old-fashioned banking. 
But Paul doesn't care what others say. `CenTrust's success,’ he 
says smugly, `reflects the inadequacy of other management 
teams. People don't like that. But that's not my problem.’764  
  
The profile included numerous red flags, such as Paul’s inability to recruit staff 
from the community. "Nobody locally would go to work for us,” CenTrust President 
Walter Shealy III said.765 This suggests local bankers would not risk their reputations by 
working for CenTrust. These were among the clues about Paul’s behavior and activities 
were outside the normative behavior of bankers. Prior coverage in the St. Petersburg 
Times described Paul as a larger-than-life character; as early as July 20, 1987, the St. 
Petersburg Times referred to Paul as “flamboyant.” The St. Petersburg Times, by 1988, 
showed Paul’s regular litigation involving his personal and business life, describing him 
as “mercurial” in his attempts to gain control of several south Florida thrifts. For 
example, Paul filed a lawsuit against the Florida Division of Banking and Finance after 
his bid for Freedom Savings and Loan failed, accusing state officials of providing a 
competing bidder with inside information to make a winning bid.766 As discussed in the 
                                                            
764 Swasy. “On Top and in Command,” 1988. 
765 Swasy. “On Top and in Command,” 1988. 
766 n/a. “Newsmakers    St. Petersburg Times    12/26/88.” St. Petersburg Times, 
December 26, 1988. 
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methodology chapter, a normative feature of the banking industry involves minimizing 
and resolving conflicts, not exacerbating them through lawsuits.  
A small number of the articles reviewed had positive portrayals of Paul. In 
National Thrift News, for example, Paul was portrayed positively in four of 86 articles.767 
Examples of this positive coverage include Paul commenting as an industry expert at a 
conference, the announcement of CenTrust launching as a public company, or a positive 
earnings report. St. Petersburg Times had four positive portrayals out of 219 articles, 
which primarily involved references to Paul’s charitable activities in Miami and a new 
college savings program sponsored by CenTrust. The single positive portrayal out of 61 
articles in The New York Times was a 1988 article about a charity dinner, which later 
turned out to be a controversial use of the bank’s money on a lavish event. Research for 
this dissertation found no positive portrayals in The Wall Street Journal or American 
Banker articles.  
 In the National Thrift News, 29 percent of its coverage had a negative portrayal 
of Paul, highly significant given the publisher’s social and professional relationship with 
the Miami banker. The New York Times’ coverage was the most negative, with 30 percent 
of its articles portraying Paul in a negative light while the St. Petersburg Times coverage 
had 16 percent negative portrayal. The St. Petersburg Times statistic in this case is 
skewed, however, due to its voluminous coverage of Paul and CenTrust. The St. 
Petersburg Times published 213 items on CenTrust and Paul, four times the amount of 
The New York Times coverage. As described earlier, the St. Petersburg Times published 
critical stories about Paul months ahead of the rest of the news media. 
                                                            
767 As discussed in the methodology section, positive portrayals emphasize Paul’s 
viewpoint and elevate his stature without any rebuttal or element of skepticism. 
 258 
Rogue	Bank	Narrative	Grows:	1989	
The rogue bank narrative gained momentum from March 1989 up to February 
1990. The probing and negative articles were informed by earlier reporting about 
CenTrust’s unusual business plan, its controversial accounting policies, Paul’s faked 
resume, and the $25 million spent on art. This narrative built as reporters looked at the 
bottom line and found CenTrust was losing money.  
 
 
The St. Petersburg Times, National Thrift News, and The Wall Street Journal 
noted the thrift lost $11 million in its first quarter that ended December 31, 1988. All of 
the stories were brief earnings reports and came about six weeks before the art stories 
Figure 16.  Major Events for CenTrust, 1989 
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emerged.768 These earnings reports provided a critical element to allow the media 
narrative to change: Paul was in trouble with regulators with his extravagance, he was 
using bank money to finance his opulent lifestyle, and now, the bank was losing money. 
The New York Times followed up on its art story with a March 25, 1989, piece examining 
Paul’s controversial business model, which relied more on junk bond investments and 
trading than traditional savings and loan activities for profits. The article spelled out 
many of the elements of the rogue bank narrative. The lead paragraph described Paul as 
“acting like a hard-charging Wall Street trader” and noted in the second paragraph that 
“CenTrust is no longer the rising star of the savings and loan business.”769 The New York 
Times described how the thrift’s “profits suddenly evaporated” due to an adverse move in 
interest rates that reduced the value of its bond portfolio. The article described the 
leveraged investment in junk bonds and the thrift’s trading strategies, questioned the 
adequacy of the thrift’s capital cushion, and said further multi-million dollar losses were 
expected.770 Other newspapers also shifted their CenTrust narrative from rapid growth to 
one of managing financial and regulatory problems. Paul told the National Thrift News in 
May 22, 1989, that it now had a “no-growth’ pledge” that was the result of regulators’ 
actions and "because the current economic and political climate requires a more 
conservative and risk-based approach."771  
                                                            
768 The earnings were reported as briefs in the following stories: “H.F. Ahmanson 
Earns $67 Million For Quarter, Up 47% from 1987,” National Mortgage News, February 
6, 1989; n/a, “Stock Prices Advance Again,” St. Petersburg Times, January 31, 1989. 
769 Volsky, George, “Hard-Driving Banker Hits High-Rate Wall,” The New York 
Times, March 25, 1989. 
770 Volsky, “Hard-Driving Banker Hits High-Rate Wall,” 1989. 
771 n/a, “CenTrust Savings Lost $5.4 MM in Quarter,” National Mortgage News, 
May 22, 1989. 
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Management	Changes	
As bad news emerged, senior management headed for the exits. Executive 
changes can be routine beat stories but they can provide readers with valuable insights if 
they are placed within the context of the thrift’s broader troubles. The Wall Street 
Journal’s coverage reflected this clearly and The New York Times coverage generally 
viewed the executive changes as a sign of broader problems. The other newspapers in this 
study, including National Thrift News, did not place these changes within the broader 
context of the thrift’s troubles.  
The Wall Street Journal’s reporting on the departures of two senior executives in 
April and July 1989 — shortly after the art purchase revelations — was an example of 
how to place routine announcements into a broader context. Alfred L. Teti, senior 
executive vice president and chief operating officer, resigned in April 1989, and Walter 
D. Shealy III, president and chief  operating officer, resigned in July 1989. The Wall 
Street Journal treated Shealy’s departure as “the latest in a series of recent executive 
changes at the loss-ridden thrift" and noted CenTrust “has sustained huge losses 
recently." And a week later, The Wall Street Journal reported “CenTrust has also been 
shaken by a steady exodus of top executives.”772 In The New York Times May 31, 1989 
article, Teti made the point of saying he was not part of the “flash and dash at Centrust - 
the junk bonds and the securities trading” but instead was running the traditional banking 
operation.773  Such a distinction is significant. Teti was seeking to disassociate himself 
from the speculative, and perhaps reckless, part of CenTrust and used a forum such as 
                                                            
772 Brannigan, Martha, “CenTrust Savings Is Said to Be Close To Branches’ 
Sale,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1989. 
773 Cuff, Daniel F. “Business People; Top-Level Appointment Is Made by 
Amerifirst,” The New York Times, May 31, 1989. 
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The New York Times to attempt to repair his professional reputation — and take a dig at 
his former employer.  
The other newspapers missed the significance of these departures. National Thrift 
News reported Teti’s departure in a June 5, 1989, item that focused on his new employer 
rather than the problems he was leaving behind. It also reported Paul’s attempt to save 
face rather than address the underlying problems. Paul said Teti was the fifth CenTrust 
officer to become a chief executive of another financial institution.774 National Thrift 
News also failed to report a separate story on Shealy’s departure, and instead mentioned it 
in passing in a Sept. 11, 1989, article. The St. Petersburg Times story on Shealy’s 
departure was a 161-word item in a list of brief news stories on July 12, 1989, and relied 
on a company-prepared statement to note that Shealy would “pursue other interests.”775 
The story, however, did note that Shealy was the second top executive to leave in the last 
month. American Banker did not cover Shealy’s departure. 776 
Red	Flag:	Branch	Sale	
As the financial problems mounted, Paul moved to sell much of CenTrust’s 
branch network, officially ending his rapid expansion plans and signaling an era of 
retrenchment and regulatory battles. The branch sale announcement in July 1989, coming 
after the art controversy and poor earnings report, should have been a warning sign that 
                                                            
774 n/a, “Teti of CenTrust Going to AmeriFirst,” National Mortgage News, June 5, 
1989. 
775 n/a, “Dow Makes Sixth Straight Gain,” St. Petersburg Times, July 12, 1989. 
776 One note about Shealy’s departure, which none of the newspapers developed. 
The 39-year old Shealy had been in the post for about one year. This episode bears some 
similarity to Keating’s American Continental, which had a 35-year-old CEO named 
Robyn Symes installed briefly in 1987. The age of the chief executives was relevant 
because it suggested two outsized and controlling personalities, Paul and Keating, were 
actually running the show and the senior management team served as figureheads. 
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CenTrust was in serious trouble. With this development, we see a split in coverage 
between the mainstream newspapers and the trade newspapers. 
The most explicit warning was in The New York Times, which repeated concerns 
from its March story about CenTrust’s investment business, quoting one analyst as 
calling it “a risky animal.''777 The Wall Street Journal’s criticism was more indirect, 
saying the branch sale “would help bolster CenTrust's weak capital position.”778 This 
suggested the thrift was in significant financial trouble since it has to sell its retail 
banking operations to stay in business. That point was not made explicitly in The Wall 
Street Journal story. Other parts of the story, such as the executive departures, also 
suggested CenTrust was in trouble. 
Both the American Banker and National Thrift News muddied their coverage of 
the branch sales with industry jargon, which is a norm for the trade press. National Thrift 
News described how the branch sales would help CenTrust achieve “positive tangible net 
worth.”779 The American Banker coverage was mixed. Its July 17, 1989, headline on the 
branch sale described CenTrust as “ailing.”780 The next day, it followed up and the 
article’s lead paragraph was packed with industry jargon, saying CenTrust’s sale of 63 
branches with $2.4 billion in deposits was “a deal designed to return the troubled Florida 
thrift to a positive tangible net worth."781    
                                                            
777 Lev, Michael, “Great Western Expanding in Florida,” The New York Times, 
July 18, 1989. 
778 Brannigan, Martha, “CenTrust Savings Is Said to Be Close To Branches’ 
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781 Cox, Rebecca, “CenTrust Savings to Sell Deposits, 63 Branches to Great 
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The trade newspaper warnings were clearer when CenTrust said it was selling 
large portions of its junk bond investments. The National Thrift News framed the August 
1989 junk bond sale as a last-ditch move, reporting CenTrust's "financial future appears 
uncertain in the wake of the recently passed thrift bailout bill."782 American Banker 
reported CenTrust posted a $5 million quarterly loss after boosting its loss reserves for its 
junk bond investments, another sign of a distressed bank trying to stem a decline.783  
Another significant event in the beat reporting involved announcements of 
quarterly dividends. In October 1989, regulators ordered CenTrust to suspend its 
quarterly dividend payments to shareholders. Such a development is serious since a 
dividend suspension can make a company’s stock less attractive to investors, causing 
them to either sell existing shares or avoid buying new ones. CenTrust’s dividend 
payments were one way Paul was able to siphon money out of the thrift; in 1988, he 
received $2.76 million in CenTrust stock dividends while his salary was $550,000 and his 
bonus was $300,000.784 The Wall Street Journal and National Thrift News articles 
provided additional, ominous detail that regulators labeled CenTrust a “troubled 
institution.”785 The New York Times first mentioned the dividend suspension December 
11, 1989, whereas the search did not capture any coverage by American Banker and St. 
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Petersburg Times, thereby missing regulators’ most aggressive action against CenTrust 
up to this point.  
PR	War	
In the five months leading to regulators’ seizure of CenTrust, a remarkable public 
relations battle played out between the thrift and its regulators, the federal Office of 
Thrift Supervision and the State Comptroller of Florida. This exchange provided insight 
about Paul’s intensity, his litigiousness, and his push to preserve his financial empire. It 
also gave the Office of Thrift Supervision, a new regulatory agency created under the 
1989 thrift bailout law, a chance to flex its regulatory muscle in wake of revelations about 
weak regulation of Keating’s Lincoln Savings.  
The dueling press releases, preserved in the PRNewswire and Business Wire 
databases, began in October 1989. That is when CenTrust complained about the Office of 
Thrift Supervision’s order to suspend payment of its stock dividends. CenTrust then 
issued a press release on Nov. 8, 1989, complaining about the Florida Comptroller’s 
order for a speed sale of the Rubens painting and other artwork. The Comptroller’s office 
released its own statement, noting the art investments were highly unusual and improper 
for a thrift such as CenTrust, which “lost more than $29 million during the last 15 
months.”786  
When the Office of Thrift Supervision issued a cease and desist order on 
December 8th, CenTrust responded with a 500-word press release that asserted “not one 
                                                            
786 “Comptroller Gerald Lewis Takes Legal Action Against Miami Savings Bank 
to Expedite Sale of Valuable Art Collection,” PRNewswire, November 8, 1989. 
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of the alleged issues raised by the OTS threatens the safety or soundness of CenTrust.”787 
The federal agency issued a long, sternly worded release of nearly 1,200 words, noting 
the thrift’s “books and records are so incomplete” that the agency couldn’t determine 
CenTrust’s financial health.788 A similar back-and-forth occurred on December 20th with 
the Comptroller’s action to remove Paul from CenTrust. The thrift issued a second 
release announcing it had sued the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. as well as the Office 
of Thrift Supervision and its director, M. Danny Wall, alleging the agencies had violated 
CenTrust’s constitutional rights.789 
None of the newspapers led an article on this war of words between Paul and his 
regulators, although it was a theme reflected in the body of some articles. The Wall Street 
Journal discussed this escalating battle between CenTrust and the regulators in its routine 
beat coverage. In the cease and desist episode, for example, the news articles offered little 
sympathy for Paul and few articles adopted frames from the CenTrust press releases. The 
St. Petersburg Times gave the cease and desist order major treatment, a detailed 1,898-
word story on page one that described Paul’s opulent spending and included blunt 
comments from regulators. The newspaper also compared CenTrust to the then-notorious 
Lincoln Savings, which had just been on the front pages due to the House Banking 
Committee hearings.790 The American Banker issued a firm warning on December 11, 
1989, noting in its lead paragraph the cease and desist order was "one step short of 
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regulatory control.”791 In a next-day story, the American Banker offered a significant 
warning about CenTrust’s troubles, noting “worried depositors continued to withdraw an 
undetermined amount of funds” from CenTrust, a clear indication that the thrift’s stability 
and public confidence were shaken.792 It also described Paul’s political activity, saying 
CenTrust and Paul had made “significant contributions” to some 19 Democrats and two 
Republicans since 1987.793    
The National Thrift News became increasingly critical of Paul, particularly after 
the cease and desist order; five negative articles about Paul and CenTrust were published 
between December 18, 1989, and January 29, 1990. In a December 26, 1989, article, 
National Thrift News led with Florida regulators seeking to ban Paul “the controversial 
and flamboyant thrift executive, from the ailing CenTrust Bank SSB here, saying he 
operates it as a `personal piggy bank.’”794 The 866-word article detailed Paul’s spending 
on art consultants and shopping trips at Tiffany’s for his wife, and concluded with 
allegations about Paul’s fake biography. 
Following the cease and desist order, the junk bond narrative began to gain more 
emphasis. American Banker described the connection to Drexel Burnham Lambert in a 
December 1989 article, saying CenTrust “is suspected of being part of a daisy chain 
involving as many as seven thrifts that may have moved billions in junk bonds for Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Inc.” It cited sources as saying the Justice Department and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission were seeking to learn if CenTrust and Drexel’s 
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bond deals were arranged at artificially inflated prices.795 The American Banker 
published a strong headline identifying the role of junk bonds in CenTrust’s $119.5 
million quarterly loss on January 18, 1990. Despite the clear headline, the article fell 
victim to industry jargon: "The bank blamed its problems primarily on `changes in law 
and regulatory directives,’ specifically a requirement that it divest itself of high-yield 
securities at market value."796 This was yet another instance where the trade press norm 
of jargon diluted an article that could be useful for a general reader.  
Proposed	Sale	to	Ensign	Bank		
The 1990s began with CenTrust announcing a sale to New York-based Ensign 
Bank. This fit a pattern in bank failures. Regulators first will push a troubled bank to find 
a private buyer so the government does not inherit the expense of cleaning up a failed 
bank (recall Keating’s attempts to sell or find a merger partner for Lincoln Savings before 
its failure on April 1989). Paul’s proposal to sell Ensign was short-lived, however. The 
American Banker expressed considerable skepticism of a CenTrust sale, saying such a 
deal “faces formidable obstacles” because a money-losing thrift such as CenTrust will 
require millions of dollars in fresh capital to stabilize the institution.797 National Thrift 
News clearly told readers what was at stake, saying CenTrust was “fighting for its 
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survival” with the Ensign merger.798 The Ensign deal fell apart after CenTrust released its 
quarterly earnings report that showed a $119.5 million loss.  
Trading	Suspension	
Even though regulators were aggressively pursuing CenTrust in the fall of 1989, 
the news media coverage occasionally missed important developments. For example, The 
New York Times and St. Petersburg Times buried a major development in January 1990. 
Regulators had suspended trading in CenTrust’s stock, a highly unusual and aggressive 
move that would further drive shareholders away from the thrift and dry up a key source 
of external financing. The New York Times mentioned the trading suspension two weeks 
later in a report about the regulators seizing CenTrust.799 The St. Petersburg Times 
reported this in the last paragraph of a Feb. 2, 1990 story.800 The American Banker did 
not report on the suspension. 
Yet The Wall Street Journal and National Thrift News saw the significance of this 
action. The Wall Street Journal reported on the suspension on January 24, 1990. The 
National Thrift News reported on it on January 29, 1990, predicting the action was a 
prelude to a full government seizure of CenTrust.801 This article, one of the few included 
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in the House Banking Committee hearing record,802 spelled out the poor quality of 
CenTrust’s junk bond investments in Braniff Airlines and Integrated Resources, both of 
which had filed for bankruptcy protection. 
While the St. Petersburg Times may have buried this important development, the 
newspaper delivered some significant and critical coverage in this period. It published six 
articles critical about CenTrust and its business operations between December 9, 1989, 
and February 3, 1990. A December 9 article predicted CenTrust would fail — two 
months ahead of regulators’ decision to seize the bank: "Bert Ely, a financial institutions 
analyst in Alexandria, Va., said CenTrust almost certainly will fail and speculated that the 
thrift office's order was issued to buy time until the branch sales can go through. 
`CenTrust is a gone institution,’ Ely said.”803 The newspaper then followed up with a 
hard-hitting and critical portrait of Paul shortly before regulators seized the thrift, a 
3,160-word story detailing Paul’s opulence and personal insecurity. 
Seizure	of	CenTrust	
The Office of Thrift Supervision seized CenTrust on February 2, 1990. National 
Thrift News wrote an 885-word story on page one about CenTrust’s failure, which 
emphasized losses in the junk bond portfolio. The St. Petersburg Times also wrote a 
major story, some 1,125 words, on the collapse of CenTrust, and The New York Times 
published a 741-word article.  This collapse happened during a momentous period of the 
savings and loan crisis: Milken’s Drexel Burnham Lambert, a cornerstone of the U.S. 
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corporate bond market, filed for bankruptcy protection on February 13 of the same year. 
This was a major event for the savings and loan industry since some 200 thrifts held junk 
bond investments and Drexel was at the center of the junk bond marketplace.  
Shortly after the CenTrust collapse, the St. Petersburg Times published a 2,307-
word article about accounting scandals and problems in savings and loans, which noted 
the role of CenTrust’s outside accounting firm, Deloitte and Touche, in signing off on the 
thrift’s accounts. After a dispute, Deloitte quit and CenTrust hired Price Waterhouse. The 
decision to switch auditors is a red flag and an event that business journalists are 
encouraged to research. The Office of Thrift Supervision, however, said CenTrust’s 
annual report in 1989 did not meet accounting guidelines and that it was “impossible to 
determine CenTrust’s true financial condition.”804 The St. Petersburg Times report, which 
described controversies involving other banks, had this remarkable comment about 
accounting standards during the savings and loan crisis: 
 
Little wonder that some people think an auditors' opinion isn't 
worth the paper it is printed on. `I don't even read the auditor's 
statement,’ said Susan R. Leadem, a thrift analyst with Robinson-
Humphrey Co. in Atlanta. `Our theory is that we don't believe 
what the auditors say.’805 
  
A September 1991 article by National Thrift News’ Stephen Pizzo provided a 
better explanation of the accounting problems at CenTrust. Paul took the junk bond 
accounting issue all the way to the U.S. court of appeals in Washington, one step short of 
the Supreme Court. This litigation gained little coverage besides the St. Petersburg 
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Times, which reported on January 18, 1990 ,about the Appeals Court backing 
enforcement of accounting regulations.806 
 
Politics	-	Keating	
Following the collapse of CenTrust, the five newspapers began to explore the 
political dimensions of Paul’s activities, a narrative generally not reflected in coverage up 
to this point. The St. Petersburg Times was an exception, as it raised Paul’s political 
influence in a April 23, 1989, editorial and in a December 12, 1989, article, focusing on 
Paul’s contributions to then-U.S. Rep. Bill Nelson, D-Fla.807 It also reported on 
December 21, 1989, about Paul’s contributions to Florida Comptroller Gerald Lewis, 
who was the main state regulator of CenTrust.808 National Thrift News made a brief 
mention of Paul’s political contributions before the CenTrust collapse with a December 
26, 1989, article describing Paul’s contributions to Democrats and to Lewis809. The 
American Banker noted on December 12, 1989, that CenTrust had contributed to the 
campaigns of 19 Democrats and two Republicans since 1987, but this was not the main 
theme of the article.810 The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal did not report 
on Paul’s political contributions prior to CenTrust’s collapse. After the thrift’s collapse in 
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February 1990, the political theme became prominent. National Thrift News reported in 
April about the thrift’s frequent campaign contributions to politicians while noting the 
CenTrust collapse would cost taxpayers potentially $2 billion.811 On October 29, 1990, 
on the eve of the midterm elections, the National Thrift News published a 1,993-word 
story detailing how candidates for state and federal offices would be affected by the 
savings and loan scandal: "Democrats from coast to coast who have been tainted by the 
savings and loan crisis are likely to suffer little damage come election day but some 
Republican congressmen could be big losers."812 This story defied the trade press norms 
of covering politics in such detail; as Elfenbein wrote, trade newspapers generally 
avoided political reporting and instead focused on coverage to advance professional and 
business development.813  
 
Keating-Paul	Similarities	
The analysis of Paul’s political influence brought up numerous comparisons to 
Charles Keating’s activities. In an Oct 25, 1990 editorial, The Wall Street Journal 
referred to Paul as the "Charles Keating of Florida."814  As the section below describes, 
the similarities between the two were substantial. Paul and Keating even had the same 
lawyer, Chicago attorney Steven Neal.815 Paul and BCCI investor Ghaith Pharaon visited 
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Keating’s vacation home at Cat Cay in the Bahamas.816 Like Keating, Paul sought to gain 
favor of top politicians to help with his fights against regulators over CenTrust’s 
operations. As The Wall Street Journal noted on Oct. 23, 1990: 
 
The similarities between the two thrifts are striking: a high-living 
chief executive, huge investments in risky real estate and in junk 
bonds underwritten by Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., a 
combative and litigious attitude toward savings-and-loan 
regulators, and hobnobbing with politicians.817 
   
Paul had contributed $328,000 to various Democratic political campaigns. Sen. 
Bob Graham, D-Fla., and former Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass. — both members of the 
Senate Banking Committee — were criticized for their meetings and flights on Paul’s jet. 
Rep. Nelson returned $33,000 in contributions to Paul amid this scrutiny.818 The Wall 
Street Journal editorialized on September 11, 1991 that "Mr. Paul's political connections 
trumped those of even Mr. Keating."819 Further, Paul “met frequently” with some of the 
Keating Five senators, Donald Riegle and Alan Cranston, who held fundraisers on Paul's 
yacht, the Grand Cru, The Wall Street Journal reported. The National Thrift News on 
December 18, 1989 carried one of the earliest articles to detail a Paul-Keating link and 
interference with regulators. This article described an October 1988 supervisory report by 
a Federal Home Loan Bank Board noting concerns about stock transactions between 
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Keating’s American Continental Corp., CenTrust, and Drexel. Drexel had served as 
CenTrust's investment banker in past transactions. This report said Keating wanted to sell 
one of Lincoln's units to CenTrust.820 
National Thrift News, The Wall Street Journal, the American Banker and the St. 
Petersburg Times described how Paul, like Keating, faced an aggressive regional 
regulator who sought to shut down or limit speculative activities. The Atlanta Federal 
Home Loan Bank sought to issue a cease and desist order against the CenTrust in 1985, 
four years before such an order was actually issued. National Thrift News reported on 
September 23, 1991, that supervisory agent T. Park Zimmerman of the Atlanta Federal 
Home Loan Bank office "turned to Washington regulators requesting permission to issue 
a cease-and-desist order against CenTrust” but the request “fell on unwelcome ears.”821 
Zimmerman was concerned that BCCI investor Ghaith Pharaon had violated regulations 
with his purchase of a 28 percent stake in CenTrust. Zimmerman’s request was turned 
down by Rosemary Stewart, the same official who played a similar role in the Keating 
case. "According to the congressional report, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's head 
of enforcement Rosemary Stewart balked at the request, having her deputy write to Mr. 
Zimmerman to remind him that `. . . junk bonds are a very sensitive issue . . . ’ and that, if 
pushed too hard `CenTrust may resort to the use of political pressure.’ ” 
National Thrift News, in covering the April 1990 congressional hearing on 
CenTrust, reinforced the Keating narrative.822 One article reported, “Mr. Paul and his 
consultants were able to keep the regulators at bay while CenTrust racked up huge losses 
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on junk bonds and mortgage securities…”823 Such consultants working for CenTrust 
included former Federal Home Loan Bank Board chairman Richard Pratt and two former 
general counsels of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Ashton Williams, Jr., Florida 
assistant comptroller, described how these luminaries pressured his office: "You had 
people of the stature of Salomon Brothers, Lewis Ranieri, personally embracing the 
business plan and strategy of CenTrust, telling the regulators how wonderful everything 
was, and that we ought to relax and give them time, and it would all work out.”824 
The Paul-Keating connection was made explicit in the 1992 criminal indictment 
against Paul. National Thrift News noted Paul was charged with conspiring to structure 
stock transactions with Lincoln Savings and Loan so that both institutions could book 
illusory profits.825 Paul and Keating were named as co-defendants in a January 1991 
fraud lawsuit against Drexel’s Milken. This lawsuit described the three as part of a 
conspiracy to use inflated junk bonds to further their illegal schemes at the respective 
thrifts.826 Rep. Gonzalez also paired CenTrust and Lincoln. He described how Paul, like 
Keating, met with then-Federal Home Loan Bank Chairman M. Danny Wall several 
times while the regulator was considering new examinations of CenTrust. The article 
reported, “CenTrust has the same sad-bottom line (as the Lincoln case) -- Washington 
could not get up the courage to act forcefully and support its troops in the field,” 
chairman Gonzalez said."827 This article also noted Paul’s propensity for litigation, a trait 
similar to Keating. The New York Times reported Paul paid $12 million in legal fees to 
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his main outside law firm, Paul Weiss, between 1983 and 1990, using more than 55 of the 
firm’s lawyers on various CenTrust-related litigation.828 
 This political narrative was dominant in the St. Petersburg Times, which 
regularly reported on Paul’s influence on the Miami Beach mayor, state Comptroller, 
candidates for governor, and the state’s U.S. Senators. The newspaper spelled out Paul’s 
meetings with former president Jimmy Carter and his $100,000 donation to the Carter 
Center, which was funneled through the CenTrust Foundation. Carter met with Paul and 
financier Pharaon, the BCCI front man.829 The St. Petersburg Times devoted numerous 
articles to Comptroller Lewis, criticized for his relationship with Paul and his failure to 
shut down CenTrust quickly. Republicans sought to impeach Lewis — the only elected 
banking regulator in the country — for his role in the CenTrust affair and other thrift 
failures.830 Other articles described how Paul hired lobbyists to block legislation that 
would have affected his business; in one instance, Paul paid $100,00 to a lobbyist to 
block a bill backed by Lewis to expand thrift supervision.831 
The relationship between Paul and former U.S. Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla. drew 
considerable attention. In a March 29, 1990, article, the St. Petersburg Times reported 
Sen. Graham and other Florida congressmen complained that the Federal Home Loan 
Bank in Atlanta was being too hard on Florida thrifts, echoing a complaint that Keating’s 
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allies had made about the San Francisco FHLB examinations.832 After a series of 
incremental reports, the newspaper pulled together the Paul and Sen. Graham meetings in 
a 1,691-word story on Aug. 11, 1991, remarkable for its detail and timeline of contacts.833 
The St. Petersburg Times then followed up with an editorial that took Graham to task: 
"Since Paul elaborately flaunted those and other political connections, any regulators who 
proposed to crack down on CenTrust would realize the political minefield they were 
stepping into. One regulator says Paul `threw Graham's name at me maybe eight to 10 
times’ during one discussion."  
The editorial continued: 
At the very least, though, public officials should have distanced 
themselves and their staffs from Paul as soon as CenTrust's 
problems became known. No national politician - and certainly 
not Bob Graham - can be naive enough to fail to understand the 
ways in which the David Pauls and Charles Keatings of the world 




CenTrust had a financial relationship with the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International, the Saudi-owned bank that laundered money for arms dealers and drug 
runners.835 Global bank regulators seized BCCI in July 1991 and later New York 
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prosecutors filed bribery and fraud charges. The Federal Reserve fined BCCI $200 
million for illegally infiltrating the U.S. banking system. Pharaon, the Saudi investor who 
fronted for BCCI, acquired a 28% stake in CenTrust in 1988. Through Pharaon, Paul 
engaged in a sham transaction whereby CenTrust deceived regulators about its financial 
health. This was done by temporarily “parking” a $150 million debt offering with BCCI; 
this phony debt sale was designed to deceive regulators by falsely showing CenTrust had 
increased its capital cushion against loan losses.836 This illegal transaction allowed 
CenTrust to remain open for another two years and expanded the cost of the taxpayer 
bailout by $250 million.837 
 All of the newspapers except The New York Times reported on Pharaon’s 
investment in CenTrust in 1987.838 The American Banker’s coverage was particularly 
noteworthy and forward-looking. In a September 2, 1987, article, it noted Pharaon was 
then the second largest shareholder in CenTrust and provided some brief but significant 
background about Pharaon’s investment history and heavy debt burden at one of his 
Saudi companies, issues that would later figure prominently in the BCCI investigation.839 
American Banker on March 4, 1988, noted Pharaon was a close personal friend of 
Paul’s.840  The American Banker carried a rare interview with Pharaon on June 3, 1991, 
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one of the major pieces exploring the Saudi investor’s activities in the U.S. market.841 
The story came a month before international bank regulators seized BCCI. The Wall 
Street Journal did a major investigative report on BCCI on May 31, 1990, more than a 
year before BCCI’s collapse. This report about BCCI’s global reach brought the bank’s 
activities to the attention of a mass audience. It mentioned the CenTrust connection in a 
paragraph of a 2,995 word story.842 
National Thrift News published investigative stories about the BCCI and CenTrust 
relationship in 1991 that examined Pharaon’s ownership in CenTrust and a California-
based thrift, Viking Savings. It also discussed the geopolitical dimensions of the 
Pharaon’s activities, particularly a Saudi businessman’s relationship with Paul and other 
pro-Israel political fundraisers.843 A second investigative report in September 1991 
described how CenTrust was becoming “a banking surrogate” for BCCI in the U.S, a 
significant advance in the understanding about the BCCI-CenTrust relationship.844 This 
story also defied trade press norms by covering politics and international affairs, 
something far beyond the normal scope of a trade publication as described by Laib, 
Elfenbein, and others.845 
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The St. Petersburg Times had a significant article about Pharaon’s investment in 
CenTrust in August 1987, which emphasized the Saudi investors connections to Bert 
Lance, the former aide to President Jimmy Carter. The St. Petersburg Times story took a 
critical eye towards the Saudi’s investment history, noting he overpaid twice the market 
value for Lance’s National Bank of Georgia and was facing financial trouble due to 
falling oil prices.846 It also carried a major story in June 1990 describing the BCCI 
relationship and the investigation of the illegal debt deal. 
Beat	Reporting	
The CenTrust content analysis showed the value of beat reporting and how the 
steady coverage of company announcements, with the additional analysis to place them 
in proper context, can provide valuable insights for journalists and readers. This is 
especially true when a company’s fortunes begin to slide. While the savings and loan 
crisis was an extraordinary event, the basic beat reporting turned up numerous and 
important clues well before regulators voiced concerns about CenTrust: its unusual 
securities trading and junk bond investments; its rapid growth; and its aggressive 
accounting policies. In this way, reporting of “normal” banking announcements, with 
journalists alert to broader issues, can detect emerging “abnormal” activities.  
Basic beat reporting can provide an important surveillance function. News 
organizations can warn readers through short, daily news stories if they provide sufficient 
context. The St. Petersburg Times, for example, published 66 brief items about CenTrust 
on earnings, legal developments, and other events in the case. The Wall Street Journal’s 
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reporting on the departures of two senior executives from CenTrust in April and July 
1989 — shortly after the art purchase revelations — was an example of placing routine 
events into a broader context. The first executive departure was Alfred L. Teti, senior 
executive vice president and chief operating officer, who resigned in April 1989. He was 
followed by Walter D. Shealy III, president and chief operating officer, who resigned in 
July 1989. The Wall Street Journal treated Shealy’s departure as “the latest in a series of 
recent executive changes at the loss-ridden thrift.”847 This is an example of a newspaper 
penetrating beyond bland statements that an executive was leaving to “pursue other 
interests” or to “spend more time with his family.” Another example of putting basic 
announcements into broader context involved The Wall Street Journal’s reporting about 
the thrift’s expansion and acquisitions. Such articles alerted the public to an important 
fact: CenTrust was moving fast to become a leader in South Florida. Readers and 
regulators would find this valuable since, as described earlier, rapid growth of a bank or a 
thrift was standard warning for potential trouble. 848  
Beat reporting cannot provide a public service unless the journalists provide 
proper context and write in plain language for everyday readers. The content analysis 
showed significant problems in the newspapers’ coverage of CenTrust’s earnings reports, 
which can contain important clues about the companies’ operating trends. Most of the six 
earnings stories in The New York Times had no context whatsoever; they were reported as 
statistical tables. The Wall Street Journal had six brief stories on CenTrust’s earnings but 
rarely reported any outside analysis of the earnings announcements. Some of the earnings 
                                                            
847 n/a, “Walter Shealy Quits His Two High Posts At Troubled CenTrust,” The 
Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1989. 
848 Regulators and bank analysts have regarded rapid growth as a red flag for loan 
and credit quality problems. See discussion in Methodology section. n/a, “An Examiner’s 
Guide to Problem Bank Identification, Rehabilitation and Resolution” 2001. 
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articles were drowning in industry jargon. A National Thrift News earnings roundup on 
February 6, 1989, didn’t explore why CenTrust reported a  $10.9 million quarterly loss 
for the most recent quarter. Instead, the article used a statement from Paul that was laden 
with industry jargon. “This net loss is primarily attributable to the impact of an inverted 
treasury yield curve on our net interest margin and a lower level of gains on sale of loans 
and investments," Paul said.849  
 
Another sign of beat reporting involves the amount of space news organizations 
devote to the articles. To measure this, the content analysis examined the number of 
                                                            
849 “H.F. Ahmanson Earns $ 67 Million For Quarter, Up 47% from 1987,” 
National Mortgage News, February 6, 1989. 
 
Figure 17. Brief stories on CenTrust,  percentage of total coverage, 1984-1993. 
The frequency of brief stories can serve as a measure of beat reporting. 
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significant articles published by each newspaper. Significant articles were coded as being 
greater than 200 words and with a primarily focus on CenTrust. Brief articles (200 words 
or less) or articles  in which CenTrust drew only a passing reference in a broader story 
focused on another topic were not coded as significant articles. An example of a passing 
reference: an article focused on Drexel Burnham Lambert has a one-sentence mention of 
CenTrust as customer of the securities firm.  Using these measures, the National Thrift 
News carried the highest percentage of significant articles about CenTrust. The analysis 
showed 62% of National Thrift News articles had a significant focus on CenTrust 
followed by The Wall Street Journal, with 52% of its reporting being significant 
CenTrust articles.   
Paul	Indictment	and	Trial	
In 1992, Paul was indicted on 100 criminal counts that primarily alleged he 
misrepresented CenTrust’s financial condition. During the trial, Paul did little to repair 
his public image. As the St. Petersburg Times reported August 4, 1992, "Ousted CenTrust 
Savings chairman David Paul walked out of his trial on federal civil charges Monday 
after lecturing the judge for 45 minutes about the proceedings.”850 In November 1993, 
Paul was convicted of 68 counts of defrauding the bank. He was sentenced December 1, 
1994, to 11 years, ordered to pay $60 million in restitution, and given a $5 million fine. 
Cheryl Bell, the financial crimes coordinator in the Miami U.S. attorney's office, told the 
American Banker that Paul was “south Florida's most notorious white collar criminal … 
                                                            
850 n/a, “Ex-Thrift Chief Walks out of Trial after Lecture,” St. Petersburg Times, 
August 4, 1992. 
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It's safe to say that there is no greater S&L crook on the East Coast than Paul.”851 The 
newspaper said Paul's 11-year prison sentence and $65 million in restitution and fines 
were slightly less than Keating’s punishment of 12 years in prison and $122 million in 
fines. “These sentences are among the stiffest for crimes related to failed S&Ls, " the 
newspaper reported. At sentencing, The Wall Street Journal on December 2, 1994, 
described Paul as "one of the most flagrant examples of savings-and-loan fraud." He 
served much of that sentence; U.S. Bureau of Prisons records show Paul was released 
Aug. 2, 2004. 
Sourcing	
One avenue to examine journalistic autonomy involves an analysis of disclosed 
sources in the news articles. Heavy reliance on business or government sources of 
information can suggest journalists are aligned with the worldview of the elites and may 
not serve the public at large.852 Yet an analysis of sourcing alone does not prove 
journalists are biased towards elites, since many investigative reporters rely on 
government and business documents for their articles. Still, an examination of sourcing 
provides insight about the extent of research and diversity of voices in the reporting. This 
content analysis, for example, shows the newspapers generally relied on regulators and 
CenTrust as the primary sources. Industry officials and legislative entities also played a 
significant role.  
                                                            
851 Rhoads, Christopher, “Prosecutions of ’80s S&L Figures Winding Down,” The 
American Banker, January 10, 1995. 
852 As noted in the Chapter 2 on Theory, Marx described how a ruling class with 
the means of material production can control mental production. See Marx and Engels, 
The German Ideology, 1845. Also note that Gramsci’s theory about a ruling class 
establishing a hegemony of ideas, a foundational concept in political economy theory. 
See Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1999. 
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For example,  National Thrift News relied heavily on regulatory sources, cited an 
average of 96% of all articles.853 The American Banker cited regulators the least, in just 
55% of articles, yet the remaining newspapers tended to cite regulators about two-thirds 
of the time. This fits with a normative behavior of journalists relying on official sources 
for news coverage.854  
                                                            
853 A note about the sourcing calculations: Some articles cited more than one 
regulatory source or separate individuals from CenTrust. Each separate disclosed 
sourcing of a distinct source was coded, and the coding then was calculated as a 
percentage of the total articles. The exception involved David Paul, who was coded just 
once per article even if he was quoted multiple times. While not a perfect measure, these 
percentages allow a normalized measurement across the five newspapers. The absolute 
source coding is included in a separate table in the appendix. 
854 Lashmar, Paul, “Subprime – the Death of Financial Reporting or a Failure of 
Investigative Journalism?” presented at the Technology, Education and Ethics 
Conference, University of Bedfordshire, UK, October 17, 2008. 
Figure 18. Use of regulators as sources, CenTrust coverage, 1984-1993. 
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The newspapers also relied heavily on CenTrust as a disclosed source, with the 
American Banker citing the company in 85% of articles reviewed whereas The New York 
Times cited it in just 37% of the articles. Statements or quotations attributed to David 
Paul were examined separately. Paul was cited in 27% of National Thrift News articles 
reviewed but only in 9% of St. Petersburg Times articles. 
 
Figure 19. Percentage of stories with CenTrust, David Paul quoted, 1984-1993 
  
National Thrift News may have quoted Paul most frequently, but the newspaper 
also cited anonymous sources most often, or in 11% of its articles, followed by the 
American Banker, which cited anonymous sources in 9% of its articles. None of the St. 
Petersburg Times stories reviewed cited anonymous sources. The Wall Street Journal 
cited industry sources in 62% of its articles, which ranged from competitors to data 
sources; National Thrift News cited industry sources the least amount, only in 19% of its 
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articles. And The New York Times made the heaviest use of analysts, citing them in 29% 
of articles, followed by the American Banker which cited them in 23% of articles. 
 
Figure 20. Percentage of CenTrust stories with analyst, industry sources, 1984-1993 
  
The sourcing analysis can serve as an avenue to answer the second research 
question about the National Thrift News’ role as a trade publication in reporting on 
CenTrust. Not many clear patterns emerge here. The newspaper’s high use of regulatory 
and legislative sources could follow from the publication’s reputation for deep 
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knowledge of the industry, which is a trade press norm. Yet this pattern is not replicated 
at the other trade publication under study, American Banker, which cited the fewest 
regulatory and legislative sources of the five newspapers. And a general interest 
newspaper, The New York Times, heavily cited regulatory sources while another general 
interest newspaper, the St. Petersburg Times, heavily cited legislative sources. National 
Thrift News also cited the highest percentage of anonymous sources in its coverage, 11%, 
well above the general interest newspapers, which could suggest it had some expert 
access. Alternatively, it could suggest that the trade press was more comfortable with 
citing unidentified sources, a practice generally avoided in mainstream publications. One 
surprising finding is the National Thrift News lagged all of the competing newspapers in 
citation of industry sources, cited in 19% of articles. It cited analysts in 9% of the articles. 
The New York Times cited analysts most often, in 29% of articles, whereas The Wall 
Street Journal cited industry officials the most, in 62% of its articles. Seeing the National 
Thrift News lagging in these two categories challenges the norm that a trade industry 
publication would serve as a forum for business voices in that profession. 
 
There are other limits in the explanatory power of this coding scheme, as is the 
case with content analysis in general. Consider the finding that only in 9% of St. 
Petersburg Times articles carried quotations from David Paul. Yet the Florida paper had 
the heaviest coverage of CenTrust of all the newspapers examined. One reason for this is 
the sheer number of brief CenTrust articles carried in the St. Petersburg Times would 
reduce the percentage of articles in which Paul is quoted. Coding for attribution to Paul, 
as is the case with any coding scheme, has other limits. An article is coded for a Paul 
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quotation based on a single mention, but an article with multiple quotations also receives 
a single mention. So the coding does not reflect the content or depth of Paul’s remarks. 
So this quantitative measure has its flaws, since the St. Petersburg Times did carry a 
highly important profile of Paul in May 1988, and the depth of this article is not reflected 
in the coding scheme. However, it does provide a useful overview of attribution patterns 




The issue about Strachan’s relationship with Paul speaks to one of the main 
research questions: the examination of a critical and autonomous business press. Did this 
politically active banker’s social and professional relationship with Strachan shape the 
coverage?  
Strachan was friendly with Paul, to the point of inviting him to his daughter’s bat 
mitzvah at a time when Paul was awaiting sentencing.855 There are widely varying 
accounts of the depth of that relationship. Strachan’s reporters alternatively called Paul a 
“friend” or a source. Pizzo recalled Paul “was a close friend of Stan’s.”856  Paul provided 
conflicting accounts. “I didn’t know him that well,” Paul said. Later, when pressed to 
elaborate, Paul said, “I would say we were friendly and I was a source for what was 
                                                            
855 Kleege, Stephen, Interview with Stephen Kleege, June 15, 2015; Wilson, 
Interview, June 23, 2015. 
856 Pizzo, Stephen P. Interview with Stephen Pizzo, December 8, 2014. 
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going on. He would call and we would talk, as I am doing with you now. I have nothing 








A mutual friend of Paul and Strachan was Lewis Ranieri, who provided some 
insight. Like Strachan, Ranieri had a professional and personal relationship with Paul: 
                                                            
857 Paul, David L. Interview with David L. Paul, April 16, 2016. 
Figure 21. Strachan and Paul. 
In this undated photo, Strachan, left, and Lewis Ranieri visit at an industry conference with 




Ranieri served on CenTrust’s board for six months in 1987-1988.858 Ranieri said he and 
Strachan “both liked David Paul very much ... He was an amazing charismatic guy.” 
“Sometimes a charismatic nature can blind you to some things,” Ranieri said. “I 
have no better explanation. I honestly did not think that he (Paul) was a bad guy. I 
thought he was kind of on the edge but not a bad guy. And I would let him speak for 
himself but that is probably what Stanley would say…”859 
  Strachan and Ranieri both took their families to Miami for a ride on Paul’s 95-
foot white yacht, the Grand Cru.860 Photos of that trip are in Strachan’s family albums. “I 
got to ride on the boat like Stanley did,” Ranieri said, adding he thought the gold ceilings 
in the yacht’s dining room were “kind of odd.”  
Stephen Kleege, the National Thrift News associate editor, recalled that Paul 
attended bat mitzvah of Strachan’s daughter, Hillary, in the early 1990s:  
 
And David Paul was there and the videographer came around and 
David lifted up his menu to cover his face, because he didn’t 
want to be on video. And in fact, I think he was due to go to jail 
in a few days, partly as a result of what Stan and other journalists 
had dug up.861 
  
                                                            
858 McCoy et al. “Behind the S&L Debacle -- Hall of Shame  Besides S&L 
Owners, Host of Professionals Paved Way for Crisis --- Auditors, Advisers, Officials,” 
The Wall Street Journal, 1990. 
859 Ranieri, Lewis, Interview with Lewis Ranieri, August 12, 2015. 
860 The issue of other savings and loan executives splurging on expensive yachts 
was described in earlier National Thrift News coverage. See n/a. “Use of Vernon Yacht 
Will Cost Democrats.” National Thrift News, July 13, 1987. This article describes the 
controversy of former U.S. Rep. Tony Coehlo, D-Calif., using a yacht owned by Vernon 
Savings and Loan chief Don Dixon. Coehlo used Dixon’s yacht for campaign fundraising 
and did not reimburse the thrift executive. 
861 Kleege, Stephen, Interview with Stephen Kleege, June 15, 2015. 
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Strachan’s relationship with Paul, however, is perhaps not remarkable or unusual 
at all. “David was a source of Stan’s. They traded information like any reporter-source 
does,” Muolo recalled.862 It would be notable if the National Thrift News coverage 
somehow favored Paul or CenTrust, and the research does not show that was the case. 
 
Clearly, Paul would not have been happy with some of the critical coverage in the 
National Thrift News. Some 29 percent of stories contained negative portrayals of Paul. 
The content analysis of National Thrift News’ coverage clearly showed the newspaper, 
despite its smaller size, was competitive with the larger newspapers in its coverage of 
CenTrust and Paul. At the same time, National Thrift News did not break news early on 
major CenTrust developments, unlike in the Keating Five coverage. While National 
Thrift News did not break the painting story — it was behind the St. Petersburg Times 
and The New York Times — it advanced the Paul story with details about the thrift’s 
shaky finances. It also provided considerable detail about the CenTrust-BCCI 
relationship, stories published before Paul’s trial, which certainly could not have helped 
Paul’s defense.  
 
When looking at why was the National Thrift News did not lead on the CenTrust 
story, as it did with Lincoln Savings, one possible explanation involved timing and 
availability of resources. Muolo, Pizzo, and Fricker also were working long hours in late 
1988 to finish Inside Job and meet a publisher’s deadline.863 CenTrust’s collapse, 
                                                            
862 Muolo, Paul, Second Interview with Paul Muolo, December 8, 2014. 
863 Fricker recalled that she went on part-time status at the Santa Rosa Press-
Democrat to meet a critical November 1, 1988, manuscript submission deadline for 
Inside Job. Muolo and Pizzo had Strachan’s support to juggle their reporting and book 
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beginning in the fall of 1989, came during a historic downturn and collapse of the savings 
and loan industry. Lincoln Savings became a dominant story and the subject of major 
congressional hearings at that time. CenTrust was seized by regulators two weeks before 
the bankruptcy of one of the most influential financial firms in the 1980s, Drexel 
Burnham Lambert. 
Ranieri said Strachan did not seek out to write critically of his friends and 
business associates, but he didn’t shy away from it. “He didn’t do it on purpose but it 
didn’t stop him. Stanley could like somebody a great deal and be very critical of him,” 
Ranieri said. Ranieri recalled Strachan was upset about Paul’s poor judgment about 
buying the art with CenTrust’s money. “That didn’t go over very well with Stan,” Ranieri 
said. “And I just thought it was crazy.”864   
 
Pizzo recalled his conversations with Strachan about critical stories about Paul. 
“We started writing some very tough stuff on David Paul,” Pizzo recalled. “He said boy 
you guys ought to be right…It wasn’t the David Paul that he thought he knew.” Despite 
this, Strachan allowed these critical stories to be published in the newspaper. “He never 
spiked a single story," Pizzo said.865 Muolo wrote stories about Paul’s art investments and 
the junk bond dealings with Drexel and others. “Stan never once called me off doing any 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
writing duties. “Even with these accommodations, we were working nights (sometimes 
all night) and weekends…Looking back now, the years 1987-1989 are a blur,” Fricker 
wrote. Fricker, Mary, “The Inside Story,” IRE Journal, Spring 1990. 
864 Ranieri, Lewis, Interview with Lewis Ranieri, August 12, 2015. 
865 The term “spiked” is a journalistic term for a story being killed. Pizzo, Stephen 
P. Interview with Stephen Pizzo, December 8, 2014. 
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kind of reporting on CenTrust…That never happened,” Muolo said.866 Pizzo, in a 1997 
remembrance printed after the editor’s death, recalled Strachan: 
…Had the opportunity many times to `play along’ with the high-
flyers. After all, Stan enjoyed the good life as much as anyone 
I’ve ever known, and he could have had plenty of it if he’d killed 
the right stories at the right time. But Stan never did that. Not 
once. He let his reporters call it the way they saw it, even when it 
hurt. That's what he meant when he said, "this is a reporter's 
newspaper."867 
  
The one anomaly, when compared to the Keating Five coverage, was this: the 
National Thrift News did not publish an editorial containing the terms “David Paul” and 
CenTrust during the time period examined. Neither did American Banker nor The New 
York Times, for that matter. These are curious omissions given the gravity of Paul’s 
crimes and the cost to the taxpayers for bailing out CenTrust. The St. Petersburg Times, 
however, mentioned CenTrust and Paul in 15 editorial or commentary pieces, primarily 
references to Paul’s attempts to influence local and state political leaders. And The Wall 
Street Journal wrote six editorials or opinion columns on the CenTrust scandal. 
 
Critical	Press	-	Before	&	After	the	Fact	
This dissertation seeks to understand what patterns and practices constitute a 
critical business press. The outstanding example in the CenTrust coverage was the St. 
Petersburg Times, particularly with its May 16, 1988 critical profile of Paul, an extensive 
article that questioned his business activities and highlighted his lavish lifestyle. This 
                                                            
866 Muolo, Paul, Second Interview with Paul Muolo, December 8, 2014. 
867 Pizzo, Stephen P. “A Friend And Colleague Remembers Stan Strachan,” 
National Mortgage News, January 13, 1997. 
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story came a full 10 months before regulators began to act and the news media narrative 
turned sharply critical against Paul and CenTrust. This May 1989 St. Petersburg Times 
article was a rare instance of a significant story that was not pegged to an official 
announcement or regulatory action. Was Alecia Swasy’s hard-hitting profile of Paul the 
equivalent of the National Thrift News’ expose of the Keating Five meetings? The only 
similarity would be Swasy’s article described some aggressive business practices that 
would up being at the heart of CenTrust’s financial problems. Read in hindsight, the 
profile offered clear clues about Paul’s extravagant lifestyle that turned into significant 
regulatory problems. And, like the Keating Five story, the rest of the news media 
essentially ignored Swasy’s profile of Paul until state regulators announced their 
concerns about the art collection in March 1989 — at development the St. Petersburg 
Times also was first to report. The similarities end there, however. The National Thrift 
Figure 22. CenTrust-Bank Robbery. This Feb. 6, 1990 St. Petersburg Times editorial cartoon 
depicts two types of bank robberies. Credit: Clay Bennett, St. Petersburg Times. 
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News report on the Keating Five clearly described influence peddling at a national level 
and involving five U.S. Senators.  
Aside from the Swasy profile, few articles prior to the regulatory action 
challenged the business plans of CenTrust and Paul. Below are a few examples of articles 
prior to regulators’ seizure of CenTrust that offered a challenge to Paul. A 1984 report in 
The Wall Street Journal described questionable accounting practices at Dade Savings & 
Loan, the CenTrust predecessor. This article spelled out one of the core accounting 
controversies between CenTrust and its regulators.868 Another example of critical 
coverage was the American Banker’s reporting on Pharaon’s investment in CenTrust and 
his connections to BCCI. National Thrift News, in following up on the Rubens painting 
controversy, described deeper regulatory problems with CenTrust that would surface 
seven months later when state and federal officials finally began taking steps to close the 
thrift. There were many critical stories about CenTrust and Paul, yet a majority of them 
came after the seizure of CenTrust in February 1990. 
Another measurement of the critical business press: a tally of negative articles 
about Paul or CenTrust. As described in the Methology chapter, articles were coded as 
negative based on regulatory action, violation of banking industry norms, guilt by 
association, or descriptions of Paul manipulating the political or regulatory process. 
Negative articles, therefore, would describe Paul as in regulatory trouble such as under 
criminal investigation; as violating banking industry norms as “flamboyant” or “risky”; 
as seeking to sway politicians to intervene on his behalf through campaign donations.    
 
                                                            
868 Berton, Lee, “Salomon Brothers Uses Novel Method to Lift S&L Client’s 
Profit,” The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1984. 
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Figure 23. Negative references to David Paul, percentage of coverage, 1984-1993. 
 
The St. Petersburg Times carried the lowest percentage of negative articles, at 16 
percent  (At the same time, the St. Petersburg Times published the greatest number of 
negative articles, at 36, which again was due partly to its comprehensive coverage of Paul 
and CenTrust). Negative coverage of Paul in the other newspapers: The New York Times, 
30 percent; National Thrift News, 29 percent; The Wall Street Journal, 27 percent; and 
American Banker, 22 percent. This would be due to the greater news interest in Paul’s 
problems and the CenTrust failure than in coverage of a “normal” bank where such 
problems do not arise. One important element of critical business journalism involves the 
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press identifying problems early on, hopefully in time to mitigate damage to society. This 
is a high standard, and the review of all the news coverage showed there is room for 
improvement in this regard. As described in the introduction, none of the newspapers 
carried negative articles about Paul prior to regulators’ public enforcement action against 
Paul and his $25 million art purchases in March 1989. The analysis did find some 
challenges to Paul’s business plans prior to this time but no explicit negative coverage as 
spelled out in the Methodology. 
To be sure, there was some very important and insightful journalism after the 
CenTrust failure. Consider The Wall Street Journal’s 7,000-word post mortem on the 
S&L crisis. In this exhaustive article, the newspaper made an important observation about 
the overlooked importance of lax state regulation in the debacle:  
 
Many students of the S&L scandal consider Congress's 1982 
Garn-St Germain Act a watershed event, freeing thrifts to invest 
in wind farms and racehorses. But it was a relatively modest 
proposal compared with what some state legislatures later did. 
Most of the huge losses chalked up in the second half of the 
1980s came from state-chartered institutions, such as Mr. 
Keating's Lincoln Savings.869   
 
Such an observation was useful. Yet timing is everything: the newspapers did not 
question the role of state regulators in the CenTrust case only until the weeks prior to the 
thrift’s seizure. After all, Florida Comptroller Lewis, the state banking regulator, raised 
the issue in March 1989 about the money-losing CenTrust spending $28 million on rare 
                                                            
869 McCoy, Charles, Richard B. Schmitt, and Jeff Bailey, “Behind the S&L 
Debacle -- Hall of Shame-- Besides S&L Owners, Host of Professionals Paved Way for 
Crisis --- Auditors, Advisers, Officials,” The Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1990. 
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art. Why didn’t the regulator shut down CenTrust then? The American Banker, in 
December 1989, raised the issue about whether regulators moved against CenTrust in 
wake of the publicity about the Keating hearing.870 National Thrift News, also in 
December 1989, noted Paul was a former political supporter of Lewis, and at the time 
Lewis was the only elected state banking regulator in the country.871 This became a 
prominent theme in the St. Petersburg Times coverage after the CenTrust crash as Lewis 
sought re-election. The St. Petersburg Times hit this theme much harder in December 
1989, quoting banking analyst Kenneth H. Thomas as asking, “But I don't know why the 
state banking department didn't come in early on and do this."872 The newspaper noted 
Lewis accepted $12,600 in contributions from CenTrust and its affiliates in his 1986 
election campaign. Lewis said the money had no effect on the case, which took a long 
time to build because CenTrust’s records were in disarray. The newspaper published an 
editorial a week later questioning the state’s “anything goes” banking laws and asking 
why Lewis failed to seek more examiners and resources to properly police thrifts such as 
CenTrust.873 In January, the St. Petersburg Times noted Paul had argued in court filings 
that “Lewis and the Florida Department of Banking and Finance have known all about 
CenTrust for years” and he was just acting in late 1989 because of his looming re-
election.874  
                                                            
870 Cline, Kenneth, “Regulator Orders CenTrust Chairman to Step Down,” The 
American Banker, December 21, 1989. 
871 n/a, “Florida Seeks Paul’s Ouster,” National Mortgage News, December 26, 
1989. Reference to only elected banking regulator in: Moss, Bill, and Lucy Morgan. 
“Proposal "Garbage,’ Lewis Charges,” St. Petersburg Times, March 3, 1992. 
872 Grieff, James, “State Demands CenTrust Oust High-Flying CEO,” St. 
Petersburg Times, December 21, 1989. 
873 n/a, “The Maharajahs,” St. Petersburg Times, December 30, 1989. 
874 Grieff, James, “Burning A Hole In the Bank.” St. Petersburg Times, January 
22, 1990. 
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The regulatory failure in the CenTrust case, this delay in closing down the thrift 
amid numerous warning signs, serves to reinforce the importance of journalistic 
autonomy, the topic at the center of this dissertation. As noted in the earlier theory 
chapter, Tuchman wrote, "news is an ally of legitimized institutions.” Strachan’s trade 
press reporting would suggest a refinement of Tuchman’s formulation: “critical news, 
warts and all, is an ally of legitimized institutions.” Strachan believed an industry was 
best served if journalism reported candidly on its bad actors, and his newspaper’s 
coverage of Paul and CenTrust was an expression of that viewpoint. Such coverage can 
allow the industry to police itself and evolve. This is a tradition of some of the best of the 








































What can other news media outlets and journalism scholars learn from the 
experience of the National Thrift News? How can this small newspaper’s experience 
translate to other publications, and to business journalism in general? This final chapter 
will discuss the findings of the dissertation and then describe the impact of the National 
Thrift News’ reporting. The chapter concludes with recommendations about ways 
business journalism can evolve and improve.  
Findings	
One central finding of this dissertation involves how agency and institutional 
factors combine to advance journalistic autonomy. First, the ownership structure of a 
publication is a significant factor. Strachan was co-owner of the paper, which allowed 
him greater control over the editorial product. He fought back efforts to cut staff during 
the savings and loan industry’s contraction. He took significant editorial risks with the 
Keating Five coverage and the examination of CenTrust and its ties to BCCI. One of the 
other owners and a main investor, Wesley Lindow, was a published financial writer as 
well. Lindow, a veteran banker, wrote Inside the Money Market, published by Random 
House in 1972, and also wrote a column called “Investors Corner” in National Thrift 
News in the 1980s.875 Epstein wrote about how media ownership is so important in 
shaping the final news product. Further, Epstein wrote how an employer’s viewpoints can 
                                                            
875 “Thomas Rollo v. John Glynn Et. Al. 020079-1982” (New York State Supreme Court, 
August 11, 1982), 12. 
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result in journalists aligning their views to those of their employer.876 Epstein elaborated 
on this idea:    
 
While undoubtedly there is some connection between what a 
newsman values and what elements of an event he chooses to 
emphasize or ignore, these values may come from the requisite of 
news organizations, rather than being deep seated individual 
beliefs or ideologies.877 
 
 
This ownership by a journalist allowed him to shape the culture of the newsroom. 
In the case of National Thrift News, all former employees agreed: National Thrift News 
was a “reporter’s paper” and Strachan created an environment where reporters were 
encouraged to pursue their own stories aggressively. This was an environment that 
supported individual agency for reporters, and such editorial freedom enabled Strachan to 
attract and grow talent. "When I said we were a reporter's paper, we brought the stories to 
the editors. Stan and Mark (Fogarty) always gave us carte blanche to do what we 
wanted," Muolo said.878 This is in sharp contrast to other newsrooms such as The Wall 
Street Journal, known for being run by teams of editors.879  
Further research is needed into other news organizations with business models 
similar to National Thrift News, where a journalist is co-owner. The research could 
determine if other publications enjoyed similar editorial autonomy. Certainly the 
literature suggests innovation and autonomy are more likely in smaller newsrooms and 
                                                            
876 Epstein, News from Nowhere, 1973. 
877 Epstein, News from Nowhere, 1973, 201. 
878 Muolo, Paul, Interview with Paul Muolo, October 19, 2014. 
 879 Dealy, The Power and the Money, 1993. 
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this is an encouraging idea considering many of the modern digital newsrooms are much 
smaller than their Industrial Era predecessors.880 This could apply to today’s small digital 
newsrooms, where considerable innovation is taking place. One promise of these 
newsrooms involves their small size and the potential for greater autonomy, assuming 
they are able to secure steady funding. Researchers could examine the new digital 
publications within the Investigative News Network, a confederation of nonprofit news 
outlets, now has 100 members.881  
One empirical measure of newsroom culture: Does the editor still report and 
publish news articles, and what is the nature of that reporting? Strachan set the tone in the 
newsroom with his reporting, which allowed him to remain in close contact with the most 
important players in the industry. Some of this was also by necessity, since National 
Thrift News was a smaller newspaper. The tone Strachan set with his reporting made an 
impression on his staff. "We who learned from him saw his persistence, his indefatigable 
energy when pursuing a lead,” Fogarty recalled. “We saw, and hoped to learn, his 
attentiveness to fact and detail, his quickness in turning a story around and his facility 
with the language of journalism.”882 Industry officials describe Strachan as a determined 
and prolific reporter. In 1992, after delivering a speech, economist David Olson recalled 
encountering Strachan. Olson wrote, “Stan stayed after and grilled (Olson) for two hours. 
All the questions were good and to the point … No other reporter had ever penetrated as 
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far or for so long.”883 Strachan described his reporting philosophy in editorials as well as 
in a C-Span appearance in 1989. He faulted the press generally for failing to challenge 
information provided by regulators, industry officials, and others. "We’ve been much too 
quick to accept the official version of things,” he said.884 
Another empirical measure of newsroom culture would be the news 
organization’s hiring practices. Strachan tended not to hire industry experts or veteran 
reporters, but instead hired young and aggressive reporters. This approach has some 
precedent in business journalism: Henry Luce hired non-traditional journalists and even 
poets to cover business for Fortune in the 1930s.885  Strachan’s method of training and 
mentoring reporters: leading by example. The National Thrift News offers important 
lessons for today's digital newsrooms. It sought to expand its influence — and thereby 
preserve its autonomy — by establishing a "brand" in the marketplace for this knowledge 
and using multiple communications channels to leverage that influence. Strachan did not 
just stick to print. The National Thrift News experimented with video news reports in the 
mid-1980s to gain additional advertising revenue for its coverage of industry 
conventions.  
Power	of	Professionalism	
The dissertation describes the power of the journalistic professional values and 
contends that great journalism can be produced in unconventional venues, ranging from a 
regional daily newspaper to a small trade newspaper. The political economy theory, 
                                                            
883 Olson, David, and Christine Clifford, “An Industry Remembers Stan 
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operating from its institutional tradition, would predict a different outcome, a more timid 
type of journalism unwilling to challenge its core advertisers and sources. The National 
Thrift News’ conduct can be explained on several different levels. First, Strachan and his 
business partners saw a market opportunity to provide straight, hard news about the 
savings and loan industry. Lindow and his partner John Glynn clearly saw a market 
demand for traditional hard news reporting on the industry. Their 1975 business proposal 
for National Thrift News said:  “Developments now taking place within the industry 
demand a publication with greater news reporting, national coverage and frequency than 
now exist in this industry.” 886 
 Industry officials valued this hard-edged style of reporting since it would help 
them identify problems and regulate their behavior. “He was truly a power to be reckoned 
with and he used it to educate thousands in the industry and push for appropriate 
reforms,” David Olson, a prominent industry economist formerly with mortgage giant 
Freddie Mac, wrote.887  
This raises a question about the political economy theory -- does it have a blind 
spot in its analysis of the relationship between reporters and the industry? Graham 
Murdock and Peter Golding suggest the political economy theory should better account 
for the importance of agency in the complex interplay between reporter and source. 
Murdock and Golding write: "The relationship between the material interests controlling 
the media and the cultural products they provide is a complex one, not explicable in terms 
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of conspiracy or conscious intent.”888 Kurt and Gladys Lang argue that Herman and 
Chomsky’s interpretation of political economy, with its embrace of the classic 
“transmission model” of communications, fails to account for the interactions at multiple 
levels when journalists have an adversarial relationship with sources.889 Perhaps Herman 
and Chomsky’s interpretation of political economy does not account for the industry’s 
desire for independent report that can help police bad actors. Further research on this 
point would be useful.  
 
Direct	Impact	
Assessing the impact of a newspaper’s work is complex. The direct effects would 
include cases were a news article helped launch a civil or criminal investigation that lands 
the subject in jail. For the purposes of this section, I am guided by Harold Lasswell’s 
linear media effects model, which describes how the news media’s role in society as 
contributing to social stability and performing a surveillance function.890 Another 
example of a direct effect would involve a news article that prompts a public official to 
take some new action, such as returning campaign contributions. Indirect effects would 
involve the influence reporting had on other journalists or regulators, and much of the 
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National Thrift News’ impact falls into this category. A discussion of the newspaper’s 
direct and indirect impacts on the savings and loan crisis follows. As described in the 
Keating chapter, mainstream and general business news outlets largely ignored the 
National Thrift News’ reporting on the savings and loan crisis. Yet the newspaper’s 
influence was evident in other ways. Mainstream journalists recognized and 
acknowledged Strachan and his newspaper for their work on the savings and loan 
reporting, primarily after crisis was at its peak. National Thrift News won the George 
Polk Award Financial Reporting for its 1988 savings and loan coverage, and the judges 
acknowledged the newspaper’s influence on other journalists: 
 
National Thrift News, a weekly trade publication for savings 
executives, found a new market last year — print and broadcast 
reporters anxious to understand a national story that seemed to be 
growing faster than the national debt. 
 The story - the demise of a significant segment of the savings 
and loan industry, initial government efforts to paper over the 
problem, and the ultimate realization that American taxpayers 
would absorb tens of billions of dollars of bad debt - became 
front-page and top-of-the-telecast news months after it was 
covered in the pages of National Thrift News. 
 Throughout the year, and especially in a remarkably complete 
and readable report in October, National Thrift News alerted 
those closest to the crisis of its immense implications in an 
impartial, credible and thorough manner. 
 National Thrift News has done itself proud and we are pleased 
to present it with the George Polk Award for Financial 
Reporting.891 
 
Columbia Journalism Review, Newsweek, and The New York Times were among 
those celebrating National Thrift News’ work on the Keating Five case, albeit long after 
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the newspaper published its exclusive stories.892 Strachan reacted to this praise in a 
matter-of-fact manner. He told The New York Times in 1990, if his newspaper ''wasn't 
way ahead of everybody else on this story, I'd be asking myself what was wrong… We're 
supposed to see the trends and have the best connections.’’893 It was highly unusual but 
not unprecedented for a trade publication to win a prestigious national journalism award. 
The American Banker, for example, won Gerald Loeb Awards in 1981 and 1983, and the 
trade publication Corporate Financing won Loeb awards in 1970 and 1973.894 Trade 
publications won Polk Awards six times between 1948 and 1987.895 Strachan was 
awarded the New York Financial Writers Association’s Elliott V. Bell lifetime 
achievement award in 1990 "for a distinguished career as a reporter and editor in 
financial journalism.” (The New York Financial Writers Association continues to award 
journalism students a Stan Strachan scholarship on alternate years.896) Other winners of 
the New York Financial Writers’ Association Elliott Bell award included business 
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journalists such as The Wall Street Journal’s Vermont C. Royster, television pioneer 
Louis Rukeyser, and personal finance columnist Sylvia Porter.  
Inside	Job	
One direct impact of the National Thrift News’ reporting was the publication of 
Inside Job, an award-winning book by Stephen Pizzo, Mary Fricker, and Paul Muolo.897  
It was one of the first books to argue the savings and loan crisis was a national 
phenomenon, in contrast to the prevailing view that it was a regional problem. Inside Job 
gained significant national publicity for its findings about organized crime links in the 
savings and loan crisis. “At nearly every thrift we researched for this book, we found 
clear evidence of either mob, Teamster, or organized crime involvement,” they wrote. 
“Only one conclusion was possible: The mob played an important role in the nationwide 
fraternity that looted the savings and loan industry following deregulation.”898 After the 
book’s release, the Federal Bureau of Investigation invited Pizzo and Muolo to the FBI 
Academy in Quantico, Va. to lecture about their findings. “That was quite an honor,” 
Muolo recalled. 899 
The National Thrift News collaboration occurred after Pizzo could not get The 
Wall Street Journal interested in following up on his reporting on Centennial Savings and 
Loan in nearby Santa Rosa, Calif. Journal reporter G. Christian Hill met with Pizzo and 
Fricker to discuss their Centennial investigation, and examined their notes and files. Hill 
                                                            
 897 Pizzo, et al., Inside Job, 1989.Pizzo was a National Thrift News correspondent, 
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could not get his editors interested in pursuing the Centennial story.900 “No national 
publication did a good job uncovering the savings and loan scandal. With us, it was a 
question of territorial imperatives. The Balkanized structure of the bureaus didn’t allow 
for national cooperation and coordination,” Hill told Francis Dealy.901 
The reporting for Inside Job began when Strachan sent Muolo to meet with Pizzo 
and Fricker in 1986 and discuss their reporting. The three soon agreed they had a national 
story and began pursuing leads from Texas to New York. With Inside Job, the authors 
presented an exhaustive, almost prosecutorial report to back up their theory that fraud and 
corruption were significant factors in the savings and loan crisis. The book described the 
dealings of 22 major characters and supplied the transcript of the Keating Five meeting 
with regulators on April 9, 1989. There are profiles of shysters and con-men, from 
developer Sid Shah in Sonoma County, Calif. to businessmen Don Dixon in Vernon, 
Texas to Mario Renda of Long Island. Kleege recalled watching Muolo as he worked to 
document some criminal behavior in the industry. “He spent a week tracing a check that 
had gone from some gangster to a savings and loan, Kleege said. “It was nose-to-
grindstone investigative journalism.”902  
The densely written and detailed account provided an indictment of the industry 
as well as financial deregulation. This is the book’s enduring value. The political 
dysfunction in Washington, regulatory gaps, and neoliberal ideology so richly described 
in Inside Job blew up again, 20 years later, in the 2008 financial crisis, an even more 
severe financial meltdown that triggered a major recession and put some 11 million 
people out of work. Students of contemporary financial crises can find valuable insight in 
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Inside Job as it documented a dangerous mix of ideology and deregulation operating in a 
corrupt political system. 
Several prominent journalists found Inside Job to be a significant and influential 
work on the savings and loan crisis. Warren Hinkle of The San Francisco Examiner 
wrote:  “When it comes to understanding the eighties, Inside Job plays the same role that 
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle or Lincoln Steffens’ The Same of the Cities did at the turn of 
the century."903 Jonathan Kwitny, a top investigative reporter for The Wall Street Journal, 
said, “Stephen Pizzo is the person most responsible for exposing what many consider the 
worst financial scandal since the days of the robber barons.”904 The book was a New York 
Times bestseller and winner of an Investigative Reporters and Editors award. Pizzo, 
Muolo, and Fricker spoke about their findings at journalism colleges, public policy 
forums, and on television shows such as Donahue and the McLaughlin Report.     
Indirect	Impact	
The National Thrift News had indirect impact in other aspects of the savings and 
loan crisis. One was on financial news broadcasts. Strachan began appearing on 
television in the late 1980s to discuss the savings and loan crisis, and was a regular guest 
commentator on CNN. As such, Strachan had a prominent voice through this cable 
channel and an indirect impact on the public debate about the savings and loan crisis. At 
CNN, veteran broadcasters Stuart Varney and Myron Kandel were among Strachan’s 
friends and admirers. “We had him on CNN frequently. He was so knowledgeable," 
Kandel recalled in an interview. Kandel, a pioneer in broadcast financial journalism, was 
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impressed by the quality of Strachan’s journalism and said he nominated him for a 
Pulitzer Prize.905  
Other evidence of indirect impact included Sen. Riegel’s decision to return 
$76,100 in campaign contributions from Keating and employees of American Continental 
Corp. in March 1988. He said at the time he wanted “to avoid the appearance of a conflict 
of interest,”906 which was the point of Strachan’s editorial and the Keating Five 
coverage.907 Riegel’s decision came seven months after the National Thrift News reported 
on the Keating Five meeting, but Detroit newspapers raised the issue in early 1988 and 
political opponents planned to raise the conflict of interest issue during his primary 
election.908 It is unclear if the Detroit newspapers knew of the National Thrift News 
reporting on Keating Five. DeConcini returned his contributions in September 1989, 
nearly two years after the National Thrift News report. 
There was some evidence congressional investigators were influenced by the 
National Thrift News reporting. Richard Lowy, in his recap of the S&L scandal, High 
Rollers, cited such an influence on the July 1990 U.S. Senate Judiciary subcommittee 
investigation led by former Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, an Ohio Democrat. “Most of what 
Metzenbaum’s subcommittee found out – at who knows what cost to taxpayers – had 
been published in the National Thrift News a year earlier,” Lowy wrote.909  In 1996, 
Strachan reflected on the impact of the paper’s Lincoln Savings coverage. “Four years 
                                                            
905 Kandel was unable to locate the nomination letter to the Pulitzer Prize board 
and there is no record of Strachan being a Pulitzer finalist. Kandel, Myron, Interview 
with Myron Kandel, July 13, 2015. 
906 Kleege, Stephen, “Lincoln Funds Returned,” National Mortgage News, March 
21, 1988. 
907 n/a, “Money & Politics,” National Mortgage News, September 28, 1987. 
908 Kleege, “Lincoln Funds Returned,” 1988. 
909 Lowy, Martin E. High Rollers : Inside the Savings and Loan Debacle, (New 
York: Praeger, 1991). 
 314 
after our stories appeared, a steady stream of "knowledgeable" regulators and legislators 
told a Congressional hearing that they first learned of Lincoln's condition from articles in 
this newspaper.”910  
Recommendations	
I want to provide journalists and educators with some insights from this research 
on ways to improve reporting and better connect with readers and viewers. The following 
recommendations are intended to add to an ongoing conversation about advancing the 
profession.  
Early Warning Journalism 
Investigative journalist Michael Hudson led the field with his reporting on the 
subprime lending abuses for the Roanoke Times of Virginia.911 He endorsed the idea of 
“preventative journalism,” or reporting that focuses on the internal watchdogs of the 
corporate world, such as the risk managers, quality control staff, internal fraud 
investigators, loan underwriters, and real estate appraisers. Hudson made a point to speak 
to these internal corporate watchdogs and found a pattern: “They did their jobs, they 
found fraud, they red-flagged it. But instead of being rewarded and promoted. . .  they 
were ignored, marginalized, harassed, demoted or fired, or some combination of the 
above.” Hudson said encouraging reporters to flag early warnings would provide an 
immense public service: “You may not always be able to completely stop bad practices or 
a meltdown from happening, but good, early, hard-hitting reporting can at least reduce 
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the level of damage, popping the bubble early or forcing bad actors to rein in their worst 
practices.” 912 
Set The Agenda 
Business journalists could adopt the format of popular “fact check” columns, used 
primarily in political reporting, and apply them to corporate announcements.913 Such 
columns can let journalists set the news agenda, tell readers what is important, and assess 
the level of misinformation coming from business leaders.914  
Combat Insularity.  
Many successful journalists work diligently to expand their contacts, diversity of 
sources, and to listen carefully to outside voices. A consistent criticism of business 
reporters is their over-reliance on market and business sources,915 which results in a type 
of intellectual capture of the industries they cover.916 Capture can happen when business 
journalists rely too heavily on securities analysts, regulators, and business executives and 
reporters begin to share their worldview. This capture problem, of course, is not unique to 
business journalism, as it is a source of criticism for political journalism and sports 
journalism.917   
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The dilemma of capture is a longstanding issue in business journalism. It has been 
blamed as a factor in business journalists missing major stories from the 1929 market 
crash to the savings and loan crisis to Enron. In 1938, for example, Harold Carswell 
criticized business reporters for relying excessively on the New York Stock Exchange for 
news.918 This critique about narrow sourcing continues today: "In comparison to their 
political counterparts, financial journalists use fewer sources per item, are more reliant on 
PR and they take less initiatives in contacts with sources.”919 Going outside the official 
sourcing channels can allow reporters to break news about systemic problems in the 
markets. Hudson learned about the subprime loan problem in his community from legal 
aid attorneys whose low-income clients were losing their homes due to foreclosure.920  
Workplace Culture 
Reporters should be alert to the culture and sociology of a business, and 
understand that dysfunction with an organization can spill out and cause public harm. 
Gillian Tett, now U.S. editor of the Financial Times, provided original and insightful 
reporting on how the dysfunction within large banks in London contributed to broader 
lending problems, an issue in the 2008 financial crisis. Tett, who holds a doctorate degree 
in anthropology, viewed the separate departments in modern banks -- the trading desks 
for bonds, commodities, and stocks -- as warring tribes. She wrote this conflict led to a 
breakdown in the bank’s risk management culture and was a cause for some of the major 
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trading losses.921 Donald MacKenzie made a similar observation, saying the media can 
play a useful outsider role examining the organization and identifying problems that 
specialists do not see.922 Reporters also should pay attention to workplace culture and the 
messages delivered by senior management. Journalist Bethany McLean, in her path-
breaking reporting on Enron and the 2008 financial crisis, found that stubbornness and 
excessive ambition were common traits of senior executives who led their organizations 
into disaster.923 The content analysis in this dissertation showed the character traits of 
Paul and Keating, such as their litigiousness and tendency to take significant risks, 
figured into later regulatory problems. The reputation of a firm is important and should 
be explored more carefully. 
Journalistic Ecosystem 
Business journalists can improve coverage by building on the strength of the 
existing media ecosystem. The watchdog function of the press works best when multiple 
media outlets recognize quality reporting and follow up with their own stories, helping 
bring about visibility and possible change regarding an issue. In this vein, National Thrift 
News often cited the important stories of other mainstream publications such as the 
Arizona Republic and the Orange County Register, two hometown papers for the Keating 
business empire. The content analysis did not reveal similar behavior by The Wall Street 
Journal or The New York Times. Some journalists in the trade press have been 
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performing an aggressive watchdog role for years and their findings can benefit the 
broader public, such as the work of Engineering News in the 1907 Quebec Bridge 
collapse. Their reporting “was an indictment on the entire profession” and helped lead to 
needed construction safety reforms. 924 Gussow observed one of the normative roles for 
the trade press is providing leadership function in their industries.925 Even early issues of 
the National Thrift News showed it was taking a leadership role by reporting on lending 
discrimination, a highly controversial issue for the thrift industry. The paper’s second 
issue, Oct. 14, 1976, reported on mortgage discrimination. A page one story on 
November 1976 previewed Senate redlining hearings.  Strachan wrote editorials about 
lending discrimination on December 9, 1976, and on April 14, 1977. Lending 
discrimination plagued the banking industry throughout the 1980s, and still does to this 
day. It gained considerable national attention in 1988 after the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution earned a Pulitzer Prize for its investigation on mortgage lending 
discrimination, a series that employed computer-assisted reporting techniques. 926 
A more contemporary example of the power of news media collaboration was the 
2016 reporting of the Panama Papers tax shelter investigation. The International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists worked to uncover tax shelters involving world 
leaders and celebrities in Russia, Iceland, Saudi Arabia, and China. The New York Times 
and Bloomberg News were not included in this project, yet both news organizations gave 
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Journalists’ illiteracy with numbers and market concepts are longstanding 
problems, dating back to the beginnings of modern business journalism.928 Many 
commentators have called for journalists to improve their basic financial skills. To see 
what a difference these skills can make, consider Stephen Pizzo’s training and how it 
helped him report on the crisis and write Inside Job. Pizzo was a real estate agent before 
becoming a journalist, which allowed him to conduct property research and trace 
financial transactions. Such skills allowed him to raise original questions about the 
transactions of Centennial Savings and Loan well before other media caught on. 
The need for basic accounting skills is a common theme in the professional 
development surveys. Fluency with these basic concepts allowed reporters at The Wall 
Street Journal to advance their coverage of CenTrust. The newspaper’s coverage in 1984 
warned about Paul’s unusual accounting practices, and these issues were the topic of a 
regulatory battle for the next several years.929 A 1989 Wall Street Journal story detailed 
the potential impact of new capital standards on the industry provided considerable detail 
about industry's woes, noting the capital levels of some 800 savings and loan associations 
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fell a total of roughly $20 billion short of required levels.930 Even a general orientation 
about the role and operations of accounting firms could have led to more aggressive 
reporting. For example, The New York Times reported in 1989 Keating’s company hired 
Jack Atchison, formerly a lead accountant for Lincoln’s outside auditors Arthur Young 
(now Ernst & Young), as a vice president of American Continental Corp.931 Such a hire 
suggested the outside auditing firm lacked the requisite independence from its client. This 
was a red flag that gained little attention until Atchison’s conflict and advocacy for his 
client were described in the House Banking Committee hearings.932 In addition to 
accounting training, business journalists should improve skills for handling large datasets 
and producing data visualizations. Such approaches can help provide better context about 
issues and improve reader engagement. 
The considerable criticism of the savings and loan crisis media coverage led to a 
debate about the role of business journalism in society.933 Journalist Diana Henriques 
cited the media failures in savings and loan episode as a call for more robust business 
journalism: “It took us far too long to connect the dots.”934 Such a theme was repeated in 
the analysis of media coverage of the technology boom in the late 1990s and the Enron 
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Corp. scandal in 2001.935 From this debate arose more professional development 
opportunities from groups such as the Donald W. Reynolds National Center for Business 
Journalism, founded in 2003 to improve business and economics coverage. The Reynolds 
Center, which funded research into business journalism and funded academic 
fellowships, provided resources in addition to existing professional training offered by 
the Society of American Business Editors and Writers and the Investigative Reporters 
and Editors Inc.936 Business journalism education has expanded at universities, although 
more work needs to be done.937 As Henriques wrote, “I submit that there is no form of 
ignorance more widely tolerated in the American newsroom than ignorance about 
business and finance.”938  
This project raised a host of issues about the relationship between mainstream 
news media and the trade press. Further areas of research could involve case studies 
about how other financial trade press publications influence the mainstream news agenda 
and whether these smaller publications provide adequate political and social context to 
their reports. Ragas’ work on intermedia agenda setting in business news is a useful point 
of departure for such a project.939  
                                                            
935 Sparrow, Uncertain Guardians, 1999; McChesney, “The Problem of 
Journalism” 2003. 
936 Disclosure: The author has received compensation from the Reynolds Center. I 
was a 2012 Reynolds Visiting Business Journalism Professor at the University of South 
Carolina and have been a paid speaker at subsequent Reynolds seminars. 
937 Pardue, Mary Jane, “Most Business Editors Find Journalism Graduates Still 
Unprepared,” Journalism & Mass Communication Educator, October 14, 2013. 
938 Henriques, “What Journalists Should Be Doing About Business Coverage - 
But Aren’t,” 2000. 
939 Ragas, M.W. “Intermedia Agenda Setting in Business News Coverage,” In 
Communication and Language Analysis in the Public Sphere. Information Science 
Reference, 335–57, 2014. 
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Urgency	of	Business	Journalism	
Changing and improving business journalism, and bringing it out of the backwater 
and into the mainstream of American watchdog journalism, is an urgent matter. The 
power and influence of large businesses and financial markets over American life has 
expanded dramatically in recent years as deregulation reduced the government’s 
oversight role.940 This deregulation and neoliberal ideology are encapsulated in the idea 
of an “ownership society,” an idea of individual responsibility advocated by Hayek, 
which later became a mantra for President George W. Bush’s administration. In an 
“ownership society,” for example, citizens initiate their own retirement planning 
decisions with little corporate or governmental support. This makes consumers more 
vulnerable to the market’s downturns and gains. To put it plainly, consumers are “on their 
own” when trying to navigate crucial investment decisions. Bush’s attempt to partially 
privatize Social Security in 2005 was an example of the ownership society at work. In 
this “ownership society,” the public is looking to the news media to help navigate 
investment decisions, understand how modern markets work, and identify the bad actors. 
Consumer demand for personal finance journalism, especially in the 1960s forward, 
provided some evidence the public turned to journalism for answers on how to manage 
their money.941 Hubbard in 1966 wrote about the "explosive demand for business news" 
in a survey of business and financial editors at daily newspapers,942 a trend that continued 
through the early 2000s. An editor of a New England daily newspaper noted "the experts, 
                                                            
940 Davis, Gerald F. Managed by the Markets: How Finance Reshaped America, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 193. 
941 Lucht, Sylvia Porter : America’s Original Personal Finance Columnist, 2013; 
Tofel, Restless Genius, 2009; Hubbard, Timothy W. “The Explosive Demand for 
Business News,” Journalism Quarterly, no. Winter (1966): 703–8. 
942 Hubbard, “The Explosive Demand for Business News,” 1966 
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political and economic, do not know the answers. Hence more people are looking for 
their own explanations and relying more on their newspapers to help them 
understand.”943 Generally speaking, the public still values the broader watchdog and 
investigative functions of journalism,944 which should encourage business reporters to 
continue their oversight of companies and markets. 
This is where business journalism must modernize and evolve. It faces continuing 
criticism that it has not fulfilled a watchdog role over the markets.945 An explicit 
watchdog role is not mentioned in the Society of American Business Editors and Writers 
mission statement or code of ethics.946 Henriques wrote the press is one of the remaining 
institutions left standing to counter the power of the complex markets and companies. 
 
Today, the voice of labor has been reduced to a whisper, the 
consumer advocates and other nonprofit guardians are scattered 
and poorly funded, government regulation has become a dirty 
word, and Big Business stands alone on the stage, free at last 
from any meaningful countervailing social or civic power—
except the power of the press. Business now dominates every 
corner of the world we cover to a degree that would have been 
unthinkable two generations ago.947 
 
                                                            
943 Hubbard, “Business News in the Post Watergate Era” JTW Hubbard, 1976, 
944 Pew Research Center, “Amid Criticism, Support for Media’s ‘Watchdog’ Role 
Stands Out,” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, August 8, 2013.  
945 Starkman, The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark, 2014; Stiglitz, Joseph E. Freefall : 
America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy, (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2010); Sparrow, Uncertain Guardians, 1999. 
946 “SABEW’s Code of Ethics,” Society of American Business Editors and 
Writers, Accessed September 24, 2014. 
947 Henriques, “What Journalists Should Be Doing About Business Coverage - 
But Aren’t,” 2000. 
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These financial problems will not be going away in our generation. We live in an 
era of financial turbulence due to the disruptions of technology, neoliberal ideology, and 
globalized financial markets.948 Since 1970s, the U.S. has suffered through the savings 
and loan crisis, the bursting of the technology stock bubble, and the 2008 financial crisis. 
Major frauds have occurred ranging from Michael Milken’s Drexel Burnham Lambert to 
Enron Corp. to Bernard Madoff’s investment scheme. The 2008 financial crisis was not 
an abstract exercise for ordinary Americans, as some 8.3 million people lost their jobs in 
2008-2009 and retirement savings accounts lost one-third of their value, or more.949 At 
the same time, institutional barriers to quality business journalism remain in place. The 
Reynolds Foundation and the American Press Foundation released a 2002 survey that 
found media executives gave business reporting a low priority and provided fewer 
resources and less attention than other beats in the newsroom.950 Business journalists 
need to band together to leverage their oversight power to serve the public interest. Part 
of that oversight function involves paying closer attention to quality trade journalism, 
which can be found in unlikely places such as the National Thrift News. Strachan 
articulated the path forward for the profession when he wrote: “We still have the strong 




                                                            
948 Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis,” 1982. 
 949 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 
2011. 
950 See Roush, Chris, Show Me the Money, 2004; Cited in Darie, Tatiana, 
“Lessons From the Financial Crisis: What Have We Learned? Business Journalists Speak 
Out,” University of Missouri-Columbia, 2015. 



























To examine media coverage of Keating and Lincoln Savings, database searches 
were conducted of the National Thrift News, American Banker, The New York Times, and 
The Wall Street Journal. The first case study analyzed coverage by the National Thrift 
News of the Keating Five scandal and compared it to The Wall Street Journal and The 
New York Times as well as a leading financial industry publication, the American Banker.  
The second case study examined the National Thrift News' coverage of Miami-based 
CenTrust Savings and Loan. The National Thrift News CenTrust coverage was compared 
to reports in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, the American Banker, and 
the former St. Petersburg Times, a significant regional newspaper that covered CenTrust 
from its beginning to its end. I first sought to examine CenTrust coverage in the Miami 
Herald, but full electronic access to Herald was not available on the University of 
Maryland’s library databases. The newspaper is not included in LexisNexis Academic. 
Factiva carries the Miami Herald only back to Oct. 7, 1994, well after the scope of this 
study. 
The content analysis examined 334 newspaper articles952 that mention the terms 
“Keating” and “Lincoln Savings” from January 1, 1986, to January 1, 1990, a period that 
represented the emerging fight between Keating and financial regulators and culminated 
with the U.S. House Banking Committee hearings shortly after Lincoln’s collapse. These 
congressional hearings on Keating and Lincoln in the fall of 1989 put the crisis on the 
                                                            
952 LexisNexis Academic was searched for the National Thrift News, American 
Banker, and The New York Times. Factiva was used for The Wall Street Journal as this 
newspaper is not in LexisNexis. The initial search yielded 363 articles, but 28 were 
rejected as they were brief digest or index items referring to longer articles in the same 
issue; calendar notices about upcoming hearings; items too brief for a full study; or 
otherwise not relevant to the study. 
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front pages of major newspapers. This time period also aligned with the peak of the 
savings and loan crisis. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. reported 48 thrifts failed in 
1987, 185 in 1988, and 327 in 1989.  
The second content analysis examined coverage of Paul and CenTrust from 1984 
to 1993 in five newspapers: National Thrift News, American Banker, The New York 
Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the St. Petersburg Times. The content analysis 
examines 516 newspaper articles953 that mention the terms “David L. Paul” and 
“CenTrust” or “David Paul” and “CenTrust.” The period of January 1, 1984 through 
December 31, 1993, covered the growth of CenTrust and then its decline, seizure by 
regulators, and Paul’s criminal trail and conviction. This time period also tracked the rise 
and the ebb of the savings and loan crisis.  
The case-study approach provided important insights about the media coverage of 
the savings and loan crisis, but like any study, it had its limits. The 334 Keating articles 
were a fraction of the total savings and loan coverage published in these four newspapers 
over the four-year period. While these findings speak to universal themes in coverage, 
they do not represent the entire universe of the savings and loan reporting. For example, a 
broader search for the term “savings and loan” yielded 23,797 articles in the National 
Thrift News, American Banker, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times 
between January 1, 1986, and January 1, 1990. As such, this dissertation did not capture 
the newspapers’ coverage of other thrift failures in the country, such as Texas and 
                                                            
953 After reviewing the initial results, I conducted four supplemental searches to 
gather articles on executive appointments, regulatory action and corporate earnings 
announcements that were not captured by the “David L. Paul” and “CenTrust” terms. 
These additional searches were necessary to ensure an accurate representation of the 
newspaper’s coverage of CenTrust. These details were described at the end of this 
section. 
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California, which escalated dramatically during this period and were an element of the 
savings and loan narrative. The depth of this content analysis, however, provided an 
important contribution to the academic research on business journalism and the savings 
and loan crisis.  
Both the Keating and Paul episodes were analyzed with the same codebook, 
which is appended at the end of this section.  In addition, the grounded method theory of 
content analysis is used, which resulted in additional codes to fill gaps in the Keating and 
Paul case studies and obtain the most accurate representation of these newspapers’ work 
on the story. These additions were described below. The following section spells out the 
method for analyzing the portrayal, narratives, and sourcing in both the Keating and Paul 
episodes.  
Keating	Portrayal	
This category measured whether Keating was portrayed in a positive, negative or 
neutral fashion in the news coverage. It helps answer RQ 1, how National Thrift News 
differed from the four newspapers in the Keating case and the five newspapers in the Paul 
case. A textual and rhetorical analysis was conducted of how Keating was described in 
each article. Adjectives, adverbs, and other descriptors were examined using a keyword 
search for “Keating.” The portrayals were reviewed for the immediate context in the 
paragraph containing “Keating” or immediate preceding or following paragraphs. This 
approach is in keeping with Neuendorf’s emphasis to maximize reliability and 
replicability by clearly defining the unit of analysis,954 which in this case would be the 
                                                            
954 Neuendorf, Kimberly A. The Content Analysis Guidebook, (SAGE, 2002), 12-
13. 
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immediate or companion paragraphs. This approach is consistent with Berelson’s 
writings that qualitative analysts should state as precisely as possible the relevant 
indicators in the particular context for the categories  in mind: “The analyst’s subjectivity 
must be minimized in the effort to obtain an objective description of the communication 
content.”955 In sum, readers should not have to hunt through the article to discern a 
negative portrayal. In developing this approach, I reviewed the discourse analysis 
approach to content analysis, which Neuendorf described as engaging “characteristics of 
manifest language and word use, description of topics in media texts, through consistency 
and connection of words to theme analysis of content and the establishment of central 
terms.”956 This method is intended to analyze manifest content, such as a literal reading 
the material, or “what you see is what you get,” versus an exploration of latent content, or 
“reading between the lines.” This approach is in keeping with face validity measurement 
concept to examine the passages “as freshly and objectively as possible.”957 This 
classification method was designed with empiricism and replication in mind. 958  
To develop and refine the definition of negative portrayal, I consulted research on 
measurement of negative portrayals in content analysis. Scharrer used a rating scale of 1 
to 5 to assess negative to positive tone in news coverage of Hillary Clinton’s U.S. Senate 
                                                            
955 Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, 1952, 171. 
956 Neuendorf, The Content Analysis Guidebook, 2002. 
957 Neuendorf, The Content Analysis Guidebook, 2002, 115. 
958 Some scholars do not believe content analysis should explore latent meanings. 
Berger cites one scholar’s objection: “If content analysis is the study of manifest content, 
… then how could the analyst possibly draw conclusions about the reader – actual or 
intended. To do so requires making assumptions and jumping to conclusions that cannot 
possibly be supported by the text.”  Berger, Arthur Asa, Essentials of Mass 
Communication Theory, SAGE Publications, 1995. For further discussion of manifest 
versus latent content, see Riffe, Daniel, Stephen Lacy, and Frederick Fico. Analyzing 
Media Messages : Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research, LEA’s 
Communication Series, (Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1998). 
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campaign. Coders rated an article “very negative” or a score of 1, if stories contained 
clear and blatant words used to connote a sense of disapproval or disregard, accusations 
or unflattering comments, or words or phrases that portrayed the subject in a bad light 
throughout.959 The Keating and Paul content analysis procedures followed a similar 
approach, but with a more detailed typology as described in the appendix. In assessing 
negative tone on coverage of the Occupy Wall Street movement, Cissel focused on 
conflict and a tone of downplaying or dismissal of the concerns of protesters.960 Measures 
of conflict were a central element of the Keating and Paul negative assessment below. 
Jamieson et al. surveyed approaches to content analysis of negative political 
advertising.961 Definitions of “negative” used in the Jamieson study were broad and 
lacked the precision necessary for this dissertation. For example, one category examined 
if political advertising focused on the candidate’s positive aspects or the opponent’s 
liabilities and faults. Others measured negative through a binary approach, with positive 
ads classified as focusing on the candidate and negative ads on the opponent. This 
approach lacked the linguistic precision needed in this dissertation. As a result, I 
developed a taxonomy of terms about normative values in the banking industry. 
In my approach, an article was coded as a negative portrayal if it described 
behavior that deviated from the norms of the banking industry, such as if Keating was 
                                                            
959 Scharrer, Erica, “An ‘Improbable Leap’: A Content Analysis of Newspaper 
Coverage of Hillary Clinton’s Transition from First Lady to Senate Candidate,” 
Journalism Studies 3, no. 3 (2002): 393–406. 
960 Cissel, Margaret, "Media Framing: a comparative content analysis on 
mainstream and alternative news coverage of Occupy Wall Street," The Elon Journal of 
Undergraduate Research in Communications 3, no. 1 (2012): 67-77. 
961 Jamieson Hall, Kathleen, Paul Waldman, and Susan Sherr, “Eliminate the 
Negative? Categories of Analysis for Political Advertisements,” In Crowded Airwaves: 
Campaign Advertising in Elections by James Thurber, Washington, D.C., United States: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 
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subject to regulatory action, violated banking industry norms, or was described as 
manipulating the regulatory process. A final frame involved whether Keating’s reputation 
amounted to guilt by association (terms are defined in the appendix). Articles were read 
in their entirety twice and were only given one portrayal code, positive, negative, or 
neutral, even if there were multiple positive or negative references. Articles with mixed 
portrayals were rare, and these were not coded. 
The portrayal typology is as follows: 
Regulatory	Action	Frame. This would include references to Keating under 
criminal investigation, the subject of regulatory enforcement actions, such as allegations 
of fraud, seizure of his thrift or a freeze of his bank accounts, or references to his 
bankruptcy filing. References to Keating’s involvement in an expensive thrift bailout, 
typically described as the largest S&L rescue ever, were coded as negative. For example, 
Keating’s decision to file for bankruptcy in April 1989 and the regulatory seizure of 
Lincoln Savings were coded as negative.  
Banking	Normative	Behavior	Frame. Other instances involved descriptions of 
Keating or his activities as “aggressive,” “risky,”  ”controversial,” “unsafe and unsound,” 
or “flamboyant” which would be outside the normative values of bankers.962 To establish 
normative behavior in the banking system, I consulted academic literature on business 
ethics and practices in the banking system. Fetiniuc wrote, "Ethics in the banking sector 
refer to the moral and ethical relations, but they are closely related to the legal norms that 
                                                            
962 Some of the normative values include accountability, transparency of 
operations, safe asset management, contributing to the safety and soundness of the 
financial system. Gumuła, Wiesław, “Banking and Ethics,” July 15, 2015. 
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comprise the banking legislation.”963 Her analysis emphasized an industry normative 
value of “fostering collaboration, avoidance and resolution of external conflicts of 
banks," norms that Keating and CenTrust’s David Paul violated with their constant 
litigation against regulators and industry actors. Fetiniuc cited several principles of 
banking ethics that include the “principle of business compromise and business 
tolerance” and thus seek "to harmonize conflicting interests of participants in the business 
process." Keating often violated these norms. Material describing Keating’s contentious 
relationship with bank regulators, which said he was “clashing” or “fighting” with the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, was coded as negative. A more neutral description of 
Keating as “an outspoken critic” was not coded as negative. The Federal Reserve Board’s 
“Commercial Bank Examination Manual” addressed normative behavior in a discussion 
of reputational risk, which "is the potential that negative publicity regarding an 
institution’s business practices, whether true or not, will cause a decline in the customer 
base, costly litigation, or revenue reductions.”964 Keating’s explicit attempts to 
manipulate the regulatory system through campaign contributions posed risks to the 
institutions’ reputation, for example. 
Manipulation	Frame. This included descriptions of Keating manipulating or 
attempting to manipulate the political and regulatory process. The text was scanned for 
the following descriptors of Keating’s activities: manipulate, control, influence, exploit, 
maneuver, engineer, steer, direct, rig, distort, alter, or change. One example included 
                                                            
963 Fetiniuc, Valentina, and Ivan Luchian, “Banking Ethics: Main Conceptions 
and Problems,” Annals of the University of Petrosani Economics 14, no. 1 (January 
2014): 91–102. 
964 n/a. “Commercial Bank Examination Manual,” Federal Reserve Board, 
October 2015. 
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references to Keating offering a job to Ed Gray in order to remove the regulator from his 
job; this was coded as negative since it represented Keating’s attempt to manipulate the 
regulatory process and was a form of bribery. References to politicians “under the spell” 
of Keating were coded as negative.  
References to Keating’s political contributions were not coded as negative unless 
the immediate context965 described a manipulation of the regulatory process or that his 
contributions were excessive or somehow violated industry norms. A simple description 
of Keating as “a major contributor to Republican candidates” was not coded as negative 
unless the reference showed Keating was trying to benefit his company.  
Guilt	by	Association	Frame. Other negative portrayals included suggestions of 
notoriety, such as references of someone’s association to Keating as if this mere existence 
of a relationship was newsworthy. For example, an article was coded with a negative 
portrayal when Sen. Riegle returned Keating’s campaign contributions; Keating’s 
reputation was so negative that a politician was compelled to return his money. Sen. 
William Proxmire’s opposition to Federal Home Loan Bank Board Commission nominee 
Lee Henkel, based on Henkel’s association with Keating, was coded as negative. This 
suggests Keating was somehow politically or ethically toxic. Any ambiguity or 
uncertainty about a negative portrayal was coded as neutral.  
                                                            
965 This refers to the paragraph or immediate preceding or following paragraphs; 
readers should not have to hunt through the article to discern a negative portrayal. 
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Paul	Portrayal.		
As with Keating, text and rhetoric were analyzed to measure whether Paul was 
portrayed in a positive, negative or neutral fashion in the news coverage.966 Negative 
portrayals were grouped in the same four frames as the Keating case study. Several 
elaborations and modifications specific to the Paul case are described below:  
a)Regulatory action. This refers to Paul being subject of regulatory enforcement 
actions, under criminal investigation, references to fraud allegations, or descriptions of 
Paul in jail or going to jail. Other negative portrayals included his inability to pay bills 
due to legal case from regulators. References to Paul’s involvement in an expensive thrift 
bailout were coded as negative. 
b) Violation of banking norms. The normative behavior of bankers described 
above also applies to Paul. Articles were coded as negative that describe Paul or his 
activities as “aggressive,” “risky,” “controversial,” “unsafe and unsound,” or 
“flamboyant.” Since conflict resolution and avoidance were banking industry norms, 
Paul’s contentious relationship with bank regulators were coded as negative. He also put 
the CenTrust brand at risk with his acquisition of the expensive artwork with bank funds. 
Paul also violated a banking industry norms by pushing the rapid growth of CenTrust. To 
federal regulators, fast growth at a bank has “long been viewed as a potential precursor to 
credit quality problems.”967  
                                                            
966 As with the Keating analysis, I examined the adjectives, adverbs, and other 
descriptors about David Paul. The portrayals were reviewed for the “immediate context” 
as the paragraph or immediate preceding or following paragraphs. The analysis focused 
on manifest content. 
967 n/a, “An Examiner’s Guide to Problem Bank Identification, Rehabilitation and 
Resolution,” (U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, January 2001). 
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c) Manipulation. Examples of Paul attempting to manipulate the political and 
regulatory process were coded as negative. Simple references to Paul’s political 
contributions were not coded as negative unless the immediate context described a 
manipulation of the regulatory process or that his contributions were excessive or 
somehow violated industry norms. A simple description of Paul as “a major contributor 
to Democratic candidates” was not coded as negative unless the reference showed Paul 
was trying to benefit his company.  
d) Guilt by Association. References to someone associating with Paul was coded 
as negative when the article described his reputation running a failed thrift. Other 
negative portrayals included suggestions of notoriety, as in the mere relationship with 
Paul was somehow newsworthy. For example, an article that described how Sen. Graham 
returned Paul’s campaign contributions was coded as negative.  
 e) Positive Portrayal. Examples of positive portrayal category included reporting 
that elevated Keating or Paul’s stature and emphasized their narrative without any 
rebuttal or element of skepticism. Put another way, it would involve a simple 
summarizing of a Keating or Paul press release or statement that spoke to growth of the 
business without any additional outside reporting to verify if this were the case. One 
example involved Keating’s claims that his purchase of Lincoln Savings rescued the 
bank; there was no attempt to verify such a claim, resulting in this article being coded as 
a positive portrayal. Another example involved coverage of Keating’s business plan 
without any mention of risks. Coverage of Keating or Paul’s civic engagement, kindness, 
generosity, or philanthropy fell under this category as well.  
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 f) Neutral Portrayal. Examples of neutral portrayal included references to Keating 
or Paul that did not contain value judgments about his activities or such a judgment was 
implied or suggested. “Free-market thrift executive” was one example.   
 g) Story Narratives. These following seven narrative categories emerged from the 
study of the savings and loan crisis history and news coverage of the Keating and Paul 
episodes. Coding articles with these narratives allowed for an in-depth comparison 
among the four newspapers and their coverage priorities and emphasis. A single article 
generally was coded with one narrative, although some articles have multiple narrative 
codes. 
 1) Accounting. The article primarily dealt with accounting issues involving the 
thrift industry. Accounting coverage was significant since many of the savings and loan 
frauds involved illegal inflation of property values, capital reserves, and similar 
measures. Subsequent analysis showed these loans were inflated and property values 
were far less than prevailing market rates.968 This code could overlap with “Regulation” 
below; an article coded with “Accounting” primarily focused on these issues whereas a 
“Regulation” code could involve accounting and other issues.   
2) Congressional Oversight. The article involved oversight of Congress in the 
savings and loan industry. 
3) Regulation.  The article primarily involved a dispute between a savings and 
loan executive and the regulator over rules to restrict investment options or how 
regulatory actions have devalued loan portfolios. These were key issues in Keating and 
Paul’s disputes with regulators. This code will overlap with FHLBB Leadership category 
discussed below but was a separate category to show when the media organizations 
                                                            
968 Curry and Shibut, “The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis,” 2000. 
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reported in significant depth. This code also captured a discussion of deregulation, a 
priority for the Reagan administration. This was a complex narrative filled with attempts 
by some regulators to crack down on thrifts’ egregious investments and behavior. 
4) Thrift Failures. This code described coverage of savings and loan failures 
besides Lincoln or CenTrust. Such a code was useful to analyze whether a newspaper 
was looking at broader industry issues. 
5) S&L Industry Trend. This code was used for articles that primarily reported on 
general trends in the S&L industry; Keating or Paul were not the focus of the lead 
paragraphs or the story but were mentioned in the material elsewhere. 
6) Politics. This code was used for articles that primarily focused on political 
campaigns or political issues, such as Keating or Paul’s contributions to candidates. 
7) Other. This code was used for articles that did not fit into any of the coding 
described above. 
Category:	Keating	Specific	Narratives	
These following codes describe other dominant narratives in the Keating coverage 
and help align the individually coded articles to the broader historical timelines about the 
savings and loan crisis. 
1) Elderly Bondholders. This code is used for articles that referenced elderly 
investors who lost money in American Continental Corp. bonds 
2) FHLBB Leadership. This codes was used for articles that described the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) leadership and their decisions. Keating had a 
significant fight with the FHLBB Chairman Edwin Gray, who sought to crack down on 
thrift industry abuses. Gray’s replacement, M. Danny Wall, was a deregulatory advocate 
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who accommodated Keating. This code will overlap with “Regulation” and this was 
necessary in order to provide more detail for the beat reporting analysis. 
3) Henkel. This code was for articles on the appointment of Lee Henkel to Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board. Henkel was pushed by Keating to advance a deregulatory 
agenda and to fight FHLBB Chairman Gray. 
4) Keating Five. This code described articles that mentioned the five senators’ 
meeting with Charles Keating.  
5) Lincoln Sale. This code described articles involving attempts to sell Lincoln 
Savings. 
6) Media Leak. This code was used when articled referenced media leaks, a 
source of friction between Keating and the regulators. 
Category:	Paul	Specific	Narratives	
1) BCCI. This code referenced CenTrust’s involvement in the international bank 
scandal of Bank of Credit and Commerce International or BCCI, a significant investor in 
CenTrust. 
2) CenTrust Expansion. This referenced articles that emphasize CenTrust’s rapid 
expansion, including merger announcements, new executives, and the new headquarters. 
3) CenTrust Decline. This referenced articles focusing on the thrift’s demise up to 
the Feb. 3, 1990, when it was seized by regulators. This code would also involve 
regulatory actions such as orders to suspend dividend payments, cease and desist orders, 
or earnings reports that emphasize losses. 
4) Faked biography. This referenced articles that described Paul’s faked 
biography.  
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5) Junk Bonds. This referenced articles that described risky debt financing at 
CenTrust.  
6) Opulence. This referenced articles that contained descriptions of a lavish 
lifestyle, including expensive art, yachts, or expensive meals. 
Category:	Beat	Reporting	
To measure beat reporting, the study tabulated the number of stories and their 
length, based on word count, devoted to the thematic topics above. Individual reporter 
bylines were examined to determine the number of people writing about Keating and 
Paul. The more articles by a single reporter would suggest they gained more depth in the 
topic. The number of corrections was tabulated. The coverage patterns were examined to 
determine “scoops” and which newspapers were first with a particular story, a common 
industry measure of how well beat reporters do their jobs.  
1) Earnings. Corporate earnings stories were examined closely to see if they 
repeated company announcements or provided additional context about the broader 
industry or skepticism about the company’s performance. 
2) Briefed. This measured articles in which Paul or Keating were referenced in 
package of briefs or a roundup.  
3) Long Form Journalism. This measured articles longer than 1,000 words or if an 
article employed investigative techniques such as analysis of corporate or regulatory 
documents. 
4) Legal Beat. This measured stories documenting the legal developments in the 
court fight with regulators.  
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5) Minor Mention. This coded articles that mentioned Paul or Keating in three 
sentences or less. This was designed to measure a passing reference. 
The CenTrust beat reporting analysis differed in one significant way from the 
Keating analysis. The initial review revealed gaps in the newspapers’ coverage of 
CenTrust due to the search terms, “David L. Paul” and “CenTrust” and did not fully 
reflect beat reporting on routine company announcements such as corporate earnings and 
executive changes. A second search was performed969 for these beat reporting topics 
only: the search was for “CenTrust” and “net income” or “Teti” or “Shealy” or “Ranieri.” 
This second search was necessary since the content analysis examined omissions in 
coverage. The second search captured 35 additional articles necessary for a complete 
analysis of beat reporting at these five newspapers. To assess the frequency and quality of 
the earnings stories, 176 CenTrust press releases were retrieved from the Business Wire 
and PRNewswire database from 1984 through 1994. A subset of this file contained 11 
CenTrust corporate earnings announcements, as well as the dueling releases between 
CenTrust and its regulators, described in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                            
969 To capture all earnings stories, an additional search was conducted for 
“CenTrust” and “net income” for all dates. This yielded added 25 earnings stories; for 
National Thrift News, six additional earnings stories; The New York Times, six stories; 
The Wall Street Journal, four stories; American Banker, four stories; and the St. 
Petersburg Times, five stories. One supplemental search was conducted to examine news 
coverage of the appoinment of Lewis Ranieri to the CenTrust board. The search was for 
“Ranieri” and “CenTrust,” all dates, for the five publications.This search yielded a single 
story in each of The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and American Banker 
about Ranieri’s appointment. There was no story about Ranieri’s CenTrust board 
appointment in either the National Thrift News or the St. Petersburg Times. An additional 
search was conducted for Teti and Shealy’s departures, and each of the newspapers 
carried an item. The search terms were (“Teti” or “Shealy”) and “CenTrust” and all dates. 
To capture stories about the bank being seized by regulators, an additional search was 
conducted for “CenTrust” in the January 30-February 10, 1990 time period. It yielded an 
additional story each for the American Banker and The New York Times. 
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Category:	Sourcing	
 The sourcing of quotes and other attribution practices were coded for each 
article and tabulated. This count of sourcing attributes allowed for examination of 
differences between the National Thrift News and other media coverage. This also 
measured reliance on official sources, identified as a problem for business journalism.970 
This tabulation of manifest content971 helped analyze the diversity of sourcing and 
reporting in the business news articles. As such, this survey can help answer RQ 4, the 
question about components of probing and critical business journalism, RQ 2, the 
exploration of the National Thrift News and the norms of trade journalism, and RQ 1, 
how the National Thrift News differed from mainstream publications. 
An article can contain multiple items from the list below: 
Analyst Source. Securities analyst. 
Anonymous Source. No individual identified. 
Consumer Source: A consumer group or individual customer. 
Editorial: Editorials or opinion articles on the topic. 
                                                            
970 Studies have shown newspapers’ heavy reliance on government and corporate 
sources. Culbertson studied use of unnamed sources and found federal sources were 20% 
of unnamed sources in news coverage and corporate sources accounted for 19%. 
"Technical and management people outnumbered those in the labor movement by about 
six to one.” See  Culbertson, Hugh M, “Veiled News Sources: Who and What Are 
They?” News Research Bulletin of the American Newspaper Publishers Association 3 
(May 1975): 24; Powell, Larry, and William R. Self, “Government Sources Dominate 
Business Crisis Reporting,” Newspaper Research Journal 24, no. 2 (2003): 97; Starkman, 
The Watchdog That Didn’t Bark, 2014; Kurtz, Media Circus, 1993. 
971 Manifest content refers to a literal reading of the material versus latent content, 
which requires interpretation. Berelson describes manifest as the denotative or shared 
meaning as opposed to connotative or latent "between-the-lines" meaning. Berelson, 
Bernard, Content Analysis in Communication Research, 1952. 
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Industry Source: S&L executives, analysts or others who make a direct living  
from the industry. 
Legal Source. Lawsuit, court record, judge, or jury only. Not attorneys. 
Legislative Source. Member of Congress, state lawmaker or other city-county 
elected official. 
Non-Industry Source: An independent academic or similar non-industry official. 
Other Media. A publication other than those under study. 
Other Source. A catchall for material not captured here. 
Regulator Source: Agencies such as the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
Note that a person quoted or cited several times in an article was coded only once. 
 
Category:	Sourcing	Specific	to	Paul	 	
The first review of the CenTrust and Paul articles led to creation of additional 
codes to better analyze and interpret sourcing of this episode. 
CenTrust Source. This code identified articles where David Paul or a CenTrust 
spokesman or official was cited as a source. 
Paul Quoted. This code was for articles containing direct quotations from David 
Paul. 





To assess RQ 2, National Thrift News’ trade publication status, the content 
analysis identified instances where the newspaper met or defied trade industry norms. 
These norms are described in Chapter 2, Norms of Business Journalism. Articles coded 
as “Trade Press Norms” would describe how the trade press played a functional or 
professional education role to assist a business grow. It could also use technical language 
specific to that trade or business. This code would be consistent with the trade press 
normative values described by Flynn (1944), who wrote such publications would help the 
markets and business community improve profits and "fostering commercial 
enterprise.”972 Articles were scanned for the following characteristics: 
1) Meets Trade Norms. The article contained jargon or technical language aimed 
at a specialized audience. An example would be a attributing a bank’s loss to the inverted 
Treasury yield curve, a technical measurement of bond market yields. It also examined 
lack of broader context on a particular story, especially if this context was reflected in 
competing news coverage. The articles were examined to determine if its primary 
purpose was to impart specialty knowledge to industry players or to inform general 
readers. 
2) Doesn't Meet Trade Norms. The article contained labor - management 
reporting, political coverage, general news, or coverage of crime, all trademarks of 
general news typically not covered in the trade press.973 
3) Trade Norms Unclear. It was unclear if an article did or did not fulfill classic 
trade press norms.  
                                                            
972 Flynn, “The Development of Business Papers in the United States,” 1944. 
973 See Elfenbein, Business Paper Publishing Practice, 1952. 
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Category:	Impact	
To assess RQ3, the impact of the National Thrift News’ reporting, the content 
analysis identified instances describing impact of its reporting. This was a very limited 
category that required an explicit description of impact. Examples would involve a 
newspaper’s articles cited by competing news media as a source or actions directly 
attributed to the reporting, such as a politician returning campaign contributions 
following critical news reporting. It was important to examine the impact of all four 
newspapers in order to make any valid claims about the National Thrift News’ coverage 
of the Keating and Paul episodes. 
1) Impact_NTN: This measured instances where National Thrift News articles 
were cited by competing news media as a source or actions directly attributed to the 
reporting, such as a politician returning campaign contributions following critical news 
reporting. 
2) Impact_WSJ: Instances where other media credited and followed up on The 
Wall Street Journal articles. 
3) Impact_NYT: Instances where other media credited and followed up on The 
New York Times articles. 
4) Impact_AmBkr: Instances where other media credited and followed up on 
American Banker articles. 
To assess RQ4, the elements of a critical business press, the analysis examined 
beat reporting on earnings and company announcements to see if the newspapers 
provided additional context about trends concerning the company and the savings and 
loan industry. In other words, did they go beyond the press release? One example would 
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be CenTrust reporting losses from its bond trading: did the article then describe the 
broader controversy about junk bonds in the industry? The analysis also measured which 
newspapers warned about the emerging problems in CenTrust’s business model, such as 
its trading in securities and junk bonds. The analysis looked for when the newspapers 
published investigative or long-form articles that placed company developments into 
broader context. Such articles, more than 1,000 words, involve investigative reporting 
techniques, such as use of complex or confidential documents, multiple interviews with a 




Coding Sheet for Keating, Paul Content Analysis 
  
 
 Unit of Data Collection: News articles 
All items coded by the author. 
  




Regulatory Action Regulators undertaking or have undertaken the following: seizing a thrift, filing charges, assessing fines or taking 
similar enforcement action against an institution. 
Banking Normative Behavior 
Descriptors such as “aggressive,” “risky,”  
”controversial,” “unsafe and unsound,"  "embattled," 
“flamboyant." Behavior that results in a negative 
reputation, such as an arrest or assault. References to 
filing for bankruptcy or involvement in S&L bailout. 
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Manipulation 
Sought to influence public policy process through 
campaign contributions in direct exchange for personal or 
immediate business advancement. Examples include 
advocating for appointment of regulators who would not 
enforce rules. Attempts to remove or undermine 
regulators who are enforcing rules. The text was scanned 
for the following terms as descriptors of Keating’s 
activities: manipulate, control, influence, exploit, 
maneuver, engineer, steer, direct, rig, distort, alter, or 
change 
Guilt by Association 
Suggestions of notoriety, such as references of someone’s 
association to Keating / Paul as if this mere existence of a 
relationship was newsworthy. Examples include articles 
about political campaigns and association with 
disreputable bankers. Revelations of a relationship that 
causes action, such as returning campaign contributions. 
 
 Category: Positive Portrayal 
Positive Portrayal 
Articles that elevate stature and emphasize his narrative 
without any rebuttal or element of skepticism. Articles 
that portray business in a positive light without any 
interviews from outside commentators or similar industry 
context. References to civic engagement, kindness, 
generosity or philanthropy. 
  
Category: Neutral Portrayal 
Neutral Portrayal References that do not contain value judgments about his activities or such a judgment was implied or suggested. 
  
Category: Story Narratives 
Accounting 
Article primarily deals with accounting issues at the 
banks 
Congressional_Oversight. 
Congressional hearing, report or article primarily focused 
on work of Congress 
Regulation. Regulatory actions and behavior, from rulemaking to enforcement. 
Thrift_Failures. Details about thrift failures besides Lincoln, CenTrust 
S&L Industry_Trend. 
Broader industry trends described in more than one 
paragraph 
Politics 
Article primarily focused on political campaigns or 
political issues 
Other Themes that do not fit into the categories above 
  Keating Specific Narrative Codes 
Elderly Bondholders 
Articles referencing elderly investors who lost money in 
American Continental Corp. bonds 
FHLBB_Leadership. Addresses Edwin Gray or Danny Wall’s leadership initiatives 
Henkel References to appointment of Lee Henkel to FHLBB 
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Keating_Five References to the five senators meeting on Keating's regulatory problems. 
Lincoln_Sale Attempts to sell Lincoln Savings from 1987 forward 
Media Leak Measures references to a media leak in the article. 
  
 
 Paul Specific Narrative Codes 
BCCI 
One paragraph or more referencing Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International 
CenTrust_Decline 
Coverage of the thrift’s demise up until the Feb. 3, 1990 
seizure by regulators. This would involve regulatory 
actions such as orders to suspend dividend payments, 
cease and desist orders 
CenTrust_Expansion 
Coverage of the thrift’s rapid expansion, primarily 
through 1988 
Faked_Biography Coverage of Paul’s faked biography 
Junk Bonds 
References to risky debt financing at CenTrust, which 
was financed by Michael Milken in many instances 
Opulence 
References to purchases of art, yachts, large houses, 
expensive meals 
 
 Category: Beat Reporting 
Author Number of stories by individual author 
Briefed 
Articles where CenTrust or Paul are referenced in 
package of briefs or a roundup. The item was newsworthy 
but not the subject of a standalone story. 
Earnings Corporate earnings articles. 
LongForm 
Articles longer than 1,000 words and / or employ 
investigative techniques such as analysis of corporate or 
regulatory documents 
Legal_Beat 
Stories documenting the legal developments of Paul’s 
court fight with regulators. This measures some of the 
detail the newspapers were willing to devote to the 
CenTrust story. 
Minor Mention A mention of 3 sentences or less in a broader story. A passing reference 
 
 Category: Sourcing 
Analyst_Source 
Securities analyst, industry consultant or person who 
speaks about general industry/economic trends. 
Anonymous_Source. No individual identified in text 
Consumer_Source 
A group representing consumers' interests, such as 
Consumer Union or AARP, or individual customer. 
Editorial 
Newspaper editorial or opinion-page article. Not a news 
story 
Industry_Source 
S&L executives, analysts or others who make a direct 
living  from the industry 
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Legal_Source Lawsuit or court record 
Legislative_Source Member of Congress, state lawmaker. 
NonIndustry_Source An independent academic or similar nonindustry official. 
Other_Media A publication other than those under study 
Other_Source A catchall for material not captured here. 
Regulator_Source 
Agencies such as the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corp. 
  Sourcing Specific to CenTrustPaul 
CenTrust Source 
David Paul or a CenTrust spokesman or official cited as a 
source 
Paul Quoted Direct quotations from David Paul 
 
 Category: Trade Press Norms 
 
 Meets Trade Norms Functional role: assist business or professional education 
Doesn't Meet Trade Norms Labor - management reporting, political coverage, general news crime. 
Trade Norms  Unclear Unclear if an article does or does not fulfill classic trade press norms 
 
 Category: Impact 
Impact_NTN 
Instances when National Thrift News is cited by 
competing news media. Articles prompt action, such as a 
politician returning campaign contributions following 
critical news reporting. 
Impact_WSJ Citations or action based on The Wall Street Journal articles. 
Impact_NYT Citations or action based on New York Times articles 

















Figure 24. Major coding, CenTrust sourcing. 
Total	
Articles
Regulator Analyst Industry Anonymous CenTrust
Paul-
Quoted
American	Banker 59 29 12 20 5 45 9
National	Thrift	News 86 76 7 15 9 45 21
New	York	Times 61 44 15 13 1 19 13
St	Petersburg	Times 219 148 26 87 0 162 25
Wall	Street	Journal 86 59 10 53 5 53 8










American	Banker 9 3 4 0 0 2 0
National	Thrift	News 26 14 11 0 0 6 2
New	York	Times 3 11 11 3 0 2 14
St	Petersburg	Times 127 20 25 0 15 21 28
Wall	Street	Journal 17 15 14 0 6 5 15
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